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Abstract 
 
The enactive, embodied approach to cognition gives us new ways of looking at the 
situatedness of our cognitive processes. Enactivism views cognition in terms of 
multiple nested processes spanning brain, body, and world. In contrast to more 
conventional computational or representational accounts of cognition, enactivism 
emphasizes the non-reductive nature of cognition through its interdisciplinarity and 
advocation for dynamical rather than mechanistic explanatory models. Using this 
framework, I explore the fertile ground at the crossroads of situated cognition, 
feminist theory, and epistemology. I first argue that the enactive approach provides 
better resources for discussing epistemic situatedness, as discussed in feminist 
epistemology and philosophy of science, than computational approaches to 
cognition. In the following chapter, I demonstrate the connections between critical 
social epistemology and the enactive approach to language through a discussion of 
epistemic agency. Next, I offer a way of thinking about how gender influences agency 
in the phenomenological sense by discussing the dynamics between our minimal and 
narrative senses of agency. The next chapter provides a more sustained argument for 
a non-representational approach to the formation and fulfilment of intentions, making 
new connections between perception, affordance relevance, and language skills. In the 
following chapter, I make the case that recent accounts of social affordances in the 
ecological-enactive literature offer limited resources for explaining 
how marginalization influences affordance perception.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introducing the Thesis 
 
 My thesis examines enactive cognition through the lens of feminist philosophy 
of science and epistemology, and vice versa. Enactive cognition is at the forefront of 
a sea change in the philosophy of cognitive science. The received view of cognition as 
a computational, representational, and reducible brain-bound process has been 
challenged by a family of approaches known together as e-cognition. These enactive, 
embodied, extended, embedded, and ecological approaches differ in their 
commitments, but all share the view that cognition often or always involves more than 
what is going on in the head. 
 Initially, I intended for my thesis to argue that insights from feminist philosophy 
of science can and ought to be brought to bear on enactive understandings of 
cognition. Considering the wealth of literature in feminist philosophy I was able to 
find in epistemology, metaphysics, and many subfields of the philosophy of science, I 
was disheartened when I found only a handful of such linkages between e-cognition 
and feminist theory. I wanted to provide a number of arguments to the enactivist 
community explaining why feminist theory is relevant, crucial even, for our research.  
 I am pleased to say that I did not write that thesis. I ultimately decided to just 
go ahead and make these linkages, as a philosopher of enactive cognitive science, 
rather than dedicate my thesis to justifying a project that I didn’t think needed 
justification. This thesis is thus a collection of contributions to what I call feminist 
philosophy of e-cognition.1 All chapters but one explicitly connect feminist theory and 
enactivism, and the chapter that doesn’t specifically address feminist theory addresses 
a gap illuminated through my other work (and with an eye toward providing resources 
for future work on lived identities).   
 Feminist scientists and philosophers of science have brought attention to the 
ways in which gender biases and tropes make their way into empirical research, 
addressed the situatedness of scientific knowledge, examined how gender is obscured 
                                                   
1 Some contributors might include Michele Merrit, Hanne De Jaegher, Anne Jaap Jacobson, 
Michelle Maiese, Elena Cuffari, and Victoria Pitts-Taylor.  
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or ignored in scientific practice, problematized the treatment of gender as an isolated 
axis of investigation, proposed alternative scientific methods and theories, and much 
more. All of this contributes to better scientific practices and better philosophy of 
science. The philosophy of cognitive science should be no different. 
 In practicing feminist philosophy of science, my aims are political as well as 
epistemic. Importantly, I wanted to have the resources for talking about how gender 
shapes experience in a way that respects agency and foregrounds gender identity. As a 
non-reductive approach to cognition, enactivism provides resources for thinking 
about how gender shapes cognition without having to ground those differences in 
social structures or neurobiology. My work here is thus focused on looking at how the 
enactive cognitive framework can be adaptable, inclusive, and able to provide 
resources for resisting essentialist ideologies and transforming oppressive social 
structures.  
 
1.2 Key Concepts 
  
This section provides a brief introduction to some key concepts and discussions in the 
relevant literatures. First, I give a short primer on enactive cognitive science. I then 
give a brief overview of some themes and discussions in feminist philosophy of science 
and epistemology that have structured my approach to doing feminist philosophy of 
e-cognition. I then provide a brief case study to illustrate the methodology and ethical 
importance of using a non-reductive naturalism to talk about gender issues.  
 
1.2.1 Enactive and Embodied Cognition  
 
 Enactivism is a non-reductive approach to cognition. Rather than looking for 
explanations of cognitive phenomena by focusing solely on the brain, enactivism 
posits that cognition is a dynamic process involving the active relationship between 
the organism’s brain, body, and environment (Thompson 2007, Di Paolo et al. 2018). 
Drawing much from the phenomenological tradition and grounded in the autopoietic 
notion of organismic self-production, enactivists hold that cognition is a “relational 
domain enacted or brought forth by [a] being’s autonomous agency and mode of 
coupling with the environment” (Thompson 2007, p. 13). Enactivism takes as its 
starting point organismic processes of self-maintenance, which provide the basis for 
how an organism experiences the world—imbued with significance. 
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 This is in contrast to the cognitivist view of cognition, which employs what has 
been called a ‘sandwich model’ of cognition (Hurley 1998), explaining cognition in 
terms of inputs-processing-outputs. The processing here involves the manipulation of 
representations, even if understood minimally as the “neural, maplike representations 
of relevant facts that constitute normal conditions on the performance of [targeted] 
functions” (Millikan 1984). Enactivists eschew this schema in favor of the view of 
cognitive processes as exercises of “skillful know-how in situated and embodied 
action” (Thompson 2007, p. 13).  The world appears as it is relevant to the organism 
in ongoing activity, not as it is passively received, processed, and then acted upon. 
Cognition is the active, relational process of an autonomous organism enacting a world 
that is always already relevant to it through its processes of production and 
maintenance. As such, enactivists favor the explanatory models of dynamical systems 
theory, which can include multiple agent and environmental variables over functional 
or mechanistic explanations or models (Chemero 2008, Meyer 2018).  
 Assumed in enactivism is the theory of embodied cognition, which broadly 
holds that cognitive processes constitutively depend on the body. We perceive and 
interact in the world in ways that are specified through our capacities as embodied 
agents, disclosed through embodied interactions with others, and habituated through 
embodied action and interaction (Gallagher 2005). This is closely related to the idea of 
affordances as used in ecological psychology, a close cousin of enactivism. On this 
view, much like with enactivism, the organism seeks out what is relevant information 
in the environment, bringing forth the world in activity. Developed by James Gibson 
(1977), the ecological approach holds that the main object of perception is affordances, 
or possibilities for (inter)action. Affordances are not explanatorily reducible to the 
environment or the agent, but are a complex of the agent-environment relationship. 
The ‘information’ sought by the agent is not to be conceived of in representational 
terms, but rather as ‘information-for’ the organism as specified in the relationship and 
through prior habits of interaction (Segundo Ortin et. al 2019).  
 
1.2.2 Doing Feminist Philosophy of Science & Epistemology  
 
 Feminist philosophers of science, like Sarah Richardson, and scientists, such as 
neuroscientist Gillian Einstein (2012), use feminist theory in a critical or informative 
sense “to produce more accurate and more empirically adequate knowledge” 
(Richardson 2013, p. 197). For example, Richardson explains how the influence of 
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feminist thought in biology, spearheaded by Jennifer Graves, led to a revision of the 
understanding of genetic sex determination as involving a genetic cascade rather than 
a ‘master gene’ (Richardson, 2013). Problems arise when gender assumptions become 
a factor where they don’t belong, or in such a way that they do not reveal the truth, 
but obscure it. Helen Longino’s earlier work states that the goal of a feminist 
epistemology or philosophy of science is to “reveal or prevent the disappearing of the 
experience and activities of women and/or [to] prevent the disappearing of gender” 
(Longino, 1994, p. 50). In other words, Longino’s claim advocates for not ignoring or 
avoiding the ways that gender is ubiquitous in our lived experience, social lives, and 
relationships.  
 Feminist epistemology has been largely occupied with ways that traditional 
epistemology has occluded or denied the social aspects of knowledge production, 
especially the social position (or situatedness) of the knower. Debates in this area 
include: how knowledge and knowers are situated (Haraway, 1988; Nelson, 1990); who 
it is that knows (Nelson, 1990; Tollefsen, 2004); the politics and boundaries of 
situations; the role of identity in standpoints (Alcoff, 2006; MacKinnon, 1989); and 
epistemic resources and injustices (Dotson, 2014; Fricker, 2007). Various theorists 
(Harding, 1986; Intemann, 2010) have usefully divided feminist epistemology into 
three general approaches: feminist standpoint theory, feminist empiricism, and 
feminist postmodernism. To be clear, there is no consensus amongst feminist 
epistemologists on the best way to integrate or understand either the sociality of 
knowledge production or what it is for a knower to be situated.  
 In a patriarchal society where gender inequality is the norm, women and those 
with atypical gender identity or atypical gender/sex relationships could have 
perspectives that give them an advantage in producing accurate knowledge about the 
structures of that oppression and the ways in which it manifests. This is the central 
tenet of contemporary standpoint theory: that oppressed or marginalized groups may 
have a privileged epistemic standpoint in regard to some phenomena. A standpoint, 
however, is not merely given by social position, but achieved through collective 
awareness (MacKinnon 1989) and/or consciousness-raising (Collins 1991, Wylie 
2003).  
 Standpoint theory has been influenced by postmodern theories that encourage 
a healthy skepticism towards absolute knowledge and objective truth. This is not to 
say that this necessarily amounts to a wholesale rejection of truth or objectivity, but 
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that postmodernism has encouraged epistemologists and others to give attention to 
the practices, language resources, methods, contexts, institutional structures, and other 
elements of the system(s) that constitute or contribute to the conditions for the 
possibility of truth. Such considerations, along with the acceptance of the 
contingencies of social location and identity, cast doubt on the individualistic 
ideologies of traditional epistemology while working well with naturalistic, holistic, and 
social approaches (Alcoff 2010).  
 Some standpoint theorists have suggested that those occupying different 
standpoints may have differing cognitive styles (Collins 1991). These differences 
reflect elements of the social location, norms, and roles that define or constitute the 
standpoint; no essentialist claims about sex difference are being made in these 
generalizations. As Alison Wylie points out, it is unlikely that anyone in the field would 
argue that there are essential features of individuals that alone contribute to a collective 
standpoint (Wylie 2003). To make essentialist claims in explaining what constitutes a 
standpoint not only ignores the collective aspects of standpoint building and 
achievement (Wylie 2016), but it confuses the connection between lived identities and 
the contingent social elements and expectations attributed to them.  
 The need to do better science and epistemology, where this means exhuming 
aspects that support or otherwise reflect the interests and values of dominant groups 
and their ideologies, here encounters a worry: the problem of bias. Kristin Rolin (2006) 
describes the paradox of bias as emerging from the tension between the belief that 
some perspectives are better suited to provide knowledge about phenomena (such as 
structural oppression) than others, and the belief that there is a way to evaluate this 
advantage that doesn’t inherit the same concerns about the influence of values and 
ideals. Louise Antony’s solution to the paradox, for example, relies heavily on 
cognitivist frameworks. She handles the paradox by dividing biases into native biases, 
which are good for knowledge production, and acquired biases, which may or may not 
be good for knowledge production. This also relies on a specific notion of objectivity, 
which for her is a notion attributable to an individual’s belief (Antony 2002). As 
Antony puts it, our conception of objectivity should be of information that includes 
nothing but the (perceptual) facts processed by the cognitive biases, such as induction 
and inference, that contribute to getting us closer to the truth (Antony 2016). She 
believes, taking from Quine’s understanding of a naturalized epistemology (Quine, 
1969), that there are native and acquired cognitive mechanisms at work which make 
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intelligible the huge amount of perceptual data that we encounter. Should these 
mechanisms act on this data using problematic acquired biases, such as gender and 
racial prejudice, the beliefs produced are not objective. On Antony’s account, feminist 
inquiry should aim to point out where gender biases have been incorporated into a 
knowledge claim in such a way that they contribute something other than the facts 
relevant to making a determination. 
 Using this approach to solve the paradox of bias couches epistemic situatedness 
in terms of the relationship between social location and epistemic access, reducing the 
importance of representative communities to individual biases or amelioration of bad 
individual biases. This avoids making essentializing claims while also preserving a 
strong, individualistic notion of objectivity. However, the classical computationalist 
framework used by Antony has been increasingly put under pressure by arguments in 
philosophy of mind and advances in the cognitive sciences. Specifically, the input-
output model of classical cognitivism used by Anthony to provide a way of explaining 
epistemic access has been problematized (Clark, 2016; Stewart et al., 2010).  
 While there is general acceptance of empirical success as a marker for truth 
(Longino 2002), reductive or individualized conceptions of objectivity have also been 
put under increasing pressure in feminist empiricism. Social empiricists like Lynn 
Hankinson Nelson (1990) and Helen Longino (1994) root objectivity in the 
community. For both, objectivity is a social virtue; that is, it is something attained or 
practiced by groups. Objectivity on this conception is practiced by groups, and makes 
them more capable of recognizing and working towards the removal of the types of 
biases (for example, prejudicial biases) that hinder scientific aims than individuals 
(Intemann 2010).  
 On both accounts, the social position of the individual still matters in 
understanding the contribution made to achieving objectivity. On the social account, 
demographic diversity contributes to attaining objectivity because the research 
community is better equipped to point out the ways that the interests and values of 
the dominant groups might be included in research and inquiry. However, this is not 
necessarily so, as those with standpoints or expertise that offer better perspective from 
which to gauge the ways in which the values and interests of the dominant group(s) 
affect research and/or research paradigms (Antony, 2016; Harding and Vassallo, 2001) 
may still not be included, or those with standpoints may be subject to epistemic 
oppressions, such as epistemic silencing (Dotson 2012).  
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1.3 A New Naturalism? Situating Scientist and Subject 
 
 Because of its commitments to a non-reductive approach to cognitive science 
and its incorporation of phenomenology, enactivism has had to contend with claims 
that it does not adhere to a proper methodological naturalism. The conception of 
methodological naturalism often found in philosophy sees scientific programs as 
looking for isolatable, or ‘atomistic’, functions or mechanisms to explain phenomena 
or behavior, and thereby providing explanations free from subjective influence. Shaun 
Gallagher (2019) poses that the ideal of classical science as free from subjective 
elements might be more of a philosophers’ depiction than a reflection of practice, 
where a scientist or researcher must account for “precisely what she has done in setting 
up the experiment—she has to include her own actions” (p. 126). Rather than aiming 
to take the scientist or researcher out of nature, Gallagher argues that we need to revise 
our conception of nature, “where nature is not independent from the perceiver or the 
agent” (p. 130). He advocates for recasting the scientific picture of nature in a non-
reductive way, so that we can have “a conception of nature that allows for irreducible 
structures” (p. 133).2 Using Einstein’s situated neuroscience as an example (2012), I 
will expand on two lines of thought in Gallagher’s (2019) paper: (i) that there are 
irreducible aspects of lived experience through which our relations with the world take 
on significance particular to subjects (both practitioner and subject of study), and (ii) 
that taking these aspects into account can lead us to develop more fruitful scientific 
practices. 
 Concerns about irreducibility and the relationships between gender, 
embodiment, and experience have been raised by feminist phenomenologists and 
philosophers of science in arguing that the objectification of nature in the hard 
sciences, as described by Gallagher, is neither truly objective nor good scientific 
practice (see Harding 1991, Longino 1990). Feminist scientists and philosophers of 
science have also long discussed the importance of taking situatedness into account in 
order to ‘reveal or prevent the disappearing of the experience and activities of women 
and/or [to] prevent the disappearing of gender’ (Longino 1994, p. 450). Recent work 
                                                   
2 The majority of section 1.3 of the introduction was previously published as:  
 
Brancazio, N. (2018) Irreducible Aspects of Embodiment: Situating Scientist and Subject, Australasian 
Philosophical Review, 2:2, 219-223.   
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in neurofeminism demonstrates the ongoing problems encountered in scientific 
explanations that attempt to cash out gender differences in terms of sexed brains or 
functions (Fine 2011). Considerations such as these add a compelling ethical 
dimension to Gallagher’s invitation to re-envision the concept of nature as specified 
by what he calls ‘science in its classic form.’  
 While Gallagher’s concern stems from commitments to a non-reductionist 
phenomenological program, the call for a non-reductionist approach to cognitive 
science could benefit from attention to the innovative research being done by feminist 
scientists, such as Gillian Einstein (2012) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2016), through 
the use of pluralistic methodologies.  
 So as to avoid any ambiguities, it is important to clarify in what sense it is that 
irreducibility is being used. While Gallagher states that he is focused on issues with 
Nagelian, or intertheoretic reduction, McGivern (2019) points out that there are other 
senses of reduction that could also be important in calling for a non-classical 
conception of nature, such as reductions to causal mechanisms and functional roles. 
Gallagher seems unlikely to object to this, as his point is not to claim that subjectivity 
is only intertheoretically irreducible (or that any kinds of irreducibility are mutually 
exclusive). Gallagher’s main target, though, is not reductionism, but a scientific 
naturalism that demands reductionist methods and explanations. While subjectivity 
may be irreducible on his account, this only serves to scaffold his argument that 
subjectivity ought to be centralized in our re-conception of nature, naturalism, and 
science.  
 Rather than focus on the irreducibility of subjectivity in general, I will be 
concerned with the importance of the incorporation of subjectivity in scientific 
methodologies and practices. I will use as an example Gillian Einstein’s (2012) 
triangulation of methods (first-person, third-person, and physiological) in studying the 
effects of female genital cutting (FGC) on the central nervous system of a specifically 
situated sociocultural group (Somali-Canadians). Einstein’s approach, dubbed situated 
neuroscience, demonstrates how attending to data gained through multiple methods 
helps in better understanding the data from each, and that the reciprocities between 
the domains of study, as well as among subject(s) and scientist(s) themselves, should 
be part of a complete scientific explanation. Her study design thus takes into 
consideration the situation of the scientist, as part of the study herself, and the lived 
experiences and sociocultural situation of the subject(s).  
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 In this particular project, Einstein (2012, p. 150) sought to better understand 
the effects of the traditional cultural practice of FGC, which, as she describes,  
 
in its most extreme examples requires excision of the clitoris (Clitoridectomy), 
cutting off the labia minora (Excision], cutting the labia majora (Excision), and 
suturing the labia majora together to make a small hole from which urine and 
menstrual blood can flow (Infibulation).  
 
She hypothesized that the procedure caused lasting bodily effects, which, in turn, led 
to differences in the way that recipients experienced the world, in a way that could not 
be explained simply by looking at the central nervous system itself— the effects 
instantiated a lived, corporeal embodiment of their culture.  
 In the design stage, Einstein consulted with midwives and others in community 
healthcare to ensure the study was attending to the kinds of issues and features of 
experience important or meaningful to the involved group. Determining how best to 
collect first-person data involved looking at ways that using certain types of collection 
methods would encourage or hinder participants and the kinds of concepts considered 
appropriate or inappropriate to describe their experiences. As Einstein says, “the semi-
structured version [of the interview] did not allow women to tell their stories in a way 
that did justice to the stories themselves” (2012, p. 154), so she chose to do away with 
questionnaires or shorter interviews to allow for a more narrative approach to 
gathering first-person qualitative data. Further, as Einstein describes, “[b]ecause pain 
is so culturally dependent, it became apparent that it was important to give the body a 
voice as well and to explore how different narratives about pain aligned” (2012, p. 
154). Because the sociocultural meaning of the practice was taken seriously as 
influential in establishing and describing the effects on the embodied experience of 
the recipients, narratives provided a richer and deeper understanding of the impact of 
the procedure.  
 The third-person component involved a measuring of the subjects’ pain 
threshold at four vulvular regions, or ‘quantitative sensory testing’, in a laboratory 
setting to determine how the pain appeared on a scale that could be compared to the 
pain thresholds of differently situated patients. The physiological component 
incorporated findings from the day-to-day lives of the study participants, including 
reports of their experiences during and before menses, difficulties lifting their children 
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or walking during some times of the month, and so on. This data was then compared 
with reports given by Somali women in diaspora in Finland about pains particular to 
their population (Tiilikainen 2001).  
 Though it involved a third-person component, Einstein’s methodology was 
certainly not reductive, but rather attended to the situatedness of both scientist and 
subjects through thoughtful and deliberate measures. Her situated neuroscience is a 
paradigm example of how the impact of feminist critiques of objectification has led to 
richer scientific practices. First, Einstein says,  
 
[I] tried to redress a wrong born of a Cartesian vision of the body comprised of 
separable parts. I questioned whether the Cartesian model of the separation of 
body and mind, which undergirds modern biomedicine, is in fact an adequate 
place to start in describing the biologies of women. (2012, p. 168) 
 
Gallagher similarly, states that “a reductionist program is possible only on an 
understanding of nature as a partes-extra-partes objective totality, which, along with 
Merleau-Ponty, we should reject” (2019, p. 134). While Einstein’s study purports to 
focus on the ‘brains’ of participants rather than reducing the effects of FGC to 
subjects’ bodies, it did incorporate some aspects amenable to more enactive and 
embodied approaches to cognitive science. The interplay between personal narratives, 
social meaning, and the lived body was taken seriously throughout. For example, it 
was important to note that women who had the procedure felt that it made them more 
beautiful, more desirable, and that it gave them more social capital, which is important 
when looking at how the procedure effects how one carries herself and interacts within 
a social environment. Through an enactivist lens, one could use the data gleaned from 
the study to discuss the way that embodying culture makes more salient certain 
environmental and social affordances (Chemero 2009, Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). 
As Gallagher explains it,  
 
“the function of an object is never just purely the function of an object-in-
general; what matters are the affordances that an object offers to a particular 
agent. Accordingly, the object is never neutral, and . . . behaviour simply cannot 
be reduced to differences in brain function alone, ignoring the details of body 
and world.” (2019, p. 131) 
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Second, Einstein’s (2012) study involved a mindful situating of herself as researcher,  
 
“thereby recovering for scrutiny in the results of research the entire research 
process. That is, the class, race, culture and gender assumptions, beliefs and 
behaviors of the researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the 
picture that she/he paints” (Harding 1987 p. 29, cited in Einstein 2012, p. 168).  
 
Stemming from a rejection of a fact/value distinction, situating oneself brings to the 
forefront of a study the sociocultural influences on the types of valuations the scientist 
brings into data collection and interpretation. Another insight from feminist theory 
that can be seen in Einstein’s study is the importance of viewing knowledge production 
processes as a collective, not individual, endeavour.  
 Third, Einstein (2012) makes it clear that none of the approaches used in the 
study, nor the information collected through a particular approach, should be treated 
as more valuable than another. It was imperative that ‘one field (i.e., social science) is 
not subordinated or used in the service of the other (i.e., biological science) and 
especially, that one isn’t privileged over the other’ (p. 157). This seems very much 
aligned with Gallagher’s suggestion that rethinking the scientific conception of nature 
would involve “a multidisciplinary approach that necessarily discounts every single 
discipline for the sake of the many; where neither neuroscience, nor psychology, nor 
phenomenology ... gets the final say” (2019, p.135).  
 Many feminist philosophers and scientists have been at ease with the kind of 
methodological naturalism that eschews a priori principles of objectification, 
hierarchical organization, and reductive explanations. As Einstein says on the 
implications of her own approach, “a new philosophy of science might allow each field 
and subfield to have their say, move in their own directions and dictate their own 
theory” (2012, p. 147). Her methodology seems to firmly reject any kind of theoretical 
hierarchy. The success of Einstein’s methodology adds support to Gallagher’s claim 
that “to reduce the embodied agent to a set of computational- neuronal processes that 
can be analyzed in terms of physical reality or nature, [scientists] not only miss 
something important, they frame their explanations in the wrong way” (2019: 128). To 
reject a priori the role that the body, sociocultural situation, and personal history play 
for understanding how gender and sex specific practices and norms shape experience 
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would be to foreclose on a rich research avenue offering nuanced, multidimensional 
explanations. This becomes an ethical and political issue when we consider that the 
experiences and values of marginalized groups are often disregarded or treated as 
anomalous. To simply study or reduce explanations to neural mechanisms and 
biophysical structures thus doesn’t just risk leaving out important details, but often 
fails to consider who decides which phenomena are important and how. Through the 
example of Einstein’s practice of situated neuroscience, we can see that there are viable 
scientific methodologies that can incorporate enactive, embodied approaches with 
other scientific practices and critical theories in offering a feasible way forward in 
redefining how we approach scientific practices, phenomena of interest, and perhaps 
nature itself.   
 
1.4 Thesis overview 
 
 This thesis is a collection of intertwined studies in feminist philosophy of e-
cognition. Although the chapters contribute to this common project, they have been 
designed as relatively independent studies suitable for journal submission. Further 
information on publication status is provided on the introductory page of each 
chapter.  
 In chapter two, “Naturalizing Situatedness”, I consider how situatedness, as the 
term is used in feminist theory, might be approached in terms of cognitive processes. 
The term situatedness is often used in feminist epistemology when discussing how it 
is that social roles, norms, culture, identities, and other aspects of our social world 
influence how we understand, create, and participate in knowledge production 
processes. I describe the advantages and disadvantages of adhering to a computational 
theory of cognition in discussing situatedness, and argue that cognitivist views of 
situatedness maintain some problematic Cartesian elements. I then make the case that 
embodied and enactive theories of cognition have more resources for explaining the 
many ways that situatedness influences cognition.  
 In the third chapter, “Epistemic Agency in Practice: Languaging, Knowing, and 
Epistemic Diversity”, I demonstrate the connections between recent work on language 
(Di Paolo et al. 2018) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007) 
and work in social epistemology in order to facilitate the exchange of concepts and 
resources. The notion of epistemic agency that is used in social epistemology is 
especially useful for building an enactive account of how we conduct ourselves as 
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knowers. I look at work on epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression to situate the 
account in concrete interactions. I then show how, by combining these frameworks, 
we get some new ways of thinking about epistemic diversity. 
 The fourth chapter, “Gender and the Senses of Agency”, details the ways that 
gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive framework. While it is common 
to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the 
formulation of goals and in considerations about our identities, it is less clear how 
gender structures our more immediate, embodied processes, such as the minimal sense 
of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge that gender and other aspects of our 
socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive processes, there is little work on how 
this shaping takes place. In order to provide such an account, I first look at the minimal 
and narrative senses of agency (Gallagher 2012), a distinction that draws from work 
on minimal and narrative selves (Zahavi 2010). Next I explain the influence of the 
narrative sense of agency on the minimal sense of agency through work on intention-
formation (Pacherie 2007). After a discussion of the role of gender in the narrative 
sense of agency, I expand on work by Haslanger (2012) and Young (1990) to offer 
three ways in which gender influences the minimal sense of agency, showing the effect 
that gender has on how we perceive our possibilities for interaction in a 
phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner.  
 The fifth chapter, “Distal Engagement: Intentions in Perception”, follows the 
previous one in looking at the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective 
cognition. Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide 
accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation 
comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful 
mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. 
One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several 
proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation- hungry” capacities, 
including long-term planning and action coordination. In this chapter, co-authored 
with Miguel Segundo Ortin, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts 
that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an 
important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. 
Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational 
conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective 
action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a 
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distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual 
cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a 
practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use.  
 The sixth chapter, “Refusal to Bring Forth a World: The Limitations of Social 
Affordances”, points out the limitations in recent accounts of social affordances in 
providing resources for discussing marginalization in interaction. While the 
sociocultural shaping of cognition is a fundamental aspect of both ecological 
psychology and enactivism, the influence of gender and race norms in our cognitive 
processes are tremendously undertheorized in either literature. This chapter looks at 
how cis-fragility and white fragility manifest in interactive contexts to attempt to 
answer the question of how me might understand not wanting to understand. I gauge 
the explanatory power of social affordances (Rietveld et al. 2017, Dijk and Rietveld 
2017) in scenarios where marginalization is manifested through refusal to afford 
possibilities for interaction--where engaging in a participation genre (Di Paolo et al. 
2018) is possible but (explicitly or implicitly) refrained from in order to protect the 
status quo of a privileged participant. Though there are complementarities between 
the ways that these frameworks might treat the structuring of social interactions by 
racism, misogyny, and cis-normativity, I argue that the multi-scale agency at the core 
of the enactive account is vital for understanding how these can (explicitly and 
implicitly) manifest in social marginalization. I then use this argument to support the 
broader claim that it is crucial to incorporate insights from the phenomenology of 
gender and race into the very framework of enactivist and ecological theory and their 
hybrid accounts or we risk treating these lived identities and experiences as additive to 
idealized norms or as deviating from them.  
 The last chapter discusses the significance of this collection of research and ends 
with some thoughts about the future of feminist e-cognition. Overall, I argue that 
enactive approaches avoid some problematic issues encountered when theorizing 
about lived identities on the cognitivist framework. However, I also argue that taking 
gender, race, sexuality, disability, and other aspects of our lived or visible identities 
(Alcoff 2006) into account should be an integral part of doing good enactive cognitive 
science.  
 
22 
 
Chapter 2 
Naturalizing Situatedness ∗ 
 
Abstract:  
 
Accounts of epistemic situatedness describe how it is that social roles, norms, culture, 
identities, and other aspects of our social world influence how we understand, create, 
and participate in knowledge production processes. In this chapter, I consider how 
situatedness might be discussed in terms of cognitive processes. I describe the 
advantages and disadvantages of adhering to a computational theory of cognition in 
discussing situatedness, and that cognitivist views of situatedness maintain some 
problematic Cartesian elements. I then make the case that embodied and enactive 
theories of cognition have more resources for explaining the many ways that 
situatedness influences cognition. The chapter concludes with some thoughts on the 
resources that embodied and enactive cognition can offer naturalized feminist 
epistemologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 A version of this chapter is currently under review. 
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Chapter 2 
Naturalizing Situatedness 
 
 
2.1 Naturalism and Cognition  
 
 Common to feminist epistemologies is the idea that social roles, gender norms, 
and other aspects of our social world shape knowledge and knowledge production 
processes. Arguments that the analysis of knowledge in traditional epistemology failed 
to consider the social aspects of our conceptualization of knowledge and objectivity 
(Haraway 1988), the ways subjectivity is overlooked in paradigm epistemic examples 
(Code 1995), the social nature of epistemic agency (Nelson 1990), the differences in 
available hermeneutical resources (Fricker 2007), and how knowledge is expressed and 
accepted by different groups (Hill Collins 1991), for instance, have inspired a host of 
literature demonstrating the importance of taking sociocultural and contextual 
particulars into account when looking at knowledge and belief. This notion of 
situatedness, as it has been called, has been indispensable in standpoint theory and much 
of feminist philosophy of science, and has informed methodological approaches in 
many non-philosophical fields.3 
 However, despite the influence of the concept of situatedness over the last few 
decades, there has not been much discussion about what it means, cognitively, for our 
epistemic processes to be situated. Instead, the focus has largely been on the ways this 
situatedness manifests in our experience and social structures, even though we lack a 
fully developed picture of what this might mean in terms of cognitive processes. While 
there has been empirical research on inter-cultural cognitive differences in processes 
such as perception and visual attention (Nisbett and Masuda 2003), various kinds of 
problem solving (e.g. arithmetical processing) (Tang et al. 2006), and so on, little 
attention has been paid to intra-cultural differences. A naturalized explanation of 
situatedness, one that benefits from theorizing in feminist philosophy of science and 
epistemology, might have much to offer in understanding the epistemic value of 
situatedness.  
 Naturalistic epistemology provides us with no unified method for gaining clarity 
on this, for naturalism and epistemological inquiry can both be said to have multiple 
                                                   
3 The concept of situatedness is also used in phenomenology, and similar notions can be seen in early 
pragmatism (see Gallagher 2017, Ch 3, for discussion). 
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senses. In the Quinean sense (1969), naturalism implies a continuity between 
philosophical theorizing and the sciences. In the methodological sense, using a 
naturalistic methodology means avoiding any a priori assumptions about the object of 
inquiry—which in this case would be the phenomenon of interest to epistemology. 
This phenomenon is similarly indeterminate. Should the investigation be of knowledge 
qua knowledge, any normative theorizing may put epistemology at odds with 
methodological naturalism. However, Quinean naturalists can look to our social 
sciences, practices, and institutions to assess the role that knowledge plays in our lives.  
 It is in this sense, by examining the social practices that support and maintain 
the idea of knowledge qua knowledge, it has been argued (Rooney 2003), that feminist 
epistemology can be seen as a naturalistic project. Feminist epistemology and 
naturalism are not clear allies for important reasons (Ásta 2015, Rooney 2003); on one 
hand, feminist theory has been influenced by postmodern theories that encourage a 
healthy skepticism towards claims about knowledge or objectivity. This is often 
brought up as a criticism of theories that discuss situatedness or epistemic standpoints. 
However, this skepticism should not be understood as involving a wholesale rejection 
of the possibility of knowledge; it should be read as encouragement for epistemologists 
to assess the practices, linguistic resources, methods, contexts, institutional structures, 
and other elements of the system(s) that create the conditions for the possibility of 
having or sharing knowledge. Taking into account these similarities between feminist 
epistemology and Quinean naturalism, naturalism and feminist epistemology, broadly 
construed, do not necessarily have a direct conflict. Concerns about objectivity and 
truth may only provoke further considerations about how we evaluate the best 
naturalistic approaches to these concepts, and, along with the acceptance of the 
contingencies of social location, give us pause about the privileged status of the 
individual (or some particular individuals) in the normative theorizing of analytic 
epistemology.  
 On the other hand, feminist theorists overwhelmingly reject the idea that we 
can get a fundamental, definitive, or essentialist explanation of the influence of gender 
in epistemically relevant processes by appealing to any one scientific framework, such 
as neurobiology (Grosz 1994). The bourgeoning field of neurofeminism has shown 
that explanations relating gender-related traits to hormones or brain structure are 
deeply flawed—often failing to take socialization and neuroplasticity into account, or 
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over-generalizing from very small groups and providing results that draw from 
researchers’ own very socio-culturally specific ideas about gender norms.  
 That said, neither the naturalization of epistemology, generally speaking, nor 
issues about epistemic normativity will be my main concern in what follows. My focus 
will be the naturalization of situatedness itself and the way that it is and can be used in 
feminist epistemology. Specifically, when discussing the particularities of situatedness, 
I will focus on issues caused by retaining some of the core beliefs or language of a 
naturalistic epistemology that formed largely alongside and in line with cognitivist 
approaches to the mind. 
 In its most basic formulation, a cognitivist approach to mind posits that 
cognition is essentially the computational processing of representations, understood 
as “a mental structure (concept, thought, image) with semantic properties (content, 
truth conditions, reference), or a state of process involving such a structure” 
(Thompson 2010, 25). Computational processing proposes what Susan Hurley has 
called a “sandwich view” of cognition (1998), where from representations are created 
from sensory inputs, evaluated utilizing previous data and mental states by means of 
inferential mechanisms, and result in further mental states or behavioral outputs 
(Fodor 1975, Pylyshyn 1984). The traditional conception of this representational and 
contentful processing holds that it is internal and brain-bound (Adams and Aizawa 
2008). Put simply, cognitive processes are individualistic and involve the manipulation 
of mental states.  
 Admittedly, cognitivism is still one of the dominant theories for explaining 
cognition. Computational explanations and metaphors are pervasive in the sciences of 
mind and folk psychology alike. Many perceive it to have the strongest naturalistic 
foundations and explanatory power (Milkowski 2013). Given this, describing epistemic 
differences, whether theoretically or cognitively, without using cognitivist language is 
difficult.  
 However, enactive understandings of cognition have been gaining wider 
acceptance since they were first introduced by Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991). 
Informed by Merleau-Ponty’s work in phenomenology (2012) and Maturana and 
Varela’s  work in biology (1980), especially on the notion of organismic self-production 
(autopoiesis), the enactivist paradigm holds that cognition is “a relational domain 
enacted or brought forth by [a] being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with 
the environment” (Thompson 2010, 13). The mode of coupling here is embodied, 
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meaning that the body is a constitutive aspect of cognition—the world is brought forth 
through the particularities of our body’s capacities and habits of comportment. 
Further, enactivists hold that cognition is not representational in nature—rather, the 
aforementioned coupling involves dynamic sensorimotor loops and perception-action 
cycles, through which we exercise “skillful know-how in situated and embodied 
action” (Thompson 2010, 13). 
 Given the vast differences between the cognitivist and enactivist frameworks, 
and given the common ground between enactivist conceptions of how cognition is 
situated and the views of many feminist epistemologists about situatedness and 
knowledge, it might seem that these areas have much to offer each other. Still, though, 
they remain fairly isolated (Solomon 2006). Further, in attempting to give over-arching 
theoretical accounts of cognitive processes or concepts such as agency, habit, 
perception, and the like, enactivists have generally not been attentive to the specific 
ways that these may differ given our social situations and history.  
 In examining situatedness, I will look at whether the cognitivist paradigm is 
necessary or strategically advantageous for addressing issues of particular importance 
to feminist theorizing—in particular, problems having to do with cashing out cognitive 
differences in ways that respect the intra- and inter-cultural diversity of those that 
identify as or have been subject to the social norms associated with a gender. The aim 
will be both critical and positive: I will consider some of the seeming advantages of 
using cognitivist language in doing naturalistic feminist epistemology before showing 
that there is a preferable alternative in embodied and enactive approaches to cognition.  
 The first section will explain the idea of situatedness. The second section will 
show how epistemic difference has been discussed on the cognitivist framework, and 
will describe how this framework might be seen as advantageous for avoiding 
essentialist explanations.  The third section will discuss how standpoint theory 
contributes to better research on situatedness in terms of cognitive processes. The 
fourth section will focus on embodied and enactive cognition as an alternative way of 
understanding situatedness, giving some reasons for preferring the latter framework.  
 
2.2 Situatedness in Feminist Epistemology 
 
 In feminist epistemology, situatedness has largely been discussed in terms of our 
social status and social norms affecting or structuring our experience, conception of 
knowledge, knowledge formation processes, or ways we understand justification such 
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that it makes a substantial epistemic contribution.4 There is a general consensus 
amongst naturalistic feminist epistemologists that the influence of gender on the 
epistemic situation of an individual and their values is through the influence of social 
position and their attendant social norms or schemas (Haslanger 2012). To be clear, 
claims about the epistemic significance of gender shouldn’t be taken as claims that 
gender tracks fixed social, sex-related, or cognitive differences by virtue of which 
groups produce different knowledge or understand knowledge differently. 
Situatedness and situated knowledge are generally understood in such a way that does 
not imply essentialism, or claims that people with different sex markers or gender 
identities have innate or fixed differences in cognitive styles or capacities. 
 Arguments against essentialism run broad and deep in feminist theory. In brief, 
there are serious reasons to avoid making essentialist claims, such as the possibility of 
(and indeed, long history of) normative claims about the capacities of people of certain 
genders, and their basis in assumed relationships between gender traits and sex 
differences. It would obviously be worrisome to make claims about the natures of 
women based on traits shaped through sociocultural norms that, in many cases, have 
served to sustain economic, political, and social oppression. Specific to the cognitive 
sciences are concerns that attempts to explain feminine and masculine traits by 
appealing to differences in brain structure, hormone levels, and the like overlook the 
influence of social factors (Fine 2011, Jordan-Young 2012). In fact, much recent work 
in the area of neurofeminism is dedicated to showing how gender specific traits or 
capacities are assumed in scientific research as natural phenomena for which we can 
get reductive (i.e. functional or mechanistic) explanations (Einstein 2012). The danger 
here is that where correlations are found, they are treated as though they justify 
assumptions about the innateness of gender-related traits without taking into account 
the ongoing influence of enculturation and habit in brain development 
(neuroplasticity). Making these kinds of claims about cognitive differences can be both 
politically problematic and methodologically flawed. 
 Further, to summarize Louise Antony, essentialism supports both deterministic 
claims about what women can or cannot do, and paternalistic claims about what women 
should do (Antony 2000). Deterministic claims are those that specify what cannot be 
                                                   
4 There has been some debate about whether individuals or communities should be thought of as primary 
epistemic agents (Nelson 1993, Tollefsen 2004); while the focus of this paper is on the epistemic 
situatedness of individuals, this, hopefully, does not commit me to a position on the fundamentality of any 
epistemic agent (individual, group, or community) over another. 
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changed about our natures—an example would be the claim that women are much 
better at listening because they are disposed to be more empathetic. Paternalistic claims, 
usually undergirded by deterministic claims, are those that specify that we should 
pursue or avoid certain activities because it goes against our nature, and is therefore in 
our best interest—such as the claim that men should not be the primary caregivers for 
children because they will feel unfulfilled (which is based on an implicit deterministic 
claim that caregiving goes against their nature). 
 Though this paper draws on work about gender, this is not to suggest that 
gender should be conceived of as a fixed kind of experience or phenomena for analysis. 
To treat it as such does injustice to the ways that gender is particular given our multiple 
lived or visible identities and axes of experience (Alcoff 2006). The meaning of gender 
and the social expectations built around gender are always inextricably bound with our 
other identities, and I will be using gender loosely (without making definitive claims 
about what gender is) in light of this. What matters for the following is that our gender 
or non-binary identity is an important facet of who we are, and that essentialist claims 
about what gender is are not just scientifically and epistemically wrong, but can 
themselves be a means of oppression. The challenge for naturalistic feminist 
epistemology, then, has been to explain differences in knowledge creation or 
knowledge had by different groups (in this case, groups sharing gender identities) 
without appealing to cognitive differences in any way that claims or implies that there 
are fixed variances in the epistemic capacities between these groups. 
 Discussions of epistemic differences that involve individual cognitive processes, 
such as the holding or articulation of beliefs and knowledge, have largely focused on 
how we create or come to process representations or high-level, propositional content 
in a way that is amenable to computational frameworks. For example, when discussing 
the importance of including women in scientific practices, Elizabeth Anderson says 
that “[t]hey also tend to represent the world in different terms, in virtue of their 
gendered interests, attitudes, emotions and values, and perhaps also (although this is a 
matter of controversy among feminist theorists) in virtue of different cognitive styles. 
These differences create different background beliefs, against which additional 
information may be processed. Representational schemes that are functional for 
different gender roles and gendered attitudes make different kinds of information 
salient” (Anderson 2017).  
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 Now, if we are talking about traditional epistemology, this does generally deal 
with normativity about propositional content. However, the addition of talk about 
representations, representational schemes, cognitive styles, perceptual inputs, and so 
on gives the inquiry a wider scope. This opens up room for discussion about the 
cognitive framework by which we can understand how differences in epistemic 
processes and propositional knowledge arise. For Anderson, it seems as though 
cognitive diversity may affect the content of the scientist’s representations of the 
world, and influence the way in which those representations are processed. The 
individualistic focus and epistemic mechanisms of traditional epistemology remain, 
with the latter mediated by a socially influenced representational scheme. Here, it 
seems, we would have epistemic differences that can be discussed in terms of cognitive 
differences.  
 Another way to approach epistemic difference is to discuss how social 
situatedness lends itself to differences in collective practices of knowledge creation 
(such as with feminist standpoint theory). It’s important to be clear, though, about the 
difference between situatedness and standpoints. Situatedness refers to one’s 
sociocultural location and history (and, as I will argue, may involve cognitive style), 
while a standpoint is achieved by collective consciousness raising practices, and is more 
akin to an informed perspective on or from that sociocultural location (MacKinnon 
1989). That is, where a situation may (debatably) lend itself to similarities in 
epistemically relevant cognitive processes in some sense, a standpoint requires some 
shared experiences and beliefs. A social situation scaffolds a standpoint, but is not 
sufficient on its own to provide a standpoint. The explanatory frameworks for both 
cognitive difference and standpoint theory warrant further discussion about their 
domains of inquiry and what each can contribute to understanding diversity in 
knowledge and knowledge production, so they will be looked at in turn in the 
following two sections. 
 
2.3 Cognitiv(ist) Difference 
 
 Worries about essentialism are often construed in a way that implies that either 
we concede that there are fixed cognitive differences between the sexes or we accept 
an underlying, universal, innate cognitive sameness. To conceive of epistemic 
situatedness as anything other than access to knowledge or information carries the risk 
of being taken as prone to claims about fixed cognitive difference, which are, again, 
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prone to those deterministic and/or paternalistic implications. If cognition is the 
manipulation of contentful representations, and these representations are limited by 
our epistemic access, then equality in epistemic access is an obvious aim for moral, 
political, and epistemic reasons. A computational model of cognition might seem 
strategically advantageous for feminist epistemology, then, because what is at stake is 
the content and the software. For example, in evaluating gender normativity in 
scientific frameworks, Elizabeth Anderson states that the “case for the superiority of 
the cognitive framework is that it at least offers a scheme for representing us as 
potentially free and creative (however inadequately this scheme is presently sketched-
in), whereas behaviorism forecloses such representational possibilities in advance” 
(Anderson 1995, 50-51). In other words, how we create knowledge and how we use it 
are of concern, and how we come to create it and use it can be discussed as socio-
culturally programmed. The hardware itself, to continue with the metaphor, is not 
being questioned, so there is no need to take seriously any doubts about the actual 
capacities of women’s minds.  
 As an avowed Fodorian, Louise Antony (2007) takes a cognitivist approach to 
discussing epistemic differences through a discussion of biases. Antony advocates for 
a Quinean naturalism on this account, which she takes as being opposed to any a priori 
assumptions about how we ought to connect data and theory. Instead, she continues, 
we should research the contexts and circumstances of learning and the involved 
processes (Antony 2016a, 160). However, as Quine does, Antony argues that there 
must be some kind of innate similarities between humans that allow us to make the 
same or similar inferences based on an overwhelming number of inputs 
(underdetermination) in order to have any kind of knowledge (2016a). As she puts it, 
we must have “a set of biases that make salient to us some rather than other properties 
of experienced objects… Otherwise, we would be unable to share experience in any 
epistemically useful way, since there would be no guarantee that my parameters of 
generalization would line up with yours” (2016a, 175-176). On her account, naturalized 
approaches to epistemology must be concerned with clarifying which biases are 
epistemically problematic, though there are certain biases which are foundational for 
knowing. She says: 
 
“… I am counting as a ‘bias’ any structure, database, or inferential disposition 
that serves in a non-evidential way to reduce hypothesis space to a tractable size. 
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Biases, in this sense, may be propositions explicitly represented in the mind, or 
they may be propositional content realized only implicitly, in the structure of a 
cognitive mechanism. They may reside in subpersonal computational structures, 
or they may be elements of person-level beliefs or associations, fully accessible 
to consciousness. They may work at the level of individual cognition, or at the 
level of a socially structured inquiry.” (2016a, 162)  
 
This is a fairly long list of what might count as a bias. What is important is that for 
Antony, the crucial set—what she thinks can serve as a foundation for normative 
epistemology—is the set that is universal. It would be this set that would not be 
different regardless of situatedness. Neither gender norms nor sex differences would 
affect universal biases, and differences in acquired biases of those belonging to 
different groups could be unproblematically relegated to the influence of socially 
constructed institutions. This approach to explaining epistemic difference, 
underpinned by cognitivism, would provide a basis for normative theorizing about 
knowledge and can explain epistemic differences in a non-essentialist way: by 
appealing to acquired biases and epistemic access.  
 While positing a framework of processes as universal or innate may, at least 
prima facie, seem both naturalistically viable and politically advantageous, there are at 
least two major reasons that this may not be the best framework to support a 
naturalistic feminist approach to epistemology. First, there is enough empirical data to 
cast doubt on the universalizability of any of the processes picked out as biases by 
Antony, which problematizes her view that universal biases provide a starting point 
for the normative evaluation of truth claims. On her account, the lack of universal 
biases gives us nothing to measure the reliability of acquired biases against. Second, as 
I will discuss in the next two sections of this paper, is that having only the resources 
of biases and epistemic access to explain situatedness oversimplifies some important 
aspects of the effects of gender and differences in knowledge production processes.  
 On Antony’s list of what counts as a bias, we have several that could possibly 
be said to be innate: cognitive structures, inferential dispositions, sub-personal 
propositional content, and sub-personal computational structures. Antony (2016a) 
supports her commitments to native biases of these sort on a computational 
framework by using Chomsky’s work on universal grammar (Chomsky 1975) and work 
on perceptual bias (Palmer 1999) as paradigm examples. Recent work on differences 
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between cultures in perception, information processing, and inferential styles, 
however, ought to give us pause about making claims about the universality of even 
some seemingly neutral kinds of cognitive processes, such as inferential mechanisms.  
 Evidence for universal epistemic biases would have to involve the existence of 
universal, cross-cultural similarities. Recent studies, though, have shown vast 
differences in basic processes such as the ways that objects are attended to in the visual 
field (Chua et al. 2005), the influence of context in causal attribution (Nisbett and 
Masuda 2003), as well as the attribution of causes for behavior in others (Mason and 
Morris 2010). Functional MRIs have shown that the brain areas used in arithmetical 
processing (Trang et al 2006) can also vary across cultures, and that these differences 
“may not be merely due to different languages but also due to specific mathematic 
processes” (Trang et al 2006, 10776). Brazilians and Americans displayed differences 
in the ways that objects are grouped in perception (de Oliveira and Nisbett 2017). 
Some remote cultures have demonstrated insusceptibility to illusions thought 
previously to affect humans universally (Davidoff et al. 2008). In other words, it is 
difficult to locate any universally innate biases of the kind that Antony suspects are 
present cross-culturally in populations.  
 In an earlier work, Antony references a study by Nisbett et al. (2001) that found 
that epistemic agents from different cultures “performed in systematically different 
ways on tasks involving attention and control, explanation and prediction, and 
inference” (2002, 467). She also points to work by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) 
which argues that these cultural differences should be taken into account when we 
consider the ways that we come to have, and differentiate between, beliefs and 
knowledge, saying that “[w]hether it’s culturally ingrained habits or differences in neural 
circuitry that accounts for observed differences in performance on cognitive tasks or 
judgments in epistemic matters, epistemology has to figure out what to say if it turns 
out that not all knowers are alike” (Antony 2002, 472, emphasis added). It seems 
doubtful that she would posit the possibility of differences in neural circuitry between 
cultural groups as a way of explaining epistemically relevant differences, and still be 
able to defend the position that epistemically relevant intra-cultural differences are 
simply acquired.  
 Given these problems, we might wonder how to improve our search for 
universal biases. However, I think the evidence calls into question two foundational 
assumptions for the cognitivist answer to situatedness. First, it might be better taken 
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to indicate that the demarcation between epistemically relevant universal and acquired 
biases may not necessarily be capturing a real difference in kind. On the Quinean 
naturalistic approach, to presuppose such differences would be making problematic a 
priori assumptions about the objects of investigation that don’t match with what the 
data tells us. The assumption about the neutrality or universalizability of epistemic 
mechanisms might be rethought.  
 Second is the assumption that we can get a naturalistic answer for differences in 
belief production processes, the target of naturalistic feminist epistemologies, without 
having our explanations involve the sociocultural location and context of the agent. 
This appears to be the kind of investigation Antony is after: 
 
“Insofar as human knowledge involves an interaction between a cognitive or 
perceptual mechanism and an environment, it is appropriate, and indeed, 
necessary to study the operation of the mechanism in abstraction from the 
environment in which it is deployed. I see no problem in studying the human 
mind as if it were a computer—provided we tether our investigations to the 
naturalistic conditions in which human mentality arises.” (Antony 2016b, 33) 
 
Given our similarities in embodiment, it might be trivial to claim that humans are 
generally born sharing perceptual capabilities. However, it doesn’t follow that 
knowledge production processes involve mechanisms that can be investigated in 
abstraction from sociocultural context. Further, even if there were evidence for, say, a 
fully encapsulated, modular perceptual system, this would not tell us about the 
practices that influence the attention we give to certain features of the environment over 
others and the ways in which our epistemic practices are influenced by our 
sociocultural upbringing and context. It might be that the best way to investigate 
differences in knowledge production processes would involve looking at cross- and 
intra-cultural similarities and differences in epistemic practices. As shown above, our 
inferential patterns and perceptual experiences can vary vastly from culture to culture, 
as well as intra-culturally.  
 The real issue at hand, I propose, is whether we can get an adequate explanation 
of situatedness by means of a reductive naturalistic approach, such as cognitivism. As 
I’ve highlighted above, adhering to a reductive naturalism might seem to be 
advantageous for feminist epistemologies that seek to avoid essentialism by holding that 
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there are neutral, innate epistemic mechanisms. What happens, though, if we: (1) 
embrace a non-reductive approach to cognitive science and (2) take seriously that even 
our very basic perceptual processes involve a synthesis of both embodied capacities 
and learned practices?5 
 On one hand, it has been scientifically and politically problematic to reduce 
gender differences to physical traits (hormonal, neurophysiological, reproductive, 
genetic, some combination of these, and so on). Additionally, arguments persist that 
gender is merely performative (on a highly intellectualized reading of Judith Butler 
(1990)), and many have taken this to mean that gender is strictly something we 
(implicitly or explicitly) are choosing to do. On the other hand, claims organized solely 
around socially contingent roles, identities, or patterns of treatment do not give us an 
explanation in terms of cognitive processes we might think of as being related to 
knowing. A reductive treatment in the cognitive sciences, though, can fail to take into 
account context, history, the multiplicity and fluidity of identities, and the role of 
gender in shaping our embodiment and ways of engaging with the world. Helen 
Longino, for example, says of the introduction of situatedness in epistemology, “With 
the embodiment of the subject, experience must be rethought, as it can no longer be 
understood as the parade of sense data whose character is the same for all perceivers. 
Our bodily being in the world, our variable and complex modes of being in the world, 
are the source of beliefs about ourselves and that world” (2010, 736).  
 No single approach explains the influence of gender in cognition alone—but 
taken together they may have much to offer in widening our understanding of 
cognitive difference. In regards to what we want a theory of epistemic difference to 
do, even Antony has acknowledged that “feminists have mainly been concerned about 
the results of theorizing from a position that fails even to consider the relevance of 
differences in embodiedness for questions about knowledge” (Antony 2002, 467). In 
light of the growing popularity of ecological, situated, or embodied and enactive 
approaches to understanding cognition, it seems an appropriate time to explore 
whether adherence to a cognitivist framework is the most explanatorily valuable way 
to approach epistemic situatedness, and whether it is politically or morally 
advantageous to do so.  
                                                   
5 Linkages to work in new materialism, such as that done by Nancy Tuana (2008) and Karen Barad 
(2007)—though outside the scope of this paper—could also inform this discussion and its implications.  
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 In this section I have highlighted some issues with using the cognitivist 
framework to explain differences in knowledge creation processes. These problems, I 
claim, stem from adhering to a reductive approach to the cognitive sciences. In the 
fourth section I will provide an alternative through the use of enactive and embodied 
frameworks, which might be able to avoid essentialist claims while accommodating 
differences in cognitive processes. In the following section, though, I will briefly look 
at another way of discussing differences in knowledge production: feminist standpoint 
theories. 
 
2.4 Feminist Standpoints 
 
 Generally speaking, feminist standpoint theories focus on the social aspects of 
beliefs and belief formation practices rather than individual level explanations of 
epistemic differences (Wylie 2003). Feminist standpoint theories argue that in virtue 
of social position, oppressed or marginalized gender groups may have privileged 
epistemic access to features of the systems of their oppression (Hartsock 1983). This 
privileged access, however, is not merely given by a standpoint, but achieved through 
a combination of collective awareness and consciousness-raising practices 
(MacKinnon 1989). There is a general agreement amongst standpoint theorists that in 
a society where gender inequality is the norm, women, non-binary, and gender diverse 
persons could have epistemic access to features of oppression that enable them to 
produce superior knowledge about the structures of that oppression and the ways in 
which it manifests. While it is the case that some standpoint theorists have discussed 
the possibility that those within standpoints may have similar cognitive “styles” (Hill 
Collins, 1991), that need not be the case—it is the sharing of similar experiences in 
virtue of similar social positioning that provides the means for privileged knowledge 
production. However, as Hill Collins points out, it is often the case that collective 
practices, as well as how knowledge is understood and recognized, may indeed differ 
between groups.  
  There are (at least) two insights from standpoint theory that should be noted 
here. The first, as Antony (2016a) and others (e.g. Bar On 1993, Spelman 1990) have 
pointed out, is that there is no single way in which women are situated that lends itself 
to a women’s standpoint. However, standpoint theory does not seek to provide an 
exhaustive explanation of the differences in situatedness between groups—rather, 
standpoint theorists give us reasons to believe that there are epistemically relevant 
36 
 
differences in experience. As Harding notes, there are many feminisms, and the 
standpoints of women in different groups serve as a “good place to start in order to 
explain certain aspects of the social order. There is no single, ideal woman’s life from 
which standpoint theories recommend that thought start” (Harding 2004, 131). This 
is important, as to make claims otherwise in explaining what constitutes a standpoint 
would be to confuse the connection between gender differences and the contingent 
social elements and expectations attributed, in a socio-cultural context, to gender 
categories. This would also be to treat gender as a singular standpoint, rather than an 
aspect of one’s standpoint. The knowledge that comes from having a standpoint 
comes through living with cultural norms in a particular socio-cultural situation and 
conferring with others who are similarly situated about that experience.  
 Second, standpoint theories are critical theories—they offer a means by which 
to come to the kinds of knowledge that can be used for critical ends. In one sense, this 
means that the kinds of knowledge given through lived experience as a marginalized 
person can be used to combat the systems that create that marginalization. In another 
sense, standpoints can be used in projects critical of the objects of inquiry or their 
framing, as is the case with feminist scientific practices. As Helen Longino says, “their 
role in making gender a relevant axis of investigation gives them their status as 
feminist” (1994, 339). It is in this sense that most feminist epistemologists pursue a 
critique of the very framework by which we naturalize epistemic difference. As put by 
Rouse, “Standpoint theories situate knowledge and epistemic warrant within the 
world, amid our interactions with other agents, rather than in an abstracted space of 
representations” (2009). That is, it is a non-reductive approach to knowledge 
production processes. If we conceive of knowledge as a (socio-culturally scaffolded) 
cognitive achievement, looking at differences in situations and grounds for epistemic 
warrant seems a fitting place for a naturalist to start, for “All thought by humans starts 
from socially determinate lives” (Harding 2004, 128). 
 In regards to the naturalizing of situatedness, we can understand standpoint 
theory as both a critical tool and as offering important research on contributing social 
factors. While feminist standpoint theorists often reject the idea that there are 
fundamentally different “ways of knowing” between groups due to gender or other 
sociocultural identities or positions (Intemann 2010), the recent naturalizing turn in 
feminist theory has stressed the corporeality of lived experience, as well as the 
inextricable intertwining of the biological, the social, the material, and the political 
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(Hekman 2010, Pitts-Taylor 2016). What we need for naturalizing situatedness is a way 
of incorporating all of these elements into explanations without insisting on the 
fundamentality of any one approach over another. Or, in Rouse’s words, “We need a 
more inclusive naturalism if we want to understand how knowledge claims are 
formulated, accepted, and used, how the institutions and agents who participate in 
knowledge-making are reshaped in the course of inquiry, and how the world itself is 
transformed through efforts to make it knowable in specific ways” (Rouse 2009, 201). 
A non-reductive naturalism will need to find a way to intertwine the social and the 
individual aspects, the neuroscientific and phenomenological approaches, and to 
reconcile biological processes with embodied habits. With this in mind, I turn to the 
enactive and embodied framework for understanding cognition. 
 
2.5 Situatedness and Enactive Cognition 
   
 Non-reductive approaches to cognitive science have been promoted in some 
recent works in neurofeminism, which have mainly focused on projects that criticize 
claims about gender differences based solely on neurobiological data (Fine 2011). This 
not to say that neurofeminists explicitly reject the idea that there might be important 
neurobiological differences related to sex differences. The scientific evaluation of these 
differences, and what they might mean for cognition, however, often retain explicit or 
residual assumptions about gender roles. Put simply, the study of neurobiological 
differences has been used to explain the assumptions already in place about the 
psychological traits, social habits, and proclivities assigned to gender groups. Some 
neurofeminists, such as Fine (2011) and Jordan-Young & Rumiati (2012), point to the 
brain’s neuroplasticity as evidence for the role of social norms in explaining how 
neurobiological differences come to be. However, as discussed in the previous 
sections, pointing out how our social lives shape our brain matter would be only one 
aspect of a more holistic naturalistic approach. For instance, Gillian Einstein has 
advocated for doing neuroscience in such a way that respects the experience of the 
subjects, integrates subjects’ values and interests in building scientific studies, and does 
not treat any particular science (neuroscience, social science, or biology) as 
fundamental—she calls this approach situated neuroscience (2012). 
 This is not so different from the approach enactivists take to the cognitive 
sciences (Brancazio 2018). On its most simple formulation, enactivism posits that 
cognition is a dynamic process involving the relationship between an organism’s brain, 
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body, and environment. Enactive approaches see cognitive processes as habituated 
and contextualized; cognition is treated as relational and action-oriented (Varela et al. 
1991; Noë 2004; Gallagher, 2005, 2017; Thompson 2010). Proponents of embodied, 
enactive frameworks, in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty (2012) and Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch (1991), commit to a strong understanding of embodiment in terms of 
cognition being comprised of and in organism-environment relations, meaning that 
the body is taken into account as part of what constitutes cognitive processes in 
interaction with the environment. Taken together, cognition is not any one thing, but a 
network of embedded processes across varying timescales (Gallagher 2017). On this 
framework, an explanation of cognition cannot be reductive in the received sense—
there is no single process, substance, or even timescale (e.g. the present) to which 
cognition can be reduced.  
 Where neurofeminist work has applied feminist theory to the neuroscience of 
knowledge production (Bluhm et al 2012), enactivism can similarly incorporate 
theoretical insights from feminist thinkers in investigations of the cognitive processes 
and interactions by which knowledge can be said to be held and exchanged. An 
excellent example of this is the work of Anne Jaap Jacobson. Bringing together insights 
from feminist epistemology and enactive cognitive science, she has argued that cultural 
learning and norms of interaction have an effect on how we classify items in our 
environments as well as the kinds of relationships that we posit between items, and 
that these differences can have a marked effect on differences in knowledge 
production (2012).  
 In this vein, I think the framework has more to offer to discuss how it is that 
we might think of differences in epistemically relevant processes, such as perception 
and attention. In looking at embodiment and habituation, those working on enactive 
frameworks should keep in mind that the embodied subject is shaped by norms of 
race, gender, sexuality, ability, and so on. Phenomenologists of race and gender have 
shown us that there are no neutral bodies, no abstractions from experience, that get at 
some idealized core or innate modes of being. As discussed in Fanon (2000), Ahmed 
(2007), and other phenomenological works on race and racialization, the body 
becomes attuned to norms of perception by others such that movement can be 
inhibited or our pre-reflective phenomenological experience can be interrupted by the 
perception of others. This and other factors influence the way that agents’ bodily 
comportment and self-awareness can be shaped; as Haslanger puts it, “Individuals are 
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socialized to become embodied subjects, not just rational, cognitive agents; so race 
and gender socialization isn’t just a matter of instilling concepts and indoctrinating 
beliefs, but are also ways of training the body—training the body to feel, to see, to 
touch, to fear, to love” (Haslanger 2012, 285). In many ways, the best way to 
understand these norms is as norms of being; they are not rules guiding our behaviors, 
but are an implicit part of our experience in everything from our basic intersubjective 
interactions to our social institutions. 
 While social norms are often discussed as behavioral constraints which facilitate 
better social cohesion and cooperation (Schmidt et al. 2012), the effects of these norms 
are not merely discursive, nor should they be thought of as additive to innate cognitive 
capacities. The embodied framework can also take into account their influence in 
forming our embodied habits (Gallagher 2005, Young 2005), and how these habits in 
turn affect our experience of the world. The intersubjective cultivation of cognition, 
for human forms of life, means that social structures, habits, and norms affect, through 
patterning and habituation, how it is that we hold and move our bodies and perceive 
potentials for interaction (Gallagher 2008, Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014, Brancazio 
2019).  
 For instance, Anne Fausto-Sterling’s work in biology (2000, 2012), using a 
dynamic systems framework, argues that gender norms have a lasting effect on our 
biological makeup; our bodies do not develop on the course of some pre-determined 
trajectory, but are shaped by sociocultural norms. While Fausto-Sterling herself 
favours a “mosaic brain” approach (see Joel and Fausto-Sterling 2016), her account is 
highly compatible, for instance, with Shaun Gallagher’s work on the way that the body 
and its habits shape our cognitive processes (2005). Linking these two accounts 
together to explore the way gender and other norms are involved in embodied action-
readiness priming might tell us how the influence of norms shapes the body, and how 
the shaping of the body continues to shape action-readiness in pre-reflective 
experience. In contrast to innate mechanisms or learned biases, this gives us a more 
developed understanding of how it is that, as put by Rouse, that “[t]he same features 
of the world may not be salient to different knowers, even when exposed to them” 
(Rouse 2009, 202).  
 The idea of salience is also used in ecological psychology (Gibson 1979) and the 
more recent ecological-enactive framework (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2018). 
Ecological-enactivists hold that the main object of perception is affordances, which are 
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the possibilities for interaction in one’s environment. Affordances are “relations 
between abilities and properties of the environment” (Chemero 2009, 145), meaning 
that they do not involve properties of the world or capacities of the agent alone, but 
are perceived through the relationship between these. The ecological approach also 
takes into account that perceiving what is afforded by any particular environment is 
socioculturally learned (Gibson 1963) and habituated through previous interactions 
and the development of skills. For instance, if I am at home and I want to pour a cup 
of coffee, perceiving a cup as affording me the possibility of holding coffee depends 
on many factors: the urge for coffee (which brings about my perceptual search), my 
ability to perceive the cup’s shape, the sociocultural habit of coffee drinking and my 
prior use of cups for doing so, and so on (Reed 1996). The coffee cup thus solicits my 
attention during my perceptual acts—it is salient to me because of these factors (Nisbett 
and Masuda 2003). We know that, for better and worse, gender contributes to the 
development of certain skills (such as attending to the needs or expectations of others 
or being highly attuned to looking for possible dangers when walking alone at night). 
It stands to reason, then, that gender influences affordance perception and salience.6  
 Of course, there are many other ways that we might think of how norms 
associated with demographic differences or differences in our lived or visible identities 
might influence our pre-reflective experience of the world. For instance, another area 
of interest for enactivists is in thinking about the relationship between the ways that 
we make sense of our lives through language and narratives and how this can influence 
our immediate, embodied cognitive processes (Di Paolo et al. 2018, Brancazio 2019). 
It might seem obvious to those working in critical-theoretic areas of philosophy that 
our access to hermeneutic resources (Fricker 2007), the kinds of roles we’re 
encouraged to take on, and gender-related narrative archetypes might affect our pre-
reflective experience through downstream dynamics in epistemically relevant ways. 
That is, the way in which we make sense of ourselves and our interactions in a narrative 
sense, and the linguistic resources we have available for doing so, could influence our 
more immediate, pre-reflective experience. However, there is still much work to do to 
provide naturalistic explanations for the relationship between these types of cognitive 
processes. The enactivist framework is well-poised to do so through a multi-scale 
approach to cognitive levels of integration (Gallagher 2017), considerations about 
                                                   
6 This will be taken up in detail in Chapter 4.  
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levels of agency, and the scaffolding and constraints that different levels of sense 
making capacities can enable or impose upon each other.  
 An advantage of the enactive framework for articulating situatedness is that it 
can give a more robust account and understanding of how gender shapes cognitive 
processes while avoiding reductive claims that attempt to essentialize gender 
differences or essentialize gender itself. There are many ways in which gender can be 
looked at as an axis of influence in cognition without the need to reify ‘gender’ as any 
one particular type of influence. Given the attention to norms and sociocultural 
scaffolding in the enactive framework, and given the similarities in approach to those 
advocated by feminist theorists, using both in tandem would give us a better 
understanding of gender, cognitive processes, and their influence in epistemically 
relevant processes and interactions.   
 In conclusion, while the cognitivist paradigm for understanding the influence of 
gender in cognition may seem politically advantageous, I have shown that it is 
inadequate for addressing contemporary feminist theorizing about differences in 
cognition. Rather than continue to work on modifying the cognitivism framework to 
better fit the insights given to us through feminist theory, I have argued here that the 
enactivist framework is more adequate for understanding gender and the influence of 
gender in cognition. I have gestured towards the resources from the enactive 
framework (though not exhaustively) that can be used for more specific projects 
discussing pre-reflective experience, intersubjectivity, interaction, perception, and the 
relationships between different kinds of cognitive processes, with the aim of offering 
naturalistically satisfactory options for discussing gender and cognition without 
anchoring the explanations of those differences in neurologically, biologically, or 
socially fixed binaries.  
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Chapter 3 
Epistemic Agency in Practice: Languaging, Knowing, and 
Epistemic Diversity 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
The enactive framework offers new resources for thinking about our epistemic 
processes. In this chapter, I demonstrate the connections between recent work on 
language (Di Paolo et al. 2018) and participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 
2007) and work in social epistemology in order to facilitate the exchange of concepts 
and resources. The notion of epistemic agency that is used in social epistemology is 
especially useful for an enactive approach to how we conduct ourselves as knowers. I 
look at work on epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression to situate the account in 
concrete interactions and offer some ways that epistemic agency influences our other 
domains of embodiment. I then show how, by combining these frameworks, we get 
some new ways of thinking about epistemic diversity.  
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Chapter 3 
Epistemic Agency in Practice: Languaging, Knowing, and 
Epistemic Diversity 
 
3.1 Introduction   
 
 Until recently, naturalized epistemology has been dominated by the 
computational approach and reductive spirit of the cognitivist approach to cognition. 
Though computational metaphors have long dominated the cognitive sciences, the 
growing literature in empirically grounded non-reductive and non-representational 
approaches to cognition, such as the enactive approach (Varela et al. 1991), looks 
instead at cognition as involving brain-body-environment relationships over multiple 
nested timescales (Gallagher 2017; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo at al. 2017). Recent 
work in this field has problematized the naturalistic grounding of epistemic entities 
such as propositional knowledge and mental states, quintessential staples of analytic 
epistemologies. Contemporary enactive cognitive science provides an expanding 
canon of alternative ways of thinking about the so-called ‘higher-order’ or ‘complex’ 
cognitive phenomena we might associate with knowledge production processes, such 
as language use (Di Paolo et al. 2018), memory (Peeters and Segundo-Ortin 2019) and 
social cognition (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; Rietveld 2015)—previously thought to 
be reliant on the existence of propositional mental states or representations. This 
growing field thus offers many new resources for thinking about our epistemic 
processes. 
 This revolutionary turn in the philosophy of mind and cognition has been 
paralleled by a revolutionary turn in epistemology. Until rather recently, analytic 
epistemology has operated under the received view that knowledge ought to be treated 
as a discrete unit, a propositional statement, which is believed, somehow justified in 
being believed, and true. Discussions have thus centered on topics such as how we 
come to have our beliefs, how we should best conceive of justification, the 
relationships between our units of knowledge, how we know that we know (if we do 
at all), and so on. However, the past few decades have seen several branches break 
away from these core topics, exploring the social nature of knowledge and knowledge 
production processes (Nelson 1990), epistemic practices, epistemic and intellectual 
virtues (Battaly 2018), injustices between knowers and between knowers and 
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institutions of knowing (Fricker 2007, Dotson 2012), and the epistemology of 
understanding (Grimm 2012).  
 While there has been a lot of activity at the crossroads of epistemology and 
situated cognition, a term used to describe the family of e-approaches to cognition 
(e.g. extended, enactive, embedded, embodied, ecological; see Solomon 2006 for a 
particularly prescient example), there has been no extensive treatment of epistemology 
through the enactive framework. However, there have been some notable 
contributions from enactivists that have begun to clear the ground for such work. One 
such example is De Jaegher’s proposal for an engaged epistemology (2019), which 
describes epistemic phenomena in terms of knowing-in-connection. She describes 
knowing as relational balance between loving and letting be, as a way of appreciating 
the tensions and inconsistencies in knowing as a fully engaged, rather than disengaged 
practice. Another preliminary example is found in the discussion of what is called the 
objectifying attitude in the enactive account of language by Di Paolo, Cuffari, and De 
Jaegher (2018). They present the attitude as a way of thinking about how we treat 
practices or linguistic artefacts as objects within particular practices.  
 In line with the work of feminist social epistemologists (Alcoff 1996), I hold 
that by re-conceptualizing our epistemic processes holistically (by not reducing them 
to any one explanatory domain, i.e. social or neurological), we open up new 
possibilities of explaining and perhaps transforming our epistemic landscapes. The 
enactive approach to cognition provides non-reductive, phenomenologically informed 
naturalistic resources that can be helpful for doing so. The point of connection I will 
explore will be between discussions of linguistic agency (Di Paolo et al. 2018) and 
epistemic agency (Dotson 2012). My aim is to contribute novel, useful insights to 
empirically informed situated epistemology that can take the multiplicity of agencies, 
historicity, power structures, practices, and their contexts into consideration.  
 In order to make this connection, I outline how we might think of our epistemic 
practices as a relationship between knowers situated socio-culturally and politically 
(Haraway 1988, Alcoff 1996), within institutions and sedimented structures of 
exchange, and involved in particular kinds of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher 
& Di Paolo 2007). In drawing connections between this framework and critical social 
epistemology, I look at how this gives us some tools for thinking about epistemic 
oppressions and their lasting, embodied effects. I also show that using the enactive 
approach can provide new insights on the epistemic value of diversity.  
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 This is not to exclude or deny a place for normative assessments of the aims of 
epistemic practices. Analytic epistemology’s interest in the “epistemic goal of truth” 
(Solomon 2006, p. 416) or the “normative evaluation of reasoning” (Solomon 2006, 
p. 417) is its own sort of situated epistemic practice. What we get from an enactive 
approach is a starting point where sociocultural situatedness is taken into account as 
being fundamental to knowledge production and its artefacts. We can then approach 
normative assessments of those artefacts from within a framework which understands 
these as specific situated practices, rather than starting from (largely Western) 
normative practices and trying to make our broader epistemic explorations fit within 
that fixed normative framework. 
 The paper unfolds in the following manner. In the second section, I detail the 
enactive approach to cognition. In the third section, I explain how this approach can 
be taken as a starting point for a different kind of naturalistic approach to 
epistemology. The fourth section connects linguistic agency with Kristie Dotson’s 
work on epistemic agency (2012, 2014). In the fifth section, I discuss how we can think 
of the relationship between epistemic agency and epistemic communities. I then 
conclude with some thoughts about other directions an enactive epistemology could 
explore.  
 
3.2 The Enactive Framework 
 
The recent intersubjective turn in the cognitive sciences (see De Jaegher 2018), 
especially the enactivist conception, complicates the naturalistic underpinnings of 
much of what has been previously thought about the cognitive phenomena involved 
with having or producing knowledge, challenging received views about the 
individuality and internalism of cognitive processes. Cognitive and computer scientist 
William Clancey describes the empirical perspective of the situated approach to 
cognition as adhering to the idea that: 
 
“[W]e cannot locate meaning in the text, life in the cell, the person in the body, 
knowledge in the brain, a memory in a neuron. Rather, these are all active, 
dynamic processes, existing only in interactive behaviors of cultural, social, 
biological, and physical environment systems. Meaning, life, people, knowledge, 
and so on, are not arbitrary, wholly subjective, culturally relative, or totally 
improvised. Rather, behaviors, conceptions, and emotional experiences are 
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constrained by historically developed structural relations among parts and 
subprocesses in different kinds of memories - neural, artifactual, 
representational, and organizational - and are dynamically constrained in action 
across system levels.” (Clancey 2009, p.28) 
 
Enactive understandings of cognition, drawing from the autopoietic notion of 
organismic self-production, explain living as a process of maintenance and production, 
in which we are always precariously coupled with the world, exerting energy to 
maintain these processes and avoid equilibrium. On this account, cognition is a 
“relational domain enacted or brought forth by [a] being’s autonomous agency and 
mode of coupling with the environment” (Thompson 2007, p. 13). It is inherently 
integrative, in that it does not treat individual cognition and social practices as 
constituting different realms of inquiry—subjectivity is social, and the social is 
intersubjective. Further, drawing from research in cognitive science and robotics, 
enactivists hold that cognitive processes are not representational in nature—rather, 
cognition involves “skillful know-how in situated and embodied action” (Thompson 
2007, p. 13). This is in contrast to the well-established paradigm of cognitivist, or 
computational, approaches to mind. A cognitivist approach to mind posits that 
cognition is a matter of manipulating, processing, or making inferences through the 
computation of contentful mental states, or representations (Adams 2010). Pillars of 
the traditional computational theory are that cognition is internal, brain-bound, 
inferential, contentful, and representational (Fodor 2007).  
 The enactive paradigm views cognition as involving brain, body, and 
environment. Explaining cognition therefore requires looking at the domain(s) in 
which it takes place, the body’s capacities for interaction, sociocultural shaping, and 
habits of interaction. Looking at cognition as involving embodied, skillful know-how, 
though, means that explanations of cognition, for enactivists, will involve dynamic 
variables over multiple, nested scales (Baggs and Chemero 2019). It also means that 
the approach to naturalism is not inter-theoretically reductive; cognition is spatially 
and temporally extensive, and explanations of cognitive phenomena will involve 
research at multiple scales (Gallagher 2018; McGivern 2018). Enactive cognitive 
science is thus interdisciplinary, and points to no particular science as being able to 
offer a fundamental type of explanation for cognition.  
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 The basic idea of autopoietic enactivism is simple and biological in nature—we 
are bounded, autonomous, precarious biological organisms seeking continuity and 
stability in the processes of self-production and self-individuation. Self-maintenance 
requires that we see the world in terms of significance, as affording support or possibly 
hindering our continuity. This sense-making, as “the creation and appreciation of 
meaning” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007, p. 488), is fundamental to the enactive 
approach. However, while it is a claim about our enactive mode of being, it is also a 
claim about the fundamentality of subjectivity or perspective for any cognizing bodies 
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).   
 How might enactive cognitive science, though, scale up in order to explain the 
cognitive phenomena associated with our epistemic practices? While this has been an 
ongoing challenge for non-representational theories, the enactive account of 
languaging given by Di Paolo, Cuffari, and De Jaegher (2018) provides an excellent 
groundwork for looking at more specific linguistic practices. The approach doesn’t 
attempt to explain what language is in terms of brain localities or activation patterns, 
try to specify what separates language from other forms of communication, or take as 
its subject those sophisticated tokens of language use that come to mind when we 
think of particular (culturally relevant) human practices. Rather, their approach begins 
from our linguistic practices, as bodies shaped intersubjectively and linguistically with 
others as we navigate multiple scales of agency. Language is treated not as “a static 
entity, manifested as a set of rules, vocabularies, nor even a series of communication 
events. Language is a living stream of activity in the sociomaterial world of practices 
and history” (Di Paolo et. al 2018, p. 7).  Language, as discussed on cognitivist 
accounts, is often thought to require an explanation in terms of the computation of 
contentful mental representations, so this is quite a shift in how we might begin carving 
out the phenomena of interest. That is, the investigation begins from the activity of 
languaging7 rather than from the assumption that an explanation involves looking to 
neuroscience to tell us how we represent linguistic artefacts. 
 Their account is founded in the enactive assumption of three dimensions of 
embodiment. One dimension is the organic, which is comprised of the regulatory 
processes which establish the possibility for activities related to self-individuation and 
production (i.e. metabolic and respiratory processes), as discussed above. The second 
                                                   
7 This draws from Maturana and Varela’s earlier work towards an autopoietic account of languaging 
(1980, 1987).  
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dimension involves the sensorimotor coupling processes between the organism and 
the environment—in brief, these are our active engagements with the environment, 
those that create stable patterns of interaction, or habits, over time. The third 
dimension of embodiment, which will be the main focus of what follows, is the 
intersubjective dimension, in which we find social practices and their shaping of our 
cognitive processes. These entangled dimensions of embodiment permeate, scaffold, 
and constrain each other in an ongoing fashion.  
 The intersubjective dimension of embodiment, for human forms of life, 
involves participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). Participatory sense-
making takes place when participants engage in an interaction which enables them to 
establish a joint domain of meaning, or sense-making. Through participating in the 
shared sense-making interaction, all parties are themselves changed—they create and 
shape the interactive process, and engagement in the interactive process shapes them. 
And because intersubjective bodies are permeated by and realized through our organic 
and sensorimotor bodies, enagaging in participatory sense-making influences and 
shapes our other dimensions of embodiment, which shape further acts of participatory 
sense-making.  
 With the introduction of linguistic practices and participatory sense-making in 
the third domain of embodiment, we see an expansion of interrelated cognitive 
phenomena. For human forms of life, language is an integral part of participatory 
sense-making and the normative elements that structure our interactions (Cuffari et al. 
2015). At the core of these is our linguistic agency, which consists in our “orchestrating 
and ordering” of our utterance flows (Di Paolo et al 2018, p. 2). These utterance flows 
are “rooted in past utterances made and reported by a multitude of participants” in an 
“ongoing appropriation of the utterances of others” (p. 191). We live amidst language, 
and we absorb the linguistic practices and means of meaning creation which they 
enable. These also enable self-directed utterances that can influence our sensorimotor 
habits and ways of comporting ourselves. For example, we can have a sensorimotor 
habit that persists, such as smoking, that is at odds with our best interest in maintaining 
organismic continuity (Di Paolo et al. 2018). I can intervene on this habit (by telling 
myself “I am quitting smoking”), or—perhaps more often in this case—unsuccessfully 
attempt to intervene (“Just one more, then I’m done”).  
 Linguistic practices lead to both other- and self-directed sensorimotor habits 
and sense-making patterns. They can also allow us to create long-term goals (or 
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intentions) which allow us to become distally engaged to temporally distant 
possibilities, such as buying a house or earning a college degree (Brancazio and 
Segundo-Ortin 2020). In short, linguistic agency allows us to shape ourselves, others, 
and our shared niche through the co-creation of meaning in linguistic domains of 
participatory sense-making and the emergence of self-directed utterances.  
 
3.3 Epistemic Practices 
 
 An enactive account of languaging might seem to have very little in terms of a 
starting point to engage with traditional epistemology. However, having 
intersubjectivity as the starting point for a naturalized account of epistemology has 
already been the starting point for much of feminist social epistemology (see Haraway 
1988, Alcoff 1996, Solomon 1994, 2006). This work starts from the understanding that 
we engage in socioculturally situated epistemic practices through which we seek truth 
together, and that a normative analysis of knowledge should start by looking at a 
knowing community and its practices. In doing so, social epistemology moves away 
from treating individual propositions or lone epistemic agents as the phenomena of 
interest to epistemology.  
 Epistemic practices are those that aim to create knowledge, however conceived. 
The primary phenomena of interest to epistemology has been the epistemic objects, 
as propositional statements, that are often taken, especially by philosophers of science 
and epistemology, as the paradigmatic ‘outputs’ of epistemic practices. Rather than 
beginning with these, treated as discrete and context-independent entities, and working 
our way towards an adequate naturalistic underpinning, I will start from the place of 
our epistemic practices. So as not to privilege the sciences as paradigm epistemic 
communities and producers of knowledge, I will instead refer to what is created in 
epistemic practices (stories, data, ‘knowledge’, assertions) epistemic artefacts (rather 
than objects) to emphasize the sociocultural and historical situation of the aims of our 
epistemic practices. Amongst differing cultures and sub-cultures, the participation 
genres that are considered to be those that produce knowledge can differ quite 
dramatically, from religious practices to in-group affirmational practices to the 
practices of sciences ordered in a hierarchy to discussions between group elders. 
Starting from epistemic practices, rather than from normative conclusions about what 
those might be, offers the opportunity to build a framework suitable for considering 
the sociocultural situatedness of differing knowledge production practices. For this 
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reason, I will not be considering the possibility of any overarching normative questions 
about knowledge or understanding.  
 In their development of the account of linguistic bodies, Di Paolo, Cuffari, and 
De Jaegher (2018) discuss what they call the objectifying attitude that we are able to take 
up in virtue of our linguistic agency. The objectifying attitude is “understood less as 
the search for propositional truths than as the practice of regulating other practices 
and experiences in a mutually constraining relation with sociomaterial conditions” (Di 
Paolo et al. 2018, p. 203). It involves the practice of taking up attitudes that objectify 
our own practices, a meta-practice of sorts, in order to evaluate or shape sociomaterial 
practices, which in turn constrain the objectifying attitudes that can be taken towards 
them. They specify that the objectifying attitude “appears progressively in our model 
in the shape of a recursive pragmatics: social practices for regulating other social 
practices” (Di Paolo et al. 2018, p. 203-4). Similar to their approach to language, they 
don’t start with the artefacts we might think of in a folk sense as objective, or 
objectivity as it has been taken up in the philosophical literature, but instead begin 
from within the practices in which it is possible and normatively appropriate to adopt 
the objectifying attitude.  
  Taken up in participatory sense-making, we can take part in making assertions 
together—we can collaboratively pick out aspects or objects of our lifeworld and 
create “objects of joint doing” (Di Paolo et al. 2018, p. 200). We can jointly attend to 
them, creating linguistic artefacts (assertions or propositions) that we also treat as 
objects. The objectifying attitude allows us to produce these epistemic objects, but 
taking them up is its own participation genre, governed by its own distinctive norms. 
Epistemic objects, rather than epistemic artefacts, are those taken up in very particular 
contexts where it is treated as socioculturally appropriate to treat knowledge as discrete 
and context-independent, as it is in traditional analytic epistemology or particular 
sciences. Thus, epistemic objects are taken up via the practice of a particular way of 
taking up epistemic artefacts. Epistemic practices are not only concerned with the 
creation of knowledge but have a reflective element in which epistemic objects are 
evaluated and are governed by intersubjectively constituted norms of production and 
presentation.   
 Previous work in situated cognition, specifically that on situated knowledge, can 
also be helpful in getting a grip on the important dynamics that take place in epistemic 
communities. In detailing the scientific precursors of situated cognition, William 
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Clancey summarizes the empirical framework situated theorists take in looking at 
knowledge by saying: 
 
“Specifically, situated cognition views human knowledge not as final objective 
facts but as (1) arising conceptually (e.g., dynamically constructed, remembered, 
reinterpreted) and articulated within a social context (i.e., a context conceived 
with respect to social roles and norms); (2) varying within a population in 
specialized niches (areas of expertise); (3) socially reproduced (e.g., learning in 
communities of practice); (Lave & Wenger, 1991); and (4) transformed by 
individuals and groups in processes of assimilation that are inevitably adapted 
and interpreted from unique perspectives (improvised in action, not simply 
transferred and applied).” (Clancey 2009, p.17) 
 
The enactive account also acknowledges the ways that our particular practices are 
embedded in a network of overlapping objective attitudes and sense-making processes, 
giving us a deep and nested conception of situatedness: “Language is a social, 
historical, and material phenomenon that cannot be dissociated from political 
configuration and struggles. It also constantly interpolates and constructs subjective 
attitudes rather than simply being a vehicle for communicative intentions" (Di Paolo 
et al. 2018, p. 116-117).   
 The enactive approach provides an excellent naturalistic starting point for 
examining how we come to have different knowledge on phenomena, as well as how 
we might have different justifications for that knowledge given the context of 
investigation and sociocultural factors. The account also resonates with the work being 
done in feminist social epistemology. For example, as Elizabeth Anderson has noted, 
“it is impossible for individuals to rely only on themselves, for the very reason and 
interpretations of their experience on which they rely and which seems most to be 
their own, is a social achievement, not an individual endowment” (1995, p. 53; see also 
Nelson 1990, Scheman 1983).  
 In this section, I have explained how the situated and enactive paradigms have 
much to offer in terms of explaining the relationship between cognition and 
knowledge production. As linguistic agents, we are caught up in practices through 
which we create meaning with others, and which constrain and enable our other 
domains of sense-making. Knowledge creation and sharing are situated, contextual 
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practices—but they are also deeply personal. To explore this tension, in the next 
section I will discuss the relationship between communities and agency.   
 
3.4 Epistemic Communities and Epistemic Agency  
 
 One area that has pioneered the conceptual territory now being explored in 
enactivism is standpoint theory. To have a standpoint is often defined as coming to 
have knowledge of the manifestations of particular kinds of oppressions through 
collective consciousness-raising and knowledge production practices (Wylie 2003, 
Hartsock 1983). As put by Joseph Rouse, a philosopher of science deeply engaged 
with feminist theory, “Standpoint theories situate knowledge and epistemic warrant 
within the world, amid our interactions with other agents, rather than in an abstracted 
space of representations” (Rouse 2009). If we conceive of epistemic practices as 
socioculturally scaffolded cognitive processes, then looking at differences in how our 
communities and situations create and influence the grounds for epistemic warrant 
seems a fitting place for a naturalist to start. This point is foundational to the enactive 
approach: “Utterances become historically entangled and this, in part, drives processes 
of sedimentation in the living stream of language. The incorporated flows of utterances 
that make up a linguistic agent are always the joint result of personal enactments and 
of patterns that live in the community; linguistic bodies—the embodiment of linguistic 
agency—are both personal and constitutively social. They are communal 
achievements” (Di Paolo et al. 2018, p. 192-3). 
 Knowing communities are not alike. Importantly, as discussed above, the 
enactive account treats knowing as a kind of participatory sense-making taking place 
within a particular participation genre. Drawing from Bakhtin’s (1986) speech genres, Di 
Paolo et al. (2018) describe participation genres as “relatively well-delimited starting 
points that precoordinated the expectations of producers and audience without ever 
removing the need for ongoing negotiation and coregulation” (p. 178). Participation 
genres extend to all kinds of collaborative activities, and speech genres are the discursive 
framings (norms, styles, etc.) that exist within the context of those activities. If we 
think about how epistemic communities work, whether we are considering 
standpoints, scientific communities, research communities, religious communities, or 
others, the collective aspects can oftentimes be as important to explanations of 
knowledge production as individual experiences and capacities.  
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 This is precisely the phenomenon of interest to social epistemologies. More 
specifically, this is the area explored by those that look at how marginalization affects 
epistemic practices, communities, and artefacts, how some cultural or sub-cultural 
epistemologies are treated within broader societies, and the colonization or erasure of 
epistemologies. For anyone familiar with feminist epistemologies and philosophy of 
science, it might be clear that the enactive account already has much in common with 
feminist theorizing about the epistemic practices of scientific research communities. 
Feminist epistemologies have long been on the forefront of theorizing about issues 
with claims on objectivity, the situatedness of scientists, and the sociocultural 
embeddedness and political values of scientific communities and their participants. 
Seeing these linkages, the relationship between situated cognition and feminist 
epistemology has been detailed at some length by Miriam Solomon (2007). As she 
writes, “for the most part situated cognition has not been incorporated into either 
descriptive or normative discussions. Normative concepts like ‘justified’ and ‘knows’ 
remain largely individualistic, linguistic, general and explicit. It is time for analytic 
philosophy to catch up with the rest of cognitive science” (2007, p. 414).  
 As discussed above, the received view in analytic epistemology is that epistemic 
artefacts are to be attributed to individuals. This has been a point of contention 
between traditional analytic and social epistemology. Linda Alcoff, for example, has 
given us reason to question the assumption that individuals are the primary agents of 
interest for epistemic phenomena. She says: 
 
“Epistemology has most often assumed that knowing occurs between an 
individual and an object or world. This typically Western assumption of 
individualism (which operates as both an ontological assumption and a value) 
dictates the kinds of problems and hurdles epistemologists set themselves to 
overcome. … Most knowledge, however, is produced through collective 
endeavor and is largely dependent on the knowledge produced by others. It is 
not achieved by individuals. If epistemology were to dispense with its 
individualist assumption and begin with a conception of knowing as collective, 
a different agenda of issues would suggest itself. For example, we would need a 
more complicated understanding of the epistemic interrelationships of a 
knowing community; we would want to understand the relation between modes 
of social organization and the types of beliefs that appear reasonable; and we 
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would need to explore the influence of the political relationships between 
individuals on their epistemic relationships.” (1996, p.231) 
 
The assertion of individuality is itself very much a practice situated in and scaffolded 
by participation in sociolinguistic practices. As Emily Lee summarizes the view of 
Alcoff, “the self does not develop, does not come to self-understanding outside a 
relation with the other and a horizon of social meanings” (Lee 2011, p. 260).   
 Epistemic artefacts, then, are always produced as part of a particular practice, 
within possibly several different sets of norms, and involve the appropriation of the 
utterances of others. Here again, we might turn to the enactive account of languaging, 
taking seriously that: 
 
“Since the frequency, recursion, and style of social interactions are bound by the 
nested constraints of locality, familiarity, power relations, and intergenerational 
asymmetries, interactive encounters never occur in a context-free manner, but 
are situated within conditions they themselves help create as participants move 
nonuniformly from one encounter to the next. Thus, interactions occur 
differently within the contexts of family, colleagues, friends, communities, and 
so on. … Thus, in and around the bodies of interactors and the enactments of 
social interactions various sources of normativity are at play and sometimes in 
tension: the norms of the embodied individual participants, the emerging norms 
of the interactive dynamics, and the larger norms of the habitus.” (Di Paolo et 
al. 2018, p. 144-145) 
  
While we might not want to reduce the production of epistemic artefacts and epistemic 
practices to individuals, neither do we want to ignore the crucial role of agency. As 
might be clear, for enactivism, the production of propositions is considered a skillful 
activity rather than the retrieval of stored information. Knowing is treated as an active, 
embedded process that takes place within appropriate conditions. This again can be 
taken in line with previous work in situated cognition, where the paradigm holds that 
the knowledge production of individuals (the act of making utterances evaluable for 
veridicality or community assessment) is situationally determined (Solomon 2007). It 
is an activity appropriate for certain kinds of social interactions, or in certain 
environments, as part of a particular practice. But, as discussed above, though there 
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are agential aspects to the epistemic process, it is not merely that a proposition formed 
and held internally by an individual is articulated. Knowledge production takes place 
in processes of participatory sense-making, or through a process of habituation 
established through such processes.  
 Recognition of the particularity of epistemic practices and the dynamics 
between agents in epistemic communities has led social epistemologists to introduce 
the notion of epistemic agency. Kristie Dotson, drawing from Townley (2003), defines 
epistemic agency as being able to utilize “shared epistemic resources within a given 
epistemic community in order to participate in knowledge production and, if required, 
the revision of those same resources” (2012, p. 24). Dotson’s definition can be 
unpacked to help in getting a better sense of the important aspects of epistemic 
interactions and practices that can be connected to the enactivist framework.   
 First, the idea of shared epistemic resources has been discussed at some length 
in the epistemology literature, though the focus is often times only on hermeneutical 
resources (Fricker 2007), or the linguistic concepts that we have available for making 
sense of and expressing our experiences. Gaile Pohlhaus offers a broader definition of 
epistemic resources, clarifying that “[k]nowing requires resources of the mind, such as 
language to formulate propositions, concepts to make sense of experience, procedures 
to approach the world and standards to judge particular accounts of experience” (2011, 
p. 718).  
 Second, epistemic agency is exercised within particular epistemic communities 
in which one is able to be involved as a participant in knowledge production. This 
needn’t mean that one has specific kind of authority or expertise, only the expertise 
appropriate for the norms of the community. While this could mean a very specialized 
type of epistemic community (cultural, practical, academic, religious, and so on), this 
could also be as a member of the wider social population. As Solomon has discussed, 
the situated cognition approach to knowledge holds that knowing can be domain 
specific in this way (2007, p. 215). This means that knowledge is often developed as a 
competence at levels of concreteness and abstraction, and that skill or applicability in 
one task might not apply at other levels or in other tasks.  
 As discussed above, the enactive account gives us a way of thinking about these 
as participation genres. Epistemic communities might have varying pre-coordinated 
expectations about appropriate levels of expertise and skill, assumptions about shared 
hermeneutical resources, and styles of languaging (speech genres), but epistemic 
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resources might also involve the socio-material environment of epistemic practices. 
For example, science studies researchers such as Pickering (1995) have pointed out 
that “scientists have situated knowledge practices that are constituted around local 
experimental successes and are dependent on particular tools, domains, historical 
contexts and forms of social organization” (Solomon 2007, p. 413; see also Hekman 
2010). We not only need to take into account that acts of knowing are taking place in 
participatory contexts within specific epistemic communities, but also that those 
epistemic practices involve a material environment that has been created to enable 
those practices, or on which those practices sometimes depend.  
 Given what I’ve provided so far, there might be a red flag raised for those whose 
priority is in providing naturalistic grounds for a strong correspondence relation 
between epistemic artefacts and ‘the world’. However, given our shared practices, it 
need not be the case that this devolves into complete epistemic relativity, as these 
shared practices (such as in the sciences) rely on agreed upon epistemic goals and 
methods appropriate for that specific domain of interest. I think a discussion of how 
an enactive approach to epistemology might deal with matters widely discussed in 
social epistemology, such as objectivity, is in order, but it is outside of the scope of 
this paper. Any situated approaches to epistemology would likely be subject to the 
same concerns about objectivity often directed at social feminist epistemology, which 
is noted by Solomon: 
 
“My final conclusion is that epistemology is complex (there are many variables) 
and specific (lacking many global generalizations). Any normative 
recommendations and judgments will be for particular kinds of situation 
(domain, social organization, etc) and highly dependent on descriptive 
understanding of the situation. The move to situated cognition is thus a move 
away from generality in epistemology. Cartwright (1983) and Dupre (1993) have 
argued that generality in ontology (the ‘laws of nature’) is a myth, and that the 
most that scientists find is local regularities. I am arguing for a similar position 
in epistemology.” (2007, p. 426) 
 
My thought is that this is a problem if one wants to be a realist about truth, but realism 
and anti-realism are not my issue here (see Rowbottom 2019 for a defense of anti-
realist epistemology). The enactive position is that taking the objective attitude towards 
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epistemic phenomena is already a situated normative convention.  What we get from 
an enactive approach to epistemic agency is a sense of the myriad factors which co-
constitute these processes of knowledge production. The idea is to explain the practice 
of getting at truth, not to confirm or deny that we’re getting at truth through practice.  
 Thinking of enagaging in epistemic practices as being involved in participatory 
sense-making processes that involve a level of skill or expertise, taken up in epistemic 
agency, gives us some purchase on the dynamics at play in epistemic interactions. In 
sharing or co-creating knowledge with others, the interaction can shape, change, 
influence, or harm the participant (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). I’ve made a case 
that social epistemology can be useful for thinking about an enactive account of 
epistemic practices and phenomena. I’ll now look at more specific phenomena 
discussed within social epistemology to expand the connection: community values and 
epistemic oppression. The question remains whether the enactivist account has 
anything to offer social epistemology, which I will answer in the affirmative in the final 
section.   
 
3.5 Epistemic Values and Oppressions 
   
 Epistemic practices and their artefacts often reflect the values and interests of 
those who produce them. One of the core claims of critical social epistemologists is 
that group values affect epistemic practices, carve out domains of inquiry, and 
influence how we establish epistemic resources. Again, to quote Linda Alcoff: “Any 
claim to validity, authorization, or legitimation implies a position on how the world is 
to be conceptualized and understood in its relation to the sphere of the social and the 
knowledge under dispute” (1996, p. 3). Any epistemic artefact that makes claims about 
how the world is contains the implication that we ought to understand it that way. 
Considering the collective aspects of our knowledge production processes, this makes 
sense. We seek out those similarly situated to create knowledge about our lived 
experience. We build communities and develop expertise around the questions that 
matter to us. We actively seek the information that we value, and our interrelated 
projects and ways of being dictate, in many ways, the interactions with the world and 
others in which we act as knowing agents. Even in epistemic agency, our “flow of 
engagements with the world is always already imbued with significance” (De Jaegher 
2019, p. 8).  
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 Epistemic engagement with others “requires us to navigate tensions between 
embodied and interactive normative domains that are not guaranteed to be in 
alignment” (De Jaegher 2019, p. 9). As critical social epistemologies show us, these are 
often not in alignment. Members of marginalized groups are often at a disadvantage 
in epistemic engagement as individual and structural prejudices and inequalities 
manifest in our epistemic communities, practices, and interactions. The norms 
established by and meant to maintain the status quo of dominant groups are 
overrepresented in many epistemic communities, which leads to a number of epistemic 
harms.  
 The literature on epistemic injustices and epistemic oppressions looks at the 
ways that marginalization and prejudice shape epistemic resources, exchanges, and 
affect us as epistemic agents. Miranda Fricker (2007) discusses two kinds of epistemic 
injustices experienced by marginalized persons. The first is the injustice of being 
attributed with less epistemic credibility than we ought to be attributed, or testimonial 
injustice. The second is the injustice of not having the concepts needed to describe 
our experiences (2007) and the harm of not having some of these concepts, developed 
in epistemic communities, be accepted in other epistemic communities (2016). And as 
explained by Kristie Dotson, marginalized persons can experience epistemic silencing 
and exclusion in knowledge-sharing or testimonial interactions (2011, 2014), and these 
and other ongoing epistemic injustices should be thought of as epistemic oppressions.  
 Given research on how phenomena such as stereotype threat (when one 
underperforms in a task due to being told that members of an identity group to which 
they belong tend to ‘be bad at’ those kinds of tasks) can lead to ongoing experiences 
of self-doubt (Goguen 2016), I think it’s fair to think that we might also need to pay 
attention to the ways that oppressions in epistemic practices can have lasting effects 
through how we conceive of and comport ourselves as knowers. This is especially 
important within epistemic contexts where we know these oppressions are pervasive. 
However, while epistemic injustices are acts perpetuated by individuals in interaction, 
they are not simply reducible to the individual because they are often supported by 
epistemic communities and practices that structurally perpetuate those injustices.  
 Dotson also explains that these kinds of harms to one’s epistemic agency aren’t 
just harms to the individual, but are harms to the broader epistemic community 
(Dotson 2012). To deny the inclusion of epistemic resources, perspectives, or 
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participation, given that the exclusion is unwarranted, is to suppress the epistemic 
community in its aims to create knowledge.  
 I want to specify that these are not necessarily ubiquitous oppressions, though 
they might be encountered frequently, and though they might be pervasive within 
some communities. We are not members of just one epistemic community. And as 
Dotson points out about hermeneutical injustices, “Fricker seems to assume that there 
is but one set of collective hermeneutical resources that we are all equally dependent 
upon. I do not share this assumption. We do not all depend on the same hermeneutical 
resources. Such an assumption fails to take into account alternative epistemologies, 
countermythologies, and hidden transcripts that exist in hermeneutically marginalized 
communities among themselves” (Dotson 2012, p. 31).  
 We are members of a number of epistemic communities, through our identities, 
expertise, and interests. Here we ought to take into consideration that our sense-
making capacities are scaffolded and changed in collaboration with others in our 
epistemic communities. Our engagement in each of these participation genres involves 
participatory sense-making within different speech genres and norms of engagement. 
But in some of these more than others, the values, interests, and shared experiences 
of our groups will shape the way that we create knowledge and how.  
 In being situated by our sociocultural identities and creating knowledge 
collectively, we also inherit a history of meaning that is always more than we can 
capture in our epistemic practices; these shape the way that the world appears as 
significant to us. And as the domains of embodiment scaffold and constrain each 
other, sense-making processes in the different domains of embodiment will shape the 
way that we attend to the world, others, and our comportment in it (Brancazio 2019, 
also see chapter 4).  
 Considered this way, we can see that the harms to epistemic agency can be far 
reaching. Dominant groups encounter a dilemma in participating with marginalized 
persons in epistemic communities. Through epistemic silencing, exclusion, and the 
rejection of epistemic resources from other epistemic communities, dominant 
members can maintain the status quo and preserve their values and interests. On the 
other hand, they are harmed through this lack of inclusion in their aims to generate 
knowledge. Oftentimes dominant groups benefit from isolating and absorbing 
members of non-dominant identity groups into their epistemic communities so long 
as non-dominant members comply with the speech genres established and maintained 
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by dominant members, by way of appearing representative (or box-ticking for diversity 
hires), and also through habituating marginalized persons to attend to the world and 
others using the epistemic resources and practices established by the dominant group. 
Not only does this affect one’s resources for articulating their experience, but it can 
influence the way in which the world and others appear significant. The harms to 
marginalized persons participating in these epistemic communities, especially where 
there is ongoing epistemic oppression taking place, isolation, or forced compliance 
(fear of losing one’s job, for example), can thus be profound.  
 This brings me to my final point. When we focus on the sciences, or any 
particular epistemic community as the paradigm for knowledge production practices, 
we don’t just devalue other epistemic practices. We also ignore the ways that epistemic 
communities benefit from their connections with other communities.  There are many 
cases in which collective practices, given members’ similarities in experiences due to 
oppressions have given rise to new knowledges. Take for example the introduction of 
the term ‘cisnormativity’ to describe the generalized assumption (social, institution, 
representational, and so on) that a gender assigned at birth will match a person’s gender 
identity. This term came into use in the LGBTQIA+ community due to the collective 
need to describe the experiences of trans and gender-diverse persons navigating 
systems that did not take their lived identities and needs into account. This term was 
then taken up academically in 2009 (by Bauer et al.) to address a systemic problem in 
the healthcare system. The term has now been used in numerous academic fields by 
researchers looking at the ways in which cisnormativity affects trans and gender 
diverse persons in other institutions—for example, in prisons (Daley & Radford 2018) 
and in education (Cumming-Potvin & Martino 2018)—in efforts to improve those 
institutions. We see the creation of a term by those for whom the term reflected 
something significant in experience, taken up in academia, a place where those who 
are members of both epistemic communities have often been subject to epistemic 
oppressions. The incorporation of the new epistemic resource enables the increase of 
the perception of its significance in institutions, and novel applications of its use to 
document, critique, and attempt to reduce systemic problems.8  
  Epistemic agency can be the site of great harms as well as the site of radical, 
transformative change. In this section, I’ve discussed how we might begin to think 
                                                   
8 Similar to the case of Carmita Wood discussed in Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice (2007), 
the lack of this term previous to this might be viewed as a hermeneutic injustice.  
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about epistemic values and oppressions on the enactivist framework. I turn now to 
some positive aspects of belonging to multiple epistemic communities, and what that 
can add to discussions on the importance of epistemic diversity.  
 
3.6 Epistemic Diversity 
 
 What enactivism and social epistemologies both tell us about the nature of our 
epistemic practices is that practices and agencies are co-constitutive: agencies shape 
practices, and practices shape agencies. It would be a mistake to isolate an epistemic 
agent, or individual, in isolation, as the proper subject of inquiry (Grasswick 2004). 
How then might we discuss diversity in our epistemic communities without reducing 
its value to the individuals involved? The enactivist approach gives us a way to discuss 
the ways that situatedness lends itself to valuable differences in epistemic processes 
and practices without making claims that reduce these differences in any determinate 
sense. Also, and unlike cognitivist approaches, we can do so without treating 
differences in situatedness as differences in epistemic access to content or information 
in the world. 
 Feminist epistemologists have been on the forefront in examining the ways that 
marginalized perspectives have been neglected in research communities, especially in 
the sciences, and how diversity in research communities can improve our epistemic 
projects. For example, having representative research communities can expose 
entrenched colonial and patriarchal values and narratives in programs and 
methodologies, and bring to light predilections or oversights in deciding which 
phenomena are relevant for study (and the factors that may or may not be incidental 
to knowing about those phenomena).  
 How it is that situatedness, or our socio-cultural-political location and identity, 
actually affects epistemic processes and practices, and whether diversity in situatedness 
provides epistemic value, has been the source of some disagreement. Cognitive 
diversity, within traditional epistemology, has garnered a fair bit of discussion as it 
applies to epistemic normativity, belief evaluation, and what it is to assert that one 
knows, but there is a wide variation in the sense of diversity at play. The term ‘cognitive 
diversity’ (or similar terms, such as ‘cognitive style’) is used to indicate differences in 
situatedness or demographic diversity, to point out differences in standpoints, to 
discuss neurodiversity, and even to mean political differences (Harding 1982, Hill 
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Collins 2000, Brown 2013, Williamson 2000). It can be challenging to understand the 
epistemic value of diversity when cognitive diversity can mean as little as “variation in 
background beliefs, concepts used, and reasoning styles” (Pöyhönen 2017).   
 Arguments promoting the epistemic value of diversity have been criticized for 
not being clear enough about why it is epistemically important rather than important 
in virtue of moral and political injustices. While diversity has been argued to be a group 
epistemic virtue (Longino 2001), the reasons given for the epistemic value of diversity 
tend to focus on moral and political issues, such as compensation for epistemic 
injustices (Fricker 2007) and filtering of problematic biases (Antony 2016). Without 
demographic differences being connected to sociocultural marginalization, it is not 
clear what makes diversity epistemically valuable. While there is general consensus on 
the importance of diversity, reasons are often based on the inequality of 
underrepresented groups. In other words, it can appear that the oppression that one 
experiences because of aspects of their lived identities makes their epistemic situation 
unique, not one’s lived identities alone.  
 Louise Antony, for instance, takes issue with the idea that diversity in 
situatedness is epistemically valuable: “The assumption needs justification—it certainly 
does not follow from the social importance of race, gender, and so forth that such 
properties are more epistemically important than any other parameters of variation” 
(Antony 2016, p. 170, emphasis original). Without qualification of some sort, Antony 
claims that pointing only to marginalization as contributing to the epistemic value of 
diversity would be to concede that there is nothing more to the truth than levels of 
influence: 
 
“Getting at the truth is complicated, and one of the things that complicates it 
considerably is that powerful people frequently have strong motives for keeping 
less powerful people from getting at the truth. It’s one job of a critical 
epistemology, in my view, to expose this fact, to make the mechanisms of such 
distortions transparent. But, if we, as critical epistemologists, lose sight of what 
we’re after, if we concede that there’s nothing at stake other than the matter of 
whose ‘version’ is going to prevail, then our projects become as morally 
bankrupt and badly self-interested as Theirs.” (Antony 1993) 
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In order to differentiate social and epistemic importance, she stresses the need for a 
naturalistic epistemology to establish how we might determine what is epistemically 
important. The job of the critical epistemologist, she continues, is to analyze the ways 
in which the truth, or access to the truth, is controlled by the interests of dominant 
groups by means of the inclusion of self-interests, influence, and access. It is here 
where she says diversity is valuable: for illuminating the ways in which the truth is 
being occluded by dominant groups. 
 Similar to Dotson’s criticism of Fricker, I think one problem with Antony’s view 
is that it assumes one epistemic community to which marginalized persons might be 
denied access. She is concerned with Helen Longino’s view (2001) that the 
incorporation of multiple perspectives is important for getting narrative objectivity, 
which she considers to be representative inclusion of values and interests in epistemic 
communities rather than the elimination of values and interests in practices. Antony 
says of Longino that she “recognises that we cannot really increase the number of 
perspectives available to individual agents—it is always just one per agent, however 
various that agent’s experience—but she thinks we can get the effect of doing so by 
increasing the number of agents whose perspectives are in play” (Antony 2016, p. 169).  
 For Antony, the epistemic benefits of increasing perspectives would only be to 
increase the possibility of unearthing problematic values or biases in the dominantly-
governed epistemic community. Along these lines, she attempts to problematize social 
position as offering epistemic benefits, saying that Longino is “not assuming that just any 
type of diversity makes for an epistemically stronger community. She makes a much 
more specific assumption: viz. that variation in social position is what is epistemically 
salutary” (Antony 2016, p. 170, emphasis original). However, given the above 
discussion, being situated in a particular way might involve belonging to multiple 
different epistemic communities, and the possible epistemic contributions and insights 
one might have from this extend to more than one’s perspective on the dominant 
epistemic community from a marginalized place within that community.   
 The enactivist approach gives us a way to discuss differences in epistemic 
processes and practices, or epistemic attunement, without conceiving of epistemic 
situatedness merely or most notably as epistemic access to content or information in 
the world. We might have one perspective, in the sense of being metaphysically limited 
to being one person over time, but the number of perspectives we might be privy to 
in terms of the ways in which we are situated within participation genres, inheriting 
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and co-create meaning within them, may be quite numerous. Being attuned only to the 
aspects of marginalized identities stemming from oppressions may be viably politically 
grounded (to avoid making essentializing claims about these groups). But the enactivist 
framework gives us a way to explore the how our habituation through belonging and 
building collective knowledge can perhaps give us unique knowledge production 
perspectives. 
 While the ameliorative effects of epistemic diversity have been discussed above, 
these are not the only epistemic benefits of diversity. Elizabeth Anderson, for instance, 
argues that the inclusion of feminist researchers or commitments opens up new 
theoretical possibilities: “Research informed by feminist commitments makes new 
explanatory models available, reframes old questions, exposes facts that undermine 
the plausibility of previously dominant theories, improves data-gathering techniques, 
and shifts the relations of cognitive authority among fields and theories.” (Anderson 
1995, p.81). This specifies feminist commitments as being the source of these benefits, 
and while I agree that theoretical expertise and political attentiveness are epistemically 
valuable for these reasons, I think that the case for epistemic diversity goes further.  
 Gender-related oppression, for example, might offer an important axis of 
understanding, through collective practices (standpoint-building) in epistemic 
communities, on the manifestations of patriarchal structures and institutions and the 
devaluation of non-masculine traits. But it could also be the case that gender is 
important because of differences in habits of coupling with the environment and other 
subjects through (or constrained by, or in spite of) social norms and reflective 
processes. My view is that the enactive approach gives us a way of thinking more about 
the positives of diversity through embodied, inter-scale cognitive dynamics without 
bottoming out in reductive, essentialist explanations. For example, cultivating a 
standpoint can lead to more than hermeneutic or other reflective epistemic resources. 
The process of building collective resources can also lead us to changes in our pre-
reflective processes, making us more attentive to facets of our experience of the world 
(as I will discuss in the next chapter).  
 As pioneering feminist practitioner of science Evelyn Fox Keller has said of her 
experience working as a feminist within the sciences that “[s]cientists in every 
discipline live and work with assumptions that feel like constants ("that's what good 
science is") but that are in fact variable, and, given the right kind of jolt, subject to 
change. Such parochialities, like any other communal practice, can be perceived only 
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through the lens of difference, by stepping outside the community” (Evelyn Fox Keller 
1985, p. 12). I propose that these differences might not be purely given through our 
belonging to epistemic communities, but that we might want to take into account the 
ways in which they become significant to us in different ways because of our 
participation in differing epistemic communities. For example, in her well-known 
biography on Barbara McClintock (1983), Fox Keller details the way that McClintock’s 
approach to scientific practice in the 1950s was radically different than those of her 
male peers, which Fox Keller claims is (at least partially) due to the influence of gender. 
She argues that the ways that men approach scientific practice is guided by the ways 
that men are socialized to preference independence and isolation, while McClintock 
has been raised to favor a holistic and integrative approach.  The enactive approach 
provides a way for exploring the ways that this kind of gender socialization can 
influence our epistemic practices naturalistically, non-reductively, and in a way that can 
be useful for a feminist, anti-racist politics that rejects any form of essentialism while 
embracing and celebrating diversity.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
 As one of only a few forays into enactive epistemology, there’s far more work 
to be done in clearing this ground, and part of that work will have to be evaluating 
what we want from normative claims about epistemic phenomena. Clancey motivates 
this rather well: 
 
“[W]e cannot locate meaning in the text, life in the cell, the person in the body, 
knowledge in the brain, a memory in a neuron. Rather, these are all active, 
dynamic processes, existing only in interactive behaviors of cultural, social, 
biological, and physical environment systems. Meaning, life, people, knowledge, 
and so on, are not arbitrary, wholly subjective, culturally relative, or totally 
improvised.” (2009, p.28) 
 
Looking at the brain alone might show connectivity differences because of habituation 
through sociocultural identities and interactions within systems of social norms, 
patterns of treatment, and neuroplasticity, developed over time in specific socio-
cultural contexts. But this is only part of a full explanation of how we might understand 
differences in epistemic agency. By utilizing a non-reductive approach, we can also 
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look at the ways that sociohistorical context, group identity, personal agency, and 
context shape epistemic practices, and are shaped by the subject who engages in them. 
If we add in ecological, material, and phenomenological dimensions, we can take into 
account differences in the ways that social, cultural, and environmental opportunities 
for action, through habits of attention and interaction, shape the way in which we 
encounter the world  and situate the practices in which we participate (Pickering 2004). 
I propose that by being attentive to the ways that our sociocultural situation influences 
our knowledge production processes, we can build an enactive epistemology that takes 
into consideration the deep and lasting impacts of epistemic oppressions. This 
nuanced approach to the cognitive underpinnings of our epistemic processes might 
also be useful for adding support to arguments for the epistemic value of diversity.   
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Chapter 4 
Gender and the Senses of Agency ∗ 
 
Abstract: 
 
This chapter details the ways that gender structures our senses of agency on an enactive 
framework. While it is common to discuss how gender influences higher, narrative 
levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in considerations about our 
identities, it is less clear how gender structures our more immediate, embodied 
processes, such as the minimal sense of agency. While enactivists often acknowledge 
that gender and other aspects of our socio-cultural situatedness shape our cognitive 
processes, there is little work on how this shaping takes place. In order to provide such 
an account, I first look at the minimal and narrative senses of agency (Gallagher 2012), 
a distinction that draws from work on minimal and narrative selves (Zahavi 2010). 
Next I explain the influence of the narrative sense of agency on the minimal sense of 
agency through work on intention-formation (Pacherie 2007). After a discussion of 
the role of gender in the narrative sense of agency, I expand on work by Haslanger 
(2012) and Young (1980) to offer three ways in which gender influences the minimal 
sense of agency, showing the effect that gender has on how we perceive our 
possibilities for interaction in a phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
 A version of this chapter has been published as: 
 
Brancazio, N., 2019. Gender and the senses of agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 18, 
425–440. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9581-z 
 
68 
 
Chapter 4 
Gender and the Senses of Agency 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 Gender plays an extensive role in influencing the way we are treated, what others 
expect of us, and how we think of ourselves. It is likely to be seen as uncontentious, 
then, to claim that gender influences our sense of agency in some significant sense. 
However, there is an ambiguity between the different senses of agency (Gallagher 
2012); this ambiguity can be thought of as existing between our narrative, or reflective, 
sense of agency and our minimal, or immediately embodied, sense of agency, tied, for 
example, to motor control processes. While it is common to discuss how gender 
influences higher, narrative levels of cognition, as with the formulation of goals and in 
considerations about our social identities, it is less clear whether, or how, gender could 
have a pronounced effect on our minimal sense of agency. The arguments provided 
in this paper will demonstrate the effect that gender has on how we perceive our 
possibilities for interaction in a phenomenologically immediate, pre-reflective manner.  
 Through an analysis of the effects of gender on our intentions and senses of 
agency, I will show that gender does more than factor into our cognitive deliberations 
and become manifest in our bodily comportment; gender structures our experience in 
very phenomenologically fundamental ways. Rather than positing basic, universal 
cognitive processes which give a phenomenological core to experience which is 
untouched by gender, race, or other particularities of a person’s identity or 
situatedness, repeated patterns of behavior mediated by socioculturally situated social 
norms give rise to differences in even our most minimal cognitive processes. The 
arguments provided thus are a means to opening a dialogue about how gender norms 
create differences in experience without either making any claims about essential, or 
hard-wired, differences, or by positing a phenomenological neutral subjectivity from 
which gender deviates us (or, more problematically, which we should be seeking to 
achieve).  
 The paper will proceed as follows: First, I will discuss the differences between 
two senses of agency: the minimal sense of agency and the narrative sense of agency 
(Marcel 2003; Gallagher 2012), which roughly correspond to minimal and narrative 
selves (Gallagher 2000, Zahavi 2010). Next I will explain the influence of the narrative 
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sense of agency on the minimal sense of agency through work on intention-formation 
(Pacherie 2008). After a discussion of the role of gender in forming high-level 
intentions, I’ll offer three ways in which gender can be said to influence the minimal 
sense of agency.  
 
4.2 Senses of Agency and Intention Formation 
 
 The relationships between action, perception, and the senses of agency are so 
tightly knit that we can only make sense of the senses of agency by looking at them 
together. First, it will be important to explain the distinction between two senses of 
agency, and further, the action-related nature of the minimal sense of agency. That is, 
in the latter case, I am concerned with our sense of agency as the feeling that one is 
the source or cause of one’s own actions in an “occurrent and immersed” sense 
(Marcel 2003). In phenomenological terms, this kind of agency can be thought of as 
pre-reflective. One generally does not need to assess whether one is exercising agency; 
there is, in most cases, no need for introspection to assess whether one is the source 
of one’s own actions while engaged in those actions (Gallagher 2000, 2012). As Farrer 
and Frith say, “The sense of agency (i.e. being aware of causing an action) occurs in 
the context of a body moving in time and space.” (2002, pg. 601). This 
phenomenological, immediate sense of agency is said to be an aspect of the minimal 
self, or the self as the basic subject of experience (Gallagher 2000, Zahavi 2010). 
Following Marcel, I will call this the minimal sense of agency (2003). 
 We ought to understand the minimal sense of agency as phenomenologically 
primitive. The minimal sense of agency is an aspect of the minimal sense of self, given 
through immediate experience, since the fundamental nature of phenomenological 
experience is that it is always experience-for-a-subject (Gallagher 2000). The minimal 
self is this subject, given in experience, who is always in the process of soliciting her 
own further experiences through action.9 Evaluating the influence of gender on the 
minimal sense of agency thus requires that we look at its influence on the embodied 
perception-action complex within which the phenomenological sense of agency arises.    
                                                   
9 It seems prudent to note that this is not always the case. There is plenty of work on pathologies and 
traumas related to agency, selfhood, and a sense of ownership (for example, see Yochai 2015, Gallagher 
2015, Gallagher & Trigg 2016). Still, most cases involve interruptions in agency and ownership, not a 
complete lack. Therefore, much of what will be developed later about the influence of gender will still be 
applicable.  
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 In the tradition of Merleau-Ponty (2012), Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), 
Gallagher and Zahavi (2012), and others who hold that the body is more than a vehicle 
for the brain, I will argue here that our minimal sense of agency can be understood as 
neither separate from the body, nor decoupled from the environment. Cognition is a 
thoroughly relational and action-oriented dynamic process involving an organism’s 
brain, body, and environment. In looking at the senses of agency, then, we have to 
consider that this minimal sense plays a role in an organism’s embodied capability to 
interact with her environment, where embodiment is understood “in terms of wide-
reaching organismic sensorimotor interactions that are contextually embedded” 
(Hutto and Myin, 2012, p. 6). Embodiment, then, is relational; the body itself discloses 
possibilities for interaction through its particular morphology (e. g. hands can grasp, 
eyes can peer, and so on) and the environmental context in which it is embedded (e.g. 
there is a cup for grasping, a night sky to gaze upon, and so on). The environment 
dynamically discloses its possibilities for interaction, or affordances (Gibson 1979, 
Chemero 2009, Kiverstein and Rietveld 2015), in relation with an organism with 
certain capacities to act. For the organism, not only is perception for action (Noë 
2005), but action is for perception. 
 The dynamic interchange between the subject’s embodied organism and her 
environment, patterned and primed by previous exchanges, changes the saliency of 
environmental possibilities for interaction based on her previous interactions. In other 
words, our actions in each moment, and our experience of those actions, influence the 
way that new possibilities for interaction unfold. The possibilities for interaction given 
to us through our bodily capacities and previous interactions, as well as our habits of 
coupling and their success, provide an embodied know-how that is manifest in 
perception and the way we perceive affordances for future actions (Kiverstein and 
Rietveld 2015).   
 There exists a long-standing tradition in the philosophy of action of looking at 
agency as the fulfillment of a certain causal sequence between an intention (or reason) 
and an action (Goldman 1970, Davidson 1980). In these cases, a functional account is 
given for linking the content of the action’s goal and the action itself. Cognitivist 
approaches to agency thus tend to characterize the sense of agency in terms of a kind 
of knowledge of oneself or one’s mental state as the causal source of action (Velleman 
1989). Much of the literature on action and agency outside of the fields of ecological 
psychology and enactivism have thus been concerned with how to best describe the 
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causal relations between reasons for acting (as propositional attitudes) and the actions 
themselves. That is, they have sought to best explain the received assumption that 
there is a robust relationship between an agent’s reasons for acting–in the sense of 
having a propositional attitude–and her action.  
 However, this view of agency seems to necessitate the extra steps of evaluation 
and attribution not required in the dynamic, agency-in-action view. The minimal sense 
of agency, as discussed above, should be considered the phenomenological side of a 
collection of interdependent, co-constitutive, nested processes that are temporally and 
spatially extensive. On this view, minimal agency is not necessarily causally guided by 
conceptual content. As described by Gallagher and Zahavi, “The first-order 
experiences of ownership and agency are embodied, non-conceptual experiences, and 
are closely tied to the temporal structure of consciousness. For example, if I reach to 
pick up a glass, there is information in my motor system that specifies something about 
the present and immediate history of my hand position, and an anticipation that is 
built into my movement as my hand shapes its grasp. This temporal structure of 
movement is mirrored in my sense of control over the movement and so in my sense 
of self-agency” (2012, p. 180). This describes what is elsewhere called our 
proprioceptive awareness, or our physical awareness of being the source of our own 
actions through the sensorimotor feedback we receive while undertaking those actions 
(Marcel 2003, p. 54).  
 However, there are many situations in which an agent does reflectively evaluate 
or explain her actions in terms of a broader framework: a belief system, history, prior 
intentions, future plans, and so forth. That is, she makes sense of her actions in terms 
of who she is as a continuous, coherent being, the kinds of rules or principles that she 
follows, and with the understanding that in order to achieve a goal in the future, she 
may have to accomplish many smaller goals at appropriate times. Her actions in these 
cases are the result of conscious, decision-making processes, and these deliberative 
processes lead to have a contentful mental state that has a causal link to a particular 
action or series of actions. There is, expectedly, a phenomenological element here as 
well; as Stephens and Graham (1994) describe it, making sense of her actions in this 
way will depend on whether she has the kinds of beliefs and intentions that cohere 
with the action undertaken in terms of her theory of herself and the kind of person 
that she is. She appeals in this case to her narrative self, or the self that she understands 
herself to be, based on her prior actions, belief system, and the way in which she makes 
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sense of herself as a being over time (Schechtman 1996). The sense of agency, in this 
case, will be in terms of fulfilling this consciously selected goal and initiating the actions 
needed to reach it. That is, there is a conscious causal relationship between some pre-
decided, propositional or contentful attitude and an action or series of actions.  I will 
call this the narrative sense of agency. 
 This isn’t to say that conscious sense-making of one’s actions always appeals to 
a full evaluation of oneself in a storied sense. However, there is a close connection 
between a notion of a narrative self and narrative agency, as the same resources used 
to build the former scaffold the latter. One aspect of the development of this narrative 
competence involves repeated exposure to narrative archetypes. Through narrative 
practices involving characters with a coherent story and character traits, we come to 
understand actions in terms of reason-action coupling (Hutto 2008). We get a sense 
of why a character performs a certain action based on who they are as a person over 
time.10 These stories we create for ourselves and share with others about who we are 
form our narrative selves, and these competencies allow us to evaluate and attribute 
propositional, coherent reasons for our actions.  
 These distinctions between the different senses of agency are not meant to be 
fine-grained; however, they should serve well enough to provide an understanding of 
the basic differences between the immediate feeling that we are the source of an action 
while engaged in that action and the carrying out of actions based on the prior 
existence of a deliberately selected goal. As I will show presently, each of these can 
influence the other. Again, quoting Gallagher and Zahavi, “To be human is already to 
be action-situated in the world in a way that defines the organized usefulness of the 
things we find around us, and then lets us think about them.” (2012, pg. 189). As 
applied to the senses of agency, we can also think of this as saying that our minimal 
sense of agency scaffolds the ability to have a narrative sense of agency. In order to 
demonstrate this, as well as to emphasize the upstream and downstream relationships 
between the senses of agency, I will discuss the role of intention-formation processes 
as related to both senses of agency discussed.  
 One criticism of the received view of reason-action coupling is that the 
attribution of reasons for action is a restrospective folk psychological sense-making 
                                                   
10 Pacherie (2007) describes this in a similar fashion, noting that, in her parlance, the long-term sense of 
agency “may be thought to include both a sense of oneself as an agent apart from any particular action, 
i.e. a sense of one's capacity for action over time, and a form of self-narrative where one's past actions and 
projected future actions are given a general coherence and unified through a set of overarching goals, 
motivations, projects and general lines of conduct” (p. 6).   
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process (Dennett 1991), meaning that reasons for actions are provided in this way after 
an action is performed due to our linguistic and cooperative tendencies. However, this 
kind of attribution of reasons in propositional, or narrative terms, can also have a 
prospective, or future-directed, aspect (Gallagher 2012). One can deliberate about 
what she ought to do and form future intentions based on the type of person she 
believes she is or has been, her related goals and desires, and so forth. 
Given the distinctions between the senses of agency, however, it only makes sense to 
consider that there may be corresponding distinctions between types of intentions. 
 Gallagher has previously made this case (2012), demonstrating that the 
distinctions between minimal and narrative senses of agency can be mapped on to 
intention-formation practices as detailed by Pacherie (2007; see also Bratman 1987). 
Pacherie distinguishes between future, present, and motor intentions (as F-intentions, 
P-intentions, and M-intentions). F-intentions are those intentions which we decide 
upon on a conscious, reflective level. These are consciously present to us precisely 
because they are generally the product of a conscious decision-making process, and 
their aims transcend what we are immediately able to accomplish. Pacherie describes 
P-intentions as “constrained by the present spatial as well as non-spatial characteristics 
of the agent, the target of the action, and the surrounding context” (2007, p. 3). These 
are the aims of our current actions, constrained spatially and temporally; in other 
words, they are those things which it is possible to accomplish presently. M-intentions 
are those sub-personal motor processes that allow us to accomplish our goals, or to 
enact our P-intentions, such as shaping our hand the correct way to grasp a cup or 
hold a pen. However, these are not (all) so sub-personal that we cannot attend to them; 
they are just not always a part of our immediate experience of an action.11 
 An F-intention is a decision to pursue a specific task or even a more general 
goal. For example, getting a university degree is a rather general goal-oriented F-
intention that cashes out into a myriad of smaller F-intentions (pass a class, do well on 
an exam, and so on). A better example might be my plan to take a holiday to Adelaide. 
The fulfillment of this F-intention requires that I fulfill a number of requirements 
beforehand (booking travel and rooms, getting approval for my time off, planning my 
itinerary) and during (getting to the airport, finding my terminal, boarding the plane). 
Each of these smaller components form P-intentions, and provide a smaller goal to be 
fulfilled. Booking the flight, for example, requires that I have the right kind of tools, 
                                                   
11 I thank Rebecca Harrison and Patrick McGivern for insight on linking M-intentions and attention.  
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such as my laptop, and time available to me to be able to perform this action. Boarding 
the plane requires that I be in a particular environment and go through a series of steps 
(standing in line, navigating the terminal, getting through security, finding my way to 
my seat) that are only possible because I am in the proper context at the right time to 
facilitate their completion. Finding and settling into my seat is only an option when I 
am on the plane. The ability to fulfill this P-intention is reliant on my being in the right 
spatiotemporal context to allow me to achieve the goal.  
 We can see from this example that a P-intention can be part of a larger F-
intention but directed at accomplishing some small goal in itself. In many cases, these 
may not occur to me explicitly as intentions. The action of standing in line to go 
through security, in the previous example, might not be the result of a conscious 
deliberating process. I have not decided to stand in line, it becomes part of a goal-
oriented action based on the current spatiotemporal situation. As a frequent traveler, 
it might not have even occurred to me in a phenomenological sense that I need to get 
into the line—I simply adapted to the situation pre-reflectively while continuing to 
think about what I’m going to do when I disembark, or whether or not I have time 
for a pre-flight cocktail.  However, if someone asked me what I was doing in line I 
could retrospectively provide them with an answer in terms of a reason (“I am waiting 
to go through security.”). 
 Drawing on this framework, Gallagher notes that the repetition of P-intentions 
can lead us to attribute those reasons for action in terms of more deliberate, over-
arching F-intentions. Gallagher provides his habit of immediately responding to letter-
writing requests as an example of this. He says “over time I built up a habitual practice 
that seems to guide my behavior in most circumstances. If I am following a rule here, 
the rule seems to have emerged from my practice, rather than the other way around. I 
could now formulate that rule as an F-intention, but I would be doing so only in 
retrospective reflection” (2012, p. 20). While there may not have been a time when he 
rationalized this rule, he is now in the habit of forming a certain kind of response to 
requests (P-intention) which, if asked why, he would describe in terms of a belief about 
how he ought to respond to these requests (F-intention). The F-intention did not lead 
to P-intentions; engaging in a particular kind of P-intention repeatedly led to the 
formulation of an F-intention (as a rule guiding his behaviors).  
 Gallagher’s example highlights that not only can F-intentions (as goals or rules) 
be fulfilled by a series of P-intentions, but that a series of separate P-intentions can 
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lead to the reflective formulation of an F-intention. This complicates the distinctions 
and relationship between types of intentions, and he argues that these complications 
should be brought to bear on our understanding of the senses of agency. However, 
Gallagher’s example is explicit enough that the P-intentions in that case might be 
thought of as a result of a deliberation process. Perhaps he briefly deliberated a few 
separate times when presented with a recommendation request, and that series of 
separate deliberation processes led to the later formulation of an overarching F-
intention.  
 This brings up an important issue: for Pacherie, the goals of P-intentions are 
contentful representations. She marks the distinction between P- and M-intentions in 
this regard as follows: “In contrast to M-intentions, P-intentions specify our situated 
goals and represent them in a perceptual representational format readily accessible to 
consciousness. Through them we can be aware of what our immediate goals are” 
(2007, p. 196) and, again, “I therefore propose to say that an action in the minimal 
sense is an intentional movement, and consists of two parts: the bodily movement 
itself and the M-intention that causes and guides this movement. An intentional action 
in turn also consists in two parts: an action or intentional movement, understood in 
the sense just outlined, and the P-intention that causes and guides it” (2007 p. 190). 
My concern here is that this seems to lead us to a Euthyphro dilemma: is an action 
intentional because it is caused by a P-intention, or do we posit the existence of a 
causally relevant P-intention because the action is intentional? In other words, what 
necessitates the existence of a contentful representation to guide the action in order 
for this to be the defining feature of an intentional action? 
 This concern may be more pronounced if we look at Pacherie’s explanation of 
how our phenomenological experience maps onto these intentions. As she says, “our 
awareness of our movements rests for the most part on our awareness of the 
predictions made at the level of P-intentions and on the comparison between these 
predictions and consciously available exteroceptive feedback. When the action unfolds 
smoothly, this awareness is typically extremely limited. Action specification and action 
control mechanisms at the level of M-intentions operate automatically and remain 
outside the subject’s subjective experience” (2007 p. 201). For Pacherie, then, M-
intentions are outside of the phenomenological sphere of experience, or conscious 
attention, while P-intentions involve explicit phenomenological attention to a goal. As 
she puts it, “Forming a P-intention to act on an object, say reach for a pen, typically 
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involves focusing one’s attention on the object that is to be the target of the action” 
(2007, p. 186-7). That is, the goal to be accomplished in the current context is present 
to us in a robust, contentful sense. 
 I don’t intend to dispute that P-intentions can be contentful, especially in the 
case that they are connected to an F-intention. In fact, this seems highly appropriate. 
However, I’d also like to entertain the possibility that there can be non-contentful P-
intentions that are available to us in phenomenological immediacy. These could be the 
products of joint attentional practices (where there has been external guidance on what 
actions to perform or how to perform them in certain contexts), behavioral corrections 
(where there has been external guidance on what actions not to perform or how not 
to perform them in certain contexts), or simply individual patterns of engagement that 
lead to habits of response. These would fall into a grey area between Pacherie’s 
intentional movements and intentional actions using the contentful criterion, but the 
phenomenological criterion would place these into the realm of P-intentions, as they 
are not outside of subjective experience, nor are their aims necessarily contentful in 
any robust sense. These are the purposeful actions, in the minimal sense of agency, in 
which we find ourselves attentively immersed but that lack any prior goal-formulation 
process. Further, these kinds of intentional actions, which I would consider to be P-
intentions, can also lead to the formulation of an F-intention at a later time, such as in 
Gallagher’s example.  
 Most relevant to the following discussion of the influence of gender is the 
question of how aware we are of the rules that govern our behavior, or if these can be 
really even said to be rules before we have brought our habits into the realm of 
conscious consideration. We often purposefully attend to features in our current 
environment and, over time, the way in which we attend to these can lead us to 
reflectively attribute a guiding rule, or F-intention, that was not contentful at the time. 
Put simply, we may not be aware that we are following a particular rule until we have 
been following it – the rule can emerge from behavior (Gallagher 2012) – and the 
formulation of this rule is often removed from the previous contexts in which it was 
enacted.  
 This section has served to establish a framework for understanding how our 
minimal and narrative selves give rise to minimal and narrative senses of agency. In 
addition, these senses of agency can be mapped on to intention-formation processes. 
Problematic, however, is the mismatch between the criterion of content for P-
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intentions and the phenomenological experience of our purposeful actions in a pre-
reflective, occurrent sense. To this, I have argued that the criterion for establishing 
that an action is intentional should also take into account the phenomenological 
experience in our minimal sense of agency, especially in the case that a P-intention is 
not connected to an F-intention. I have also argued that these kinds of P-intentions 
can also later be formulated into F-intentions, regardless of whether or not they were 
robustly contentful at the time of action. The point I will make in the following section 
is that this rule-emergence from habituation provides one avenue for understanding 
the influence of gender on our sense of narrative agency, and in the final section, on 
our minimal sense of agency.  
 
4.3 Gender and the Narrative Sense of Agency 
 
 Philosophical debates on how best to describe gender involve a range of aspects, 
from gender performance (Butler 1990) to the possession or assumed possession of 
certain capacities (Alcoff 2006) to the functional essence that defines our social identity 
(Witt 2011). In other words, there is little agreement on what gender is or how to best 
understand the associated social norms and expectations. For the purposes of this 
paper I will be using gender to refer to an associated and loosely unified set of socio-
cultural norms, roles, and expectations historically organized around presumptions 
related to a sex binary. This in no way suggests that any claims about the role of gender 
in cognition imply that all who identify with a gender are affected in the same way, nor 
that all individuals identify with a gender category. Further, the account developed 
below purposefully rejects any claims of innate biological differences in cognitive 
capacities. However, I think it would be amiss to say that there are those for whom 
gender (under the broad definition given) has not had an impact on their lived 
experience.  
 Sally Haslanger (2012) gives a brief account of how it is that gender (and other 
social norms) provide us with schemas through which we make sense of the world. In 
her words: 
 
“Let’s take schemas to be intersubjective patterns of perception, thought, and 
behavior. They are embodied in individuals as a shared cluster of open-ended 
dispositions to see things a certain way or to respond habitually in particular 
circumstances. Schemas encode knowledge and also provide scripts for 
78 
 
interaction with each other and our environment. They also exist at different 
depths. Deep schemas are pervasive and relatively unconscious. Surface 
schemas are more narrow and are easier to identify and change; but their change 
may leave the deeper schema intact.” (2012, p. 415) 
 
Given the enactive understanding of cognition, detailed above, Haslanger’s (2012) 
work on gender norms provides a good starting point for understanding how it is that 
these gender norms might situate cognition, specifically our senses of agency. While 
Haslanger uses this account of schemas to make a case about contexts and truth-
evaluability (what she calls “milieu relativism”), there are some aspects which the 
enactive account is well positioned to develop further.  
 As she describes them, gender norms result from divisions of labor and kinds 
of activities in virtue of one’s body type. Social roles, structured by these divisions, 
provide a (rough) set of associated norms and traits. Another way to put this would be 
to say that a society’s gender roles provide a normative means of assessing ourselves 
in light of the functional social role via specific gender norms (Haslanger 2012, p. 42).  
 To be clear, however, Haslanger maintains that gender norms stem from 
subordinative or hierarchical relationships. That is, gender, at least in the sense in 
which it is used now (in contemporary Western society), is used as a means of 
domination. Gender has been used to maintain oppressive, hierarchical institutions 
through which free labor is secured and reproductive autonomy denied. It is to the 
benefit of the dominant gender group that our social structures encourage us to see 
ourselves as having a gender identity and to make sense of ourselves, explicitly or 
implicitly, in accordance with gender norms.  
 One approach to understanding the impact of gender and other social norms is 
to look deeper at the narrative practices mentioned in the previous section, specifically 
as they relate to the creation of a narrative self. Beginning very early, we are repeatedly 
exposed to narrative archetypes as we are developing social and sense-making 
competencies. These archetypes, characters with a coherent story and strong personas, 
help us to develop an understanding of why a character performs a certain action based 
on their character traits. In a society with pronounced gender differences, narrative 
archetypes tend to reinforce the traits associated with gender norms. For example, 
until recently in Euro-centric cultures some of the dominant general narrative 
archetypes for women have been the temptress, the virgin, the mother, and the sage 
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(and these archetypes remain deeply entrenched). As Haslanger states, “if females are 
expected to perform the role of mothering and to perform it well, then rather than 
coerce them to fulfill this role, it is much better for females to be motivated to perform 
it. So the norms must be internalized, that is, they must be understood as part of one’s 
identity and defining what would count as one’s success as an individual” (Haslanger 
2012, p.10). Making sense of oneself through the gender archetypes provided, or the 
internalization of these archetypes to form the basis through which one understands 
her narrative self, means that the way in which one makes sense of her actions and 
formulates goals in line with her identity are in ways that perpetuate her oppression. 
Assessing whether these structures of oppression are fundamental to understanding 
gender, as Haslanger and others (see also Antony 2016) hold, is beyond what can be 
accomplished here. It is enough to say that they presently continue to sustain these 
and other injustices.  
 The centrality of gender in building one’s narrative self cannot be understated. 
Charlotte Witt (2011) has argued that because of the fundamental ways in which 
societies divide the social functions of individuals along gender lines, gender provides 
the principle of normative unity, or the basis of an individual’s social identity. 
However, where Witt thinks that the social identity can in some ways be separated 
from the person (understood as a narrative self), so that self-understanding does not 
need to be fundamentally gendered, it is not clear how acquainted we must be with 
these norms in order to achieve such a separation. Several concerns arise here: how 
contentful are gender norms, how able are we to access them, and is this in conflict 
with the issues of internalization discussed above? My position is that one does not 
have to attend to gender norms in an explicit or even implicit sense for gender to be 
central in shaping or understanding our narrative selves.  
 Pacherie’s analysis of the formation of F-intentions includes a discussion of 
consistency that can be helpful in illuminating the relationship between gender, 
narrative selves, and the narrative sense of agency. She offers three kinds of 
consistency that play a role in the deliberation processes that lead to the formation of 
F-intentions: internal consistency (the actions plans made to undertake an F-intention 
must cohere in the right way to facilitate the completion of the goal), external 
consistency (conforming with an agent’s beliefs about the world), and global 
consistency (meshing with the agent’s wider framework of projects and activities) 
(Pacherie 2007). Considerations about the influence of gender in the creation of 
80 
 
narrative selves are directly relevant to the latter two, external and global consistency, 
and intention-formation. In the case of external consistency, one’s beliefs about the 
world would include socio-culturally situated beliefs about what a member of their 
gender group ought to do, or even can do, or beliefs about the ease or difficulty of 
pursuing certain ends as a member of (or not as a member of) a certain gender group. 
Global consistency would include projects and activities related to the socially situated 
functional role associated with one’s gender identity.  
 The main point is that the narrative sense of agency, as intention-formation and 
fulfillment, though in some sense rational, deliberate, and conscious, is neither 
untethered from gender norms nor ahistorical. The practices that scaffold this capacity 
involve exposure to narrative archetypes, which assume and reinforce gender norms. 
Through socio-cultural narrative practices we learn to provide reasons for past actions 
(retrospective F-intention attribution), or to deliberate about our future actions 
(creating prospective F-intentions), holistically in terms of our coherent, storied self. 
The limited narratives provided for or imposed upon individuals in virtue of their body 
types serve to maintain gender roles, and narrative agency is constrained by these 
problematic gender archetypes. 
 Again, though, the question of how transparent or explicit the content of the 
states (beliefs, desires, norms, and so on) need be that are considered in assessing 
consistency arises. Pacherie only provides the following on this: “Their sharing a 
common conceptual representational format is what makes possible a form of global 
consistency, at the personal level, of our desires, beliefs, intentions and other 
propositional attitudes. If we accept this common view, what follows is that for [F]-
intentions to ever be such as to satisfy the rationality constraints they ought to, they 
must have conceptual content” (Pacherie 2007, p.184). However, as I’ve already 
shown, this need not necessarily be the case. Often the rules guiding our behaviors are 
not only not known or available to us, but it is doubtful that they could be robustly 
contentful prior to an explicit, conscious consideration of the reason (F-intention) for 
the kinds of actions we take when presented with particular contexts or opportunities 
for interaction. 
 Haslanger provides a good summary of the phenomena when she says that “one 
will develop unconscious patterns of behavior that reinforce the role in oneself and 
others and enable one to judge others by its associated norms. And in order for large 
groups of people to internalize similar or complementary norms, there must be a 
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cultural vocabulary—concepts, narratives, images, scripts, cautionary tales—that 
provide the framework for action” (Haslanger 2012, p.11). The first part of this might 
be unproblematic for Pacherie, but the inclusion of culturally situated conceptual 
content – the cultural vocabulary – problematizes the view that deliberation processes 
only include propositional attitudes. As I have shown, attribution of behavior-guiding 
rules in propositional form often comes after the habituation of the behaviors. It 
seems unlikely that we would have propositional attitudes with very specific 
conceptual content about gender-specific norms if we haven’t previously been made 
aware that we (or others) were following those norms.   
 Put simply, the presence of gender norms in the narrative sense of agency is not 
reducible in the sense that all such norms are propositional rules that guide behaviors. 
Phenomenologically, one does not generally access a set of social rules or norms in 
order to make sense of their actions. Sometimes our embodied habits and practices 
give rise to narratively available rules though, at which point only can it be said that 
there are propositional attitudes that guide our intention-formation processes. To 
paraphrase Gallagher again, the rule can emerge from practice (2012). All of this, I 
have shown, bears the mark of gender. Now, in the final section, I will consider the 
influence of gender on our minimal sense of agency.  
 
4.4 Gender and the Minimal Sense of Agency 
 
 As discussed in the first section, enactive approaches to understanding cognition 
have given us new ways of thinking about how rules, norms, and other features of 
experience derived from socio-cultural structures influence our embodied patterns of 
perceiving potentials for interaction (Varela et al. 1991; Ramstead et al. 2017; van Dijk 
and Rietveld 2017). This is not so different from what Iris Marion Young has said 
about the way that gender becomes part of the lived body. She writes: “Contexts of 
discourse and interaction position persons in systems of evaluation and expectations 
which often implicate their embodied being. …The diverse phenomena that have 
come under the rubric of ‘gender’ in feminist theory can be redescribed in the idea of 
lived body as some among many forms of bodily habitus and interactions with others 
that we enact and experience” (1990, p. 17).  
 What is it, though, to be a lived body? We can think of this in terms of the 
embodied minimal sense of agency discussed earlier—as experiencing oneself pre-
reflectively as the source of one’s own actions; however, now we can push this a bit 
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further. We can think of the minimal sense of agency as the selection from the range 
of perceived possibilities for interaction as disclosed through the habituated body in 
continuous action. Agency in this minimal sense is the ongoing, immediate 
phenomenal sense of oneself as the proprietor of her actions that arises while engaged 
in action itself. If we experience our environment in terms of possibilities for 
interaction, which grow salient or more limited through embodied patterns of 
engagement, and agency is the pre-reflective sense of one’s own actions, then the 
immersed, immediate action-taking process is itself providing the minimal sense of 
agency.  
 In some cases this might simply involve awareness of or attending to some set 
of our M-intentions as we carry out complex P-intentions, but this could also involve 
our experience during the kinds of habituated, contentless P-intentions previously 
described. Given all that has been provided thus far, there are (at least) three ways that 
we can now consider how gender contributes to our minimal sense of agency that do 
not involve explicitly considering our adherence to gender norms.  
 First, as Young notes, the contexts of discourse involving gender do more than 
shape the narrative self; they shape our embodied habits and interactions. Drawing 
from the notion of the ‘I can’ of the lived body discussed in Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty, Young’s analysis demonstrates how the internalization of gender norms can 
result in the experience of “I cannot” rather than “I can” in some contexts. As she 
describes above, we have an awareness of ourselves as situated within a myriad of 
socio-cultural networks, and our situation within these networks makes us subject to 
certain kinds of expectations. These expectations result in gender differences in bodily 
comportment due to women’s habituated underestimation of their bodily capacities 
(1990, p. 147). She calls this phenomenon, this lived constraint on bodily motility, an 
inhibited intentionality.  
 While Young’s analysis specifically attends to the underestimation of capacities 
by women, there are other norms (race, class, sexuality, ability, and so on) that 
complicate this inhibited intentionality (Weiss 2017). There are two additional points 
I’d like to add here. First, the idealization of an “I can” body as representative of the 
experience of men is problematic. The internalization of patriarchal norms limits the 
bodily comportment of men in different ways. For example, Western men are 
expected not to show weakness or fatigue. They are discouraged from using their 
bodies to express certain emotions. Thus, men’s bodies are subject to limitations due 
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to gender norms in a way that provides lived constraints on their bodily comportments 
as well. Second, it should always be worrisome to idealize men as unfettered, as this 
kind of idealization can be used to devalue the traditional gender norms and traits 
applied to women. My analysis here is meant to be applicable to all genders while 
recognizing that the more oppressive gender constraints of this type have 
disproportionately affected women.12 
 On the enactivist framework, and using Young’s notion of inhibited 
intentionality, we can expand on the body’s role in what is disclosed as a potential for 
immediate interaction and how this relates to the minimal sense of agency. As 
explained in the first section, the body discloses potentials for interaction with the 
environment based on the body’s capacities to interact. The body constrained and 
habituated through socio-cultural gender expectations, then, may not disclose its full 
range of possibilities in a given context. The sense of minimal agency, then, can be 
constrained through a limit on the habituated range of motion, and therefore constrain 
our perception of possible actions, arising from embodied inhibitions. In the minimal 
sense of agency, as agency-in-action, these constraints do not arise from a conscious 
deliberation of the range of possibilities the body can engage in, but are always already 
pre-reflectively present in the body’s disclosure of the range of possibilities for action 
and the ways in which those actions may be undertaken. This, I believe, also gives a 
more developed account of what Haslanger has in mind when she contends that 
“although in understanding agents we must do justice to experience, we must also be 
aware that we are bodies, and in the practices of day-to-day life, the movement, 
location, and meaning of our bodies often has little to do with the agent’s 
consciousness or intentions” (Haslanger 2012, p.11).  
 Second, repeated deliberate actions can prime one’s responses to affordances 
for action such that the selection of an action or response to an affordance does not 
require the exercise of narrative agency. That is, of all the possibilities for action 
presented to an individual, previous considerations in terms of the narrative sense of 
agency, and the outcomes of the actions taken, lead to future embodied responses. 
                                                   
12 Again, it should be stressed that there is not a particular way in which these constraints affect women. 
Some, for example, may be due to compulsory gender maintenance, while others may be due to the kinds 
of dangers experienced in maintaining gender, especially for trans women, as discussed by Overall (2012) 
(note that her use of ‘constraint’ differs from that used here). There are also lived constraints that are 
more specific to interactions with other persons due to race (Fanon 1991), orientation, class, and other 
aspects of a person’s social identity or situation.  
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To put this another way, prospective F-intentions (whether goal-oriented or as 
behavior-guiding rules) and their associated contentful P-intentions can, over time, 
condition one into having P-intentions that are the result of habituation, not conscious 
deliberation. Put simply, our responses to certain situations and environmental 
solicitations can be conditioned such that P-intentions can become disconnected from 
F-intentions, even though they may have initially been the product of a deliberative 
process. The gender-related consistency constraints present in the narrative sense of 
agency, then, can also serve to constrain the embodied responses and action selections 
of an agent in the minimal sense of agency in the long term.  
 Third, the perception of potentials for action themselves are a product of 
habituated engagement through both kinds of agency. Again, perception is action-
oriented. Perception is itself an active process, determined by “what we are ready to 
do” (Nöe 2004, p. 1). Additionally, perception is a skillful activity, developed over time 
through the successes and failures of our interactions, guided by the individual’s 
previous history of productive engagements with the environment (Rietveld and 
Kiverstein 2014). The way in which we perceive our environments as affording 
possibilities for action, then, can be said to be affected by gender in relation to the two 
previously indicated influences and their effects on the ways in which we develop the 
skills of engaging with our environments. The most salient features of the 
environment, what we are ready to interact with, establish the way in which we tend to 
carry out our plans. In terms of intentions, the possibilities perceived by us as capable 
of fulfilling P-intentions are influenced by gender in the sense that these interactive 
skills will influence the types of things we perceive as capable of fulfilling our 
immediate goals.  
 With all this in place, it is worth re-considering the upstream dynamics between 
the effects of gender on the minimal sense of agency and the narrative sense of agency. 
I have already shown that gender effects our creation of the propositional attitudes 
that guide our F-intentions and their related P-intentions. I have also discussed the 
restrospective attribution of F-intentions to describe some of our consistent 
behavioral patterns. While in the last section I was concerned with the role that gender 
plays in the actual formulation of these propositional attitudes, I have now shown that 
those purposeful behavioral patterns are, to some extent, already influenced by gender, 
largely implicitly, in our minimal sense of agency. Thus gender is already influencing 
our intentional movements and actions in such a way that we are not fully aware of its 
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effects when we retrospectively attribute the rules we think are guiding those 
behaviors.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
 In this paper I have put forward some ways of understanding the effect of 
gender on the narrative and minimal senses of agency. However, this is not to say that 
one’s senses of agency are wholly determined by gender. As Iris Marion Young says, 
“The idea of the lived body recognizes that a person’s subjectivity is conditioned by 
sociocultural facts and the behavior and expectations of others in ways that she has 
not chosen. At the same time, the theory of the lived body says that each person takes 
up and acts in relation to these unchosen facts in her own way” (Young 1990, p. 18). 
Awareness of the influence of gender can afford the agent the possibility of re-
developing her narrative, of asserting creative control over her archetype, and of 
changing her patterns of engagement with the world. In Haslanger’s words, we have 
some tools that can be used for “disrupting dominant schemas” (2012, p. 427).  
 Additionally, being aware of the influence of gender on our minimal sense of 
agency can help us bring our attention to several facets of this influence. We can be 
more attentive to the ways that we are drawn to interact with our environments, we 
can bring our habits of interaction into reflective analysis, and we can be more aware 
of the kinds of embodied, sub-personal (motor) programs and ways that we use our 
bodies in achieving our goals. For example, we can be aware that we may be acting 
with an inhibited sense of our range of motion, and this awareness can help us bring 
our M-intentions into the realm of phenomenological attention – which, in turn, can 
help us in training or re-training ourselves to explore a fuller range of mobility and 
interactive capacities.  
 Haslanger has previously made the case that we need “accounts of gender and 
race that take seriously the agency of women and people of color of both genders, and 
within which we can develop an understanding of agency that will aid feminist and 
antiracist efforts to empower critical social agents.” (Haslanger 2012, p. 36). In this 
paper, I have offered some insight into ways that we can look at the influence of gender 
and gender norms on the senses of agency. I have used the ambiguities involved in 
narrative and minimal senses of agency and intention formation to illustrate ways that 
gender can have an influence on both senses of agency, in the hopes that such work 
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can be helpful in efforts to understand and minimize the injustices that this influence 
can inflict.  
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Chapter 5 
Distal Engagement: Intentions in Perception ∗ 
 
Abstract: 
 
 Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide 
accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation 
comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful 
mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. 
One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several 
proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, 
including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate 
the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of 
long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and 
perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we 
argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their 
role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination 
of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than 
positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that 
we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes 
towards language use. 
 
  
                                                   
 A version of this chapter has been published as: 
 
Brancazio, N., Segundo-Ortin, M., 2020. Distal engagement: Intentions in perception. Consciousness and 
Cognition 79, 102897. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.102897 
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Chapter 5 
Distal Engagement: Intentions in Perception 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Our actions are often aimed toward fulfilling long-term goals. We plan meetings 
and social engagements far in the future, we save for retirement, and we think about 
mitigating the effects of global warming in the coming decades. Cognitivists have long 
explained this kind of planning by positing a sophisticated computational machinery 
that manipulates mental representations of these long-terms intentions in order to 
guide our actions. However, accounting for the ways in which we, as human agents, 
temporally extend our concerns, projects, and plans has been difficult for non- 
representational approaches.  
One such non-representational approach is ecological-enactivism. Through the 
development of the Skilled Intentionality Framework (hereafter SIF), ecological-
enactivism has provided a non-representational account for how our skills and 
concerns can affect the way in which we perceive affordances in terms of relevance 
and saliency (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014). The SIF provides resources ecological-
enactivists have used to expand the affordance framework to capture the various 
complex cognitive activities that have traditionally seemed to require a foundation in 
representational capacities—e.g. those that involve ‘higher cognition’ (Bruineberg et 
al. 2018), ‘representation-hungry’ cognition (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2018), and long-
term planning (van Dijk and Rieveld 2018).  
Ecological psychology and enactivism both view perception as an active skill 
rather than a passive collection and processing of information about the environment. 
We see an increasing uptake of the use of the affordance framework in recent enactive 
accounts (see Di Paolo et al. 2017, Gallagher 2017). While misunderstandings about 
both the metaphysical nature of information and what it means to perceive 
information have kept many enactivists from fully endorsing ecological psychology 
(see Segundo-Ortin et al. 2019), the ecological-enactive framework embraces both 
approaches (see Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014).  
In this paper, we address ecological-enactive accounts of ‘high-level’ cognition, 
especially as related to long-term planning. Although we agree with ecological-
enactivists that we should understand affordances as “determined in activity and 
intertwin[ing] across timescales” through skill and habit (van Dijk and Rietveld 2018, 
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p. 3), we argue that this does not fully account for the way that humans use language 
to deliberate, create, and coordinate their actions in line with achieving a long-term 
goal—a skill we will call distal engagement. Using the taxonomy of Pacherie (2008), we 
offer some clarification on the kinds of intentions we are concerned about. Pacherie’s 
distinctions have already been utilized within the enactivist literature (see, e.g., 
Gallagher 2012, Brancazio 2019). While her framework is explicitly committed to a 
representational view of intentions, we show that it is possible to retain Pacherie’s 
taxonomy without the necessity of representations. We offer this account to 
supplement ecological-enactive accounts of ‘higher-level’ cognition and to show how 
the use of an enactive account of language (Di Paolo et al. 2018, Cuffari et al. 2015) 
can fill the explanatory gap.  
The paper will proceed by first giving the basic tenets of the ecological approach 
to affordance perception, as well as describing the ecological-enactive approach. In the 
second section, we argue for the importance of taking into account intentions as 
relevant to acts of perception. In the third section we introduce the skill of distal 
engagement, illuminating how we might think of the differences between immediate 
and long-term goal fulfilment on the ecological-enactive account. Then, in the fourth 
section, we provide an enactive explanation of the skill of distal engagement that we 
consider to be amenable to ecological-enactive theories.  
  
5.2  The Ecological-Enactive Approach to Affordance Perception 
 
 The ecological-enactive theoretical framework is partly founded in the 
Gibsonian, or ecological, approach to perception. Ecological psychology (Gibson 
1966, 1979/2015) is a theory of perception that focuses on the ongoing perceptual 
processes by which agents adapt to their environments. The core tenets of the 
ecological approach are that perception is direct, active, and action-oriented.  
To say that perception is direct is to say that it consists of the unmediated (non- 
representational) detection of information. This information is presented in the form 
of patterns in the ambient energy array of the perceiver—namely, the ambient optic 
array. According to the ecological approach, these patterns correspond lawfully or 
reliably enough with properties of the environment, which means that animals can 
perceive the environment directly by detecting these patterns.  
This brings us to the second tenet of ecological psychology: the idea that 
perception is active. The claim that perception is active can be unpacked in two tenets. 
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First, perception requires the agent to modulate her attention, selecting or picking up 
those patterns that are relevant for what she aims to perceive (Gibson & Rader 1979). 
In this sense, perception is not something that happens in the animal, but something 
the animal does. Second, perception occurs in the context of active sensorimotor 
engagements between animals and their environments. Because informational patters 
are not always available for the agent to be detected, perceptual tasks often involve the 
agent’s active exploration of the environment to generate the required information 
(Mossio and Taraborelli 2008). As Mace puts it, “information does not come to the 
animal. The animal goes to it, actively obtaining the information” (2015, p. xx).1 In 
light of this, we think that the correct way to understand perception from a Gibsonian 
point of view is to think of acts of perception—acts that involve not only the sensory 
organs, but the whole body and its activity (Gibson 1979/2015, Ch. 12).  
Lastly, Gibsonians think that perception is action-oriented—that is, that 
perception is primarily for the control of action. According to ecological psychology, 
for an agent to perceive the environment is to perceive the opportunities for 
interaction this environment offers—so-called affordances. Perceptual information is 
thus conceived of as information that allows the agent to prospectively control its 
actions.  
  
5.2.1 The Social Shaping of Affordances 
  
 Traditionally, affordances have been cashed out in terms of physical relations. 
For instance, a mug is said to afford ‘graspability’ to animals that have opposable 
thumbs. Likewise, whether an agent perceives a step as ‘climbable’ depends on a 
relation between the height of the step and the length of her leg (Warren 1984). So 
conceived, affordances are properties of the environment taken relative to the animal’s 
body features and capabilities (Gibson 1979/2015, p. 119–120; Chemero 2009). 
 However, it has been stressed that an approach that focuses exclusively on 
physical relations is too narrow to account for the actual richness of human perception 
and action. A fully developed account of affordance perception is likely to require 
social and cultural aspects of human econiches “to be recognized as constitutive rather 
than peripheral features of the ecological approach” (Heft 2007, p. 92, emphasis 
original). Since human development takes place within a socio-cultural environment, 
taking into account socio-culturally situated practices and habits of engagement is 
crucial for understanding how a human perceives what they can do. In brief, as Heft 
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says, “perception-action processes need to be viewed as socially mediated processes” (2007 
p. 92, emphasis original; see also van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017).  
 It follows that we cannot account for an individual’s perception of affordances 
only by referring to the relation between her body and the environment. In many cases, 
a particular object affords some actions only because the perceiver is immersed in a 
specific set of cultural practices (Costall 1995, 2012). These affordances depend on the 
complex network of norms and rules within which objects and individuals are 
integrated. An important aspect of SIF is its emphasis on the sociomaterial norms 
which influence how we perceive possibilities for interaction (van Dijk and Rietveld 
2017). Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) put the acquaintance to norms and rules in terms 
of “forms of life”—that is, the relatively stable patterns of behavior that are shared by 
the members of a community:  
 
“Affordances are not simply properties of an animal’s environment conceived 
of as a material or physical environment. It is the ecological niche of a particular 
form of life that is made up of affordances, and each affordance must be 
understood in relation to the abilities available in a form of life. In the case of 
humans these abilities are generally acquired through training and experience in 
sociocultural practices.” (p. 340) 
 
According to Rietveld and Kiverstein, the affordances that are available for a specific 
individual to be perceived and acted upon also relate to the practices, conventions and 
customs that are shared across the members of her community. Partaking in these 
forms of life, they claim, involves learning to attend to a specific myriad of affordances. 
Relatively stable patterns of doing things manifest, for example, in the regularities of 
interaction that characterize our common use of everyday artifacts such as chairs, 
books, and so on, and also in the expert performance of architects, academics, or 
footballers. The richer the form of life of an agent, they conclude, the wider the myriad 
of affordances that a particular econiche offers to her—that is, she has a more complex 
landscape of affordances (2014, p. 331). 
 Moreover, Rietveld and Kiverstein suggest that being trained in a specific form 
of life does not solely affect the number of affordances that we can perceive and act 
upon within a given econiche. Rather, it also habituates us to distinguish the ones that 
are relevant to us from the ones that are not, constraining our attention and 
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responsiveness. Rietveld and Kiverstein dub this capacity to distinguish relevant 
affordances from irrelevant ones skilled intentionality (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; 
Kiverstein & Rietveld 2015; see also Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014; van Dijk & Rietveld 
2017). Skilled intentionality can be summarized as the individual’s expertise in 
responding adequately to the simultaneous actions that a niche affords in a particular 
situation in order to improve the grip on this situation. 
 Rietveld and Kiverstein argue that for a skillful agent, the subset of relevant 
affordances will not just be perceived but experienced as solicitations (see also 
Withagen et al. 2012). This means that the relevant affordances prereflectively stand 
out as more inviting than others given the situation and action(s) in progress. These 
affordances form what they call the field of affordances, which is comprised of “[t]he 
affordances that stand out as relevant for a particular individual in a particular 
situation” (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014, p. 2). Further: 
 
“The aspects of the landscape that make it into the field of affordances of an 
individual animal are therefore always those that are of affective significance to 
the animal. The skilled individual animal and the landscape of affordances 
together form a coupled self-organising dynamical system. The dynamics of this 
self-organising system are such that the individual finds itself drawn to those 
aspects of the landscape of affordances that relate to what the animal cares 
about.” (Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2015, p. 11) 
 
Think, for instance, of taking a trip to the grocery store. A grocery store is a complex 
local landscape of affordances, but the affordances are not all equally relevant or 
adequate for your situation. Depending on the number of items on your list, a trolley 
may grab your attention on the way in rather than a basket. Though you may be 
selecting the items on your list on your way through the store, your attention can be 
grabbed by some new item or a particularly good sale. Further, all the possible 
affordances are situated in a sociomaterial environment (the store). This sociomaterial 
environment makes some actions appropriate and some others inappropriate. A 
shopping trolley may be appropriate for holding your purchasable items, your bags, 
your child, and perhaps even your small dog as you stroll, but it is not an appropriate 
place to set your grandfather, for example.   
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5.3 Affordance Seeking: Intentions in Perception  
 
 The SIF promises to be a valuable tool for understanding how social 
enculturation affects both the affordances it is possible for us to perceive and the 
relevance of the actions afforded. For humans, relevance often will be tied to 
intentions to achieve goals, perhaps long terms goals, that in a sense are guiding the 
actions of the person. In the above example, for instance, the trip to the store may 
happen on a particular day of the week because it does not conflict with any of your 
family members’ plans. Or, perhaps, your trip to the store is coordinated around a 
special meal you are planning to make for an evening with some friends. Either way, 
the explanation for the relevance of certain affordances might involve accomplishing 
a goal at some remove.  
 To explain the ability to undertake long-term projects, van Dijk and Rietveld 
(2018) propose a “process-based account of affordances in which affordances are 
determined in activity and intertwine across timescales” (p. 3). This account of 
affordances is meant to pick out not just the affordances of the immediate 
environment, but to connect related affordances along a longer-term trajectory. In this 
way, neither the goal nor the trajectory need be represented in one’s mind—rather it 
is an “attunement to the unfolding situation” that comes from the development of 
practices and skills which allows for “the openness and receptivity to the movement 
of an increasingly determining situation, seeing along the direction in which the 
situation is unfolding” (p. 19).   
 However, we think that the process-based account of affordances needs a bit 
more to fully explain our selectivity in attention as it relates to our experience of 
planning, changing and coordinating projects and long-term goals. More particularly, 
we’d like to more fully develop the account of how it is that affordance salience might 
be influenced by distal intentions—the intention to buy a house, for example. These 
intentions, usually the result of a deliberation process and involving ongoing reflective 
consideration, are completed through the execution of many smaller goal-oriented 
actions over a longer period of time. Taking into account these long-term goals seems 
to be necessary if we aim to understand what it is that links affordances across a 
timescale, or how some of these trajectories stand out as more salient or soliciting than 
others though our skills remain the same. That is, we need a more detailed account of 
how it is that our personal practices of deliberation and intention-formation fit into an 
explanation for why it is that processes “unfold” in a particular way. (For example, 
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after having decided that I want to save up to buy a house I might be less inclined to 
take the opportunity to go out to a new restaurant with friends.) 
 To understand how intentions matter for perception, understood in the 
ecological way, think of the number of actions we can perform with a single object—
say, for instance, a pen. First of all, we can either grasp it or push it to the other side 
of the table with our finger. If we opt for grasping it, a different myriad of actions 
become available. We can use the pen to write down some notes about a paper, but 
we can also draw a portrait with it. Likewise, we can use it as a missile, as a blowpipe, 
as a bookmark, or even to stir our coffee. The number of actions we can perform with 
an object such as a pen are potentially infinite, and so are the affordances we can 
perceive (Cutting 1982).  
 This is not to say, however, that we perceive all of them all the time. In fact, if 
that were the case, the control of action—that is, acting upon one affordance (or a 
series of affordances) instead of another—would depend either on one of two things: 
(1) another mechanism that mediates between perception and action, whose function 
is to choose an affordance to be acted upon from all the possible affordances we 
perceive, or (2) the environment itself, where the environment determines how we act 
while we remain passive. Both options are at odds with ecological psychology and, as 
we will describe in the next section, conflict with an enactive account of the role of 
intentions in action guidance.  
 To see why this is not a problem for ecological psychology, recall that we said 
before that perceptual processes should be thought of as actions (acts of perception). 
On this view, perceivers are considered to be seekers of information for action, 
meaning that the intentions or goals of the agent will play a crucial role in perception 
(Gibson & Rader 1979). The agent actively looks for particular affordances in the 
present environment—or, more precisely, actively looks for the information that is 
relevant for her to know whether an action is possible. Affordances are found in the 
active, goal-oriented, exploration of the environment.13 
Gibson himself endorses this view: 
 
“[W]hat about the “intentionality” of perception when an observer is seeking 
information instead of simply having it presented to him? . . . What to me sounds 
                                                   
13 This is most clearly seen in experiments of ‘dynamic touch’ where the perceptual information is 
found through the haptic exploration (“dynamical effortful touching”) of the objects of the 
environment (Turvey and Carello 2011). 
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promising is to begin with the assumption that active perception is controlled by a search 
for the affordances of the environment and that active behavior is controlled by perceiving these 
affordances.” (1974/1982, pp. 387-388, emphasis added) 
 
It may be a source of confusion that Gibson uses the word “intentionality” here as 
meaning something more akin to “goal-directed”. In the SIF literature, however, 
“intentionality” is used in the traditional phenomenological sense of the experiential 
aboutness, directedness, or towards-ness of activity. For example, van Dijk and 
Rietveld “propose that a skilled individual can experience the increasing determinacy 
of action from within the unfolding act as ‘directedness’ toward the relevant 
affordances available in the form of life that she is in the process of enacting. This 
unfolding enactment can be experienced pre-reflectively as having an ‘intentional’ 
character” (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017, p. 9). We agree that the phenomenological 
sense of intentionality is central to understanding affordance perception and salience, 
but like these authors, we do not take this to mean that intentionality implies the 
existence of intentions. On this view, intentions are used in a more deflated or 
retrospective sense, in line with the phenomenological usage. That is, they in no way 
imply that there is a pre-existing “goal” or any reflective thought process involved in 
the activity—an “intentional act” (see also Heft 1989) can be pre-reflective, with the 
“intention” attributed retrospectively (also see van Dijk and Rietveld 2017 for a similar 
treatment of “affordances” as retrospectively applied to the goals of intentional acts 
or intentional arcs).14  
 Kiverstein and Rietveld do point to the importance of the concerns of the agent 
in determining her field of affordances, where concerns are defined as an agent’s 
“interests, preferences, and needs” (2014, p. 341). Conversely, they say that “[s]ome 
affordances the environment offers will be irrelevant to the agent because they have 
no bearing on the individual’s concerns at the time” (2014, p. 341). This seems helpful 
in illuminating the idea of affordance saliency in the immediate environment, but we 
would like to add to this that often times these concerns might be in relation to a long-
term goal or behavior guiding-rule that has been arrived at through a reflective process. 
Adding an account of the dynamics between reflective and pre-reflective cognition 
                                                   
14 Heft attributes this view to Merleau-Ponty (1963): “An intention is not describable in the absence 
of some foreseeable expression of it in the world. In this respect, intention does not refer to a mental 
representation; it is not a mentalistic notion. Rather, it refers to possibilities that are only realizable 
as situated behavior” (1989, p. 11). 
97 
 
provides a fuller explanation about how we choose between salient affordances. 
Distinguishing intentions from concerns (where concerns could be thought of more 
as preferences resulting from successes or failures in previous engagements, for 
example) opens up a space for more precise theorizing about skill development and 
scaffolding, the upstream and downstream dynamics between skills, and effects on 
perception and action coordination.  
 In the terms of our previous example, we would say that we don’t perceive all 
the possible actions the pen affords—not even to different degrees of saliency. On the 
contrary, since our seeking of information is always goal-oriented, our perception-
action cycle is constrained by what we are seeking to achieve. Goal-orientation 
constrains both our exploratory activity and the meaning of the information we find. 
It is because we want to use the pen as a bookmark that we will look for the 
information that is behaviorally relevant for this usage (namely, its shape, length, etc.), 
thereby perceiving that the pen can be used that way. If I have made a decision to 
observe a more environmentally conscientious diet, it could alter how different items 
on a menu attract my attention. The differences between these intentions will be 
detailed in the next section. For now, we simply want to make the point that the 
perception of the affordances offered by a situation partly depends on the intentions 
of the agent. This has also been discussed by Michaels and Palatinus (2014), who use 
the example of an outfielder to point out that her intention to catch a fly ball 
“harnesses [her] perceptual system to detect information appropriate to guide the 
deployment of [action]”, while “[t]he intention to escape a lobbed grenade would entail 
other set-ups [of the perception-action system]” (p. 24).  
None of this should be taken as implying that the agent’s intentions change or 
create the affordances of the environment. What intentions modulate, instead, is the 
acts of perception and the saliency of these searched for affordances. It is the perception 
and relevance of the affordances that is affected by the intention, not the affordances 
themselves. Being so, even in the cases where the design of an object prompts the 
perceptual saliency of some affordances over others, for instance, making some 
affordances harder to perceive than others (Withagen et al. 2012; Norman 1988/2013), 
it is the intention of the agent that modulates perception and makes the affordances 
effective constraints of behavior. By giving intentions a more central role in affordance 
perception and salience, we avoid having to put the burden of explanatory power in 
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either the environment or an internal mechanism when discussing affordance saliency 
and relevance.  
A potential concern might be that introducing intentions would make 
perception indirect, thus contradicting the core tenets of ecological psychology. As 
Withagen and van der Kamp (2010) put it, introducing the agent’s intentions in our 
explanation of perception “implies that perception includes more than the detection 
of information” (pp. 155-156). We think, however, that this critique would be 
misguided. Nothing of what we have said implies that intentions mediate perception 
in the sense of acting over the detected information. It is not the case that the agent 
detects information, somehow combines it with her intentions, and then infers the 
presence of an affordance. Intentions don’t enrich or add anything to the information 
detected, turning it into a percept. Instead, intentions modulate the perception-action 
cycles through which the agent interacts and explores the environment, determining 
what informational variables are relevant and need to be attended to at each moment, 
thus constraining the saliency of the affordances the agent perceives. So conceived, 
introducing the agent’s intentions into the story does not imply that perception 
becomes indirect.  
There is another, even more pressing concern regarding the introduction of 
(distal) intentions in perception. This concern has to do with the assumption that 
involving intentions and their formation processes is itself often thought to require a 
representational explanation. We think this representational undergirding is what van 
Dijk and Rietveld are concerned with here: “Crucial for our process account of 
affordances is that we will understand concrete situations as continuations of real-life 
ongoing practices in terms of unfolding activities of individuals rather than as 
realizations of possibilities pre-existing in abstracto” (2018, p. 6). We agree with their 
claim, but would also like to explore a third option in which pre-existing possibilities 
are not so abstract. The challenge here for us is then to resist framing the problem in 
a way that implies that: (1) the positing of an intention is purely an abstraction or that 
(2) integrating an intention as part of the explanation of how it is that we organize our 
activities over a longer process would risk the need for a representational account.  
In the following two sections, we will show why language is a crucial part of the 
explanation of how we (humans) intertwine affordances over timescales so as to 
engage with distal goals, and we will show that giving an account of language’s role in 
doing so does not require a representational explanation. For, as van Dijk says 
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elsewhere, it does seem that the “production of words within the flow of an ongoing 
situation re-shapes the situations from which and into which this situation flows” 
(2016)—but it is still unclear how reflective processes fit into the account. We shall 
argue that the incorporation of reflective processes in action coordination over time 
should be thought of as a skill, in line with the processual account of affordances, 
which we will call distal engagement.  
 
5.4 Distal Engagement as a Skill  
 
 As shown in the preceding section, intentions play an important role in 
affordance perception. In order to begin to develop an account of how it is that 
intentions play this role, however, we have to be clearer about what we mean by 
‘intentions.’ The sense of intention that we argue needs to be incorporated into the 
ecological-enactive framework are reflective, distal (future- directed) intentions, which 
can coordinate our current actions in order to achieve some later goal. These intentions 
are often at some remove from the possibility of their actualization, such as the 
intention to buy a house in five years, the intention to retire someday, or the intention 
to make better choices based on concerns about my impact on the environment.  
 In the philosophy of action and mind, all intentions have been thought of as 
future goals, arrived at through a deliberative process, that allow for practical planning 
or coordinating actions toward their achievement (Bratman 1987). In contemporary 
work, they have been described more specifically as “a mental state that represents a 
goal (and means to that goal) and contributes through the guidance and control of 
behavior to the realization of what it represents” (Pacherie 2015, p. 1). We will return 
later in the next section to the issue of whether or not intentions necessarily involve 
representations (we argue that they do not). Here we want to look at the dynamic 
between pre-reflective cognition and reflective deliberation processes, whatever those 
underpinnings may be, and the role they both play in leading us to a course of action 
oriented toward some future achievement.  
 Pacherie (2008) offers a taxonomy of intentions based on their temporal and 
spatial proximity and phenomenological accessibility. This taxonomy can be of use in 
clarifying what we mean by intention in this context, and as illustrative of what we 
think needs to be added to the ecological-enactive account. She distinguishes between 
distal intentions (D-intentions), present intentions (P-intentions), and motor 
intentions (M-intentions). D-intentions are the result of a reflective deliberation 
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process as discussed above, and would include goals such as taking a holiday, building 
a skyscraper, or writing a novel. P-intentions are those that guide our present actions, 
the goal of which can be accomplished in our immediate spatio-temporal environment. 
These aim at the immediate accomplishment of a goal, such as responding to an email 
or getting another beer. They can also be pre-reflective, such as when one opens a 
door because they intend to enter a room (Gallagher 2012, Brancazio 2019). Finally, 
there are M-intentions, which are generally sub-personal motor programs for 
accomplishing P-intentions: one may not reflectively consider the comportment of her 
hand and the motion of bringing her glass to her mouth when taking a drink, for 
example, but she can certainly change her grip if the glass is slipping.  
 The ability to form D-intentions is one of the defining features of human forms 
of life.15 The formation of D-intentions, as described, would require using linguistic or 
other kinds of symbolic reasoning. Thus, any account of their influence in affordance 
perception needs to involve a story of how it is that we are able to actively orient 
ourselves to a distal goal—specifically those that are the outcome of some such 
deliberative process. Most accounts of this type of capacity, though, tend to posit 
mental representations. Mental representations, however, are anathema to both 
ecological psychology and most branches of enactivism.  
 In several recent papers, ecological-enactivists have attempted to address 
‘higher-level’ forms of cognition, which are usually taken to be ‘representation-hungry’ 
(see van Dijk and Rietveld 2017, Bruineberg et al. 2018, Kiverstein and Rietveld 2018). 
Among these so-called higher cognitive processes, we find memory, abstract 
reasoning, and the kinds of deliberation and action coordination processes associated 
with D-intentions.  
 Bruineberg et al. (2018) aim to show that the information available for 
perception, combined with the agent’s previous history of interactions, can be rich 
enough for agents to coordinate with distal or absent aspects of the environment 
without requiring internal states that function to represent those distal aspects. For 
example, they suggest that “[a]nyone with the right abilities and sensitivity to the 
regularities that allow one to reliably couple to the affordances will be able to 
coordinate with distal aspects of the form of life in virtue of information about more 
local aspects” (p. 11).  
                                                   
15 However, there is some evidence that other animals, such as corvids and non-human primates, 
form long-term plans (see Boeckle and Clayton 2017).   
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 According to their account, agents can coordinate their behavior regarding 
aspects of the environment that are not immediately present by relying on law-like or 
reliable enough constraints, and hypothesize that these constraints can be based on 
conventions (see Bruineberg et al. 2018; Chemero 2009)16. To use their example, a 
tram need not be physically present for me to act in order to catch it. I can coordinate 
my behavior with the 4pm tram by relying on the constraint that exists between the 
tram driver’s clock and my own. Because I am attuned to this constraint, I can perceive 
that I have to leave my apartment right now to catch the tram simply by looking at my 
watch. Further, they claim that “it is the existence of these constraints that enable us 
to coordinate our behavior with respect to aspects of the environment to which we 
are not sensorily coupled” (Bruineberg et al. 2018, p. 11). 
 While we wish to stay neutral on whether conventional constraints suffice for 
perceptual information of the kind required in ecological psychology, we nonetheless 
think that even on their own account this would be necessary but not sufficient for 
giving an explanation of affordance relevance and the selectivity of the agent. The tram 
would likely not be relevant to us, even as an absent or virtual affordance, were we not 
already intending to catch it. In order to be distally engaged to catching the tram such 
that my actions are organized to exploit the information given by these regular-enough 
covariances (4pm and the tram’s arrival) and constraints (that my 4pm is the tram 
driver’s 4pm) requires that I intend to catch the tram in the first place.  
 Using Pacherie’s taxonomy, the accounts provided by ecological-enactivists 
seem to provide only a story of the link between successive P-intentions. The present 
field of affordances allows us to fulfill a range of P-intentions. In some cases, though, 
being coupled to whatever affords the fulfillment of a P-intention could present a 
distal aspect that links to the fulfillment of a successive P-intention. For example, I 
might check my watch and see that it is time to catch the train, walk to the train station, 
check that the tram will be on time, and then board the tram and find a seat. At the 
present time the environment contains a certain set of affordances, and because of the 
regularity of relationships between some of those affordances and their distal aspects, 
the possibility for fulfilling linked P-intentions presents itself such that one action leads 
                                                   
16 Part of their argument is based on the assumption that the information for perception needs not 
be specific or lawful. This is why they speak of “general ecological information,” as a type of 
information that is more inclusive than lawful or specific information (see also Chemero 2009). 
Canonically, specific information has been taken as to the condition of possibility of direct perception 
(Michaels and Carello 1981; Turvey et al. 1981; Turvey 2019), and it is an open debate whether this 
general, non-lawful information suffices for direct perception (Segundo-Ortin et al. 2019).  
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to the next in a coordinated and pre-reflective manner. This may suffice as an 
explanation for how it is that the fulfilment of P-intentions unfolds, but doesn’t quite 
tell us how to think of how a D-intention—the plan to catch the tram to go see a 
concert, for example—can guide this process.  
 Bruineberg et al. (2018) argue that “it just takes a process of selective openness 
to arrive at only the relevant affordances, or solicitations” (p. 14). However, it still 
seems that the selectivity at play here may often involve more than skill or concerns. In 
other words, we still need to account for the relationship with the guiding D-
intentions, the reflective processes that often precede but nonetheless coordinate our 
current actions. And as they themselves say, “[t]here is no light bouncing off the 
future” (Bruineberg et. al 2018).  
 This need is even more clear if we look at a more complex version of the tram 
example: “I can, for instance, use the affordances of my watch to ensure that my 
activities over the course of the afternoon are coordinated to the 17.30 train that will 
leave the train station located in the city centre in time to take me home for dinner 
when my family are expecting me” (Bruineberg et al. 2018). It seems that what 
coordinates my present actions here is not the regularities of the environment. Rather, 
these regularities become relevant for my current intentions—they are perceived as 
solicitations to act—because I want to fulfil a specific distal goal—namely, having 
dinner with my family at 18:00. The guiding D-intention in this situation is to go home 
for dinner, where the author has presumably agreed to meet with their family, but there 
is no accounting for how this D-intention can help shape the relation with the 
affordances of the environment.  
 Similarly, the process-based account of van Dijk and Rietveld (2018) seems to 
offer a reconceptualization of how we can think of the intertwining of affordances 
rather than an explanation of what intertwines them. In arguing for a “scalable” 
process account of affordances, they apply a distinction between activity (ongoing) and 
action (completed process) that can be useful for understanding what exactly is being 
posited in the case of multiple acts being connected through an unfolding process. 
This allows for the use of affordance to describe a long-term process rather than just 
immediate actions. However, in putting too much of the explanatory power in the 
affordances themselves, we don’t get much to explain why it is that any particular 
process unfolds rather than another. Again here, it is often the case that a D-intention 
pre-dates the activity (process) and acts as its impetus and unfier. We have numerous 
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skills that we can make use of at any given time, and which might be appropriate in 
our socio-cultural setting, as described by SIF. However, we are missing a piece of the 
puzzle through which relevance is established, through which opportunities are 
anticipated, and explains why certain acts of perception happen instead of others. 
Making sense of distal engagement, at least for humans, will require more than 
pointing to skill and social practices on the one hand and lawful or general constraints 
on the other.  
 Without accounting for D-intentions, the coordination of P-intentions in order 
to fulfill a long term goal – what we call distal engagement – still seems to require the 
need to overcome the issue of having our behavior guided by something that sure 
looks, by any critic’s account, to involve an internal representation. We agree with 
Neander (2017) that what makes something a representation is that it is being used “to 
represent a ... target as being a certain way it might or might not be” (p. 35). The 
question is, then, whether we can make sense of the role that linguistic utterances play 
in the formation of D-intentions without assuming these linguistic utterances function 
to represent the world in the sense above specified. As we see it, if we can think of the 
reasoning involved in forming D-intentions as a pragmatic tool for the self-control 
and self-organization of behavior—that is, if we can think of language as a means of 
coping with the world, not copying it (Rorty 1979)—the problem beings to disappear. 
With this in mind, we propose that incorporating an enactive account of language can 
do much in providing an adequate solution for the issue of distal engagement.  
  
5.5 An Enactive Proposal for Distal Engagement 
 
 A non-representational account of distal engagement requires that we draw 
more from the enactivist side of the ecological-enactivist family. Enactivism in general 
holds that cognition ought to be thought of as a lifelike process that involves the active 
relationship between organisms and the world, “anchored in the living body” (Di 
Paolo et al. 2017, p. 20), rather than as a computational process that happens inside 
the brain. Enactivism, as articulated by Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandarian (2017), 
argues that we should conceive of complex organisms as sensorimotor agents, which 
are “forms of life that are constituted as self-sustaining, habitual organizations in the 
structural and functional interrelations between their acts, skills, and dispositions” (p. 
7). They follow the autopoietic tradition in distinguishing three cycles of operations 
that constitute the life of complex sensorimotor agents (Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 
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& Varela 2001). First, sensorimotor agents are in a constant state of regulation and 
construction of themselves. Second, sensorimotor agents maintain cycles of coupling 
with their environments. This coupling with the environment involves perceiving the 
surroundings in terms of potentials for interaction (affordances) and relevancy based 
on the self- maintenance of the organism.17 And, third, sensorimotor agents maintain 
cycles of intersubjective interactions, “involving the recognition of the intentional 
meaning of actions and linguistic communication” (Thompson & Varela 2001, p. 424). 
Di Paolo and colleagues (2017) refer to these cycles of operations as dimensions of 
embodiment, and claim that although they constitute autonomous domains of inquiry, 
each of these dimensions of embodiment is intimately related to the other two, being 
“mutually constraining and mutually enabling” (p. 5).  
 To make sense of our regular activities, enactivists introduce the notion of 
‘sensorimotor schemes.’ These are organized, task-related sensorimotor patterns of 
coordination that have been established as preferable due to the existence of some 
normative framework for evaluation (Di Paolo et al. 2017, p. 58). Consider, for 
example, the act of driving. The first thing you might do when you get in a car is to 
adjust your chair. To do this, you don’t measure the length of your legs but simply rely 
on your sense of comfort as you move the seat forward or back. Then, you may want 
to adjust the mirrors so that you are confident that you can see all that surrounds your 
car at any moment. After this, you fasten your seatbelt. All these individual actions 
involve specific sensorimotor patterns that become get intertwined as a whole 
sensorimotor scheme and become pre-reflective as you drive more frequently.  
 As we explained previously, the fulfillment of a P-intention can point to the 
fulfillment of a subsequent P-intention through exploitation of the distal aspects of 
present affordances. In enactivist terms, we would say that the enactment of a 
sensorimotor scheme, in interactive coupling with the environment, can engender or 
inhibit related schemes. If we put these accounts together, we get a fuller picture of 
how sensorimotor schemes (which involve interactions with affordances) can point to 
distal possibilities for action through the activation of related sensorimotor schemes, 
bringing forth “whole streams of virtual activity at the moment I enact a single 
particular scheme” (Di Paolo et al. 2017, p. 231). So, for instance, after getting the car 
                                                   
17 Di Paolo et al. (2017) break with ecological psychology, saying that Gibsonians conceive of cognition 
as a form of information processing (p. 227). We differ in our reading, and hold that though ecological 
psychology describes perception as information pick up, it explicitly rejects that this information is 
gathered, collected, manipulated, or stored. Information pick up is understood here as detection, where 
detection involves the active exploration of the environment by the agent (see Segundo-Ortin 2019).  
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adjusted for driving, a distant location may become a possibility that might not have 
been available to you on foot.  
But how can we account for D-intentions, which are pre-existing goals set up 
through a deliberate reflective process? We claim that the resources we need are found 
in the extensive enactivist treatment of language recently provided by Di Paolo, 
Cuffari, and De Jaegher (2018; see also Cuffari, Di Paolo, and De Jaegher 2015). If 
enactivists are on the right track that the three dimensions of embodiment are mutually 
constraining and enabling, then we need to understand the role that language plays in 
enabling and inhibiting sensorimotor schemes and in influencing changes in our field 
of relevant affordances.  
  For human forms of life, the development of language skills allows for special 
kinds of cooperation and coordination with others within the bounds of normative 
practices established by one’s community and within particular contexts (participation 
genres).7 In intersubjective engagements (such as a conversation), there is often a need 
to perform regulatory acts in order to relieve tensions and asymmetries with other 
participants. While developing the skills of navigating these tensions with others, we 
also develop the ability to self-direct regulatory acts, of which self- directed speech is 
a kind. For instance, I might remind myself that I have an appointment that I need to 
get to and end a lunch date with a friend, even though we are having a good time. I’m 
self- directing a regulatory speech act and coordinating my activity accordingly, in 
order to to relieve the tension involved having a pre-existing appointment (a distal 
goal, or D-intention). In giving their account of self-directed speech, Di Paolo et al. 
(2018) follow Vygotsky (2012) in pointing out the intertwining of the development of 
speech and thought, but they steer away from the idea that thought should be 
considered “inner” in any real sense. They specify that we should think of 
“incorporated speech rather than inner or internalized speech, since we do not think 
the partially nonovert character of self-directed utterances makes them at all less than 
proper acts of a world- situated agent” (2018, p. 224, emphasis original).18  
 Languaging, a term inherited from Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992), is a skill 
we develop in the intersubjective dimension of embodiment. And, as a dimension of 
                                                   
18 Rather than treating the individual as an isolated locus of cognitive phenomena, they point out that this 
Western view is, as they say, “an abstraction of concrete processual patterns” (ibid, p. 255). Instead, they 
hold that the processes that provide the conditions for the possibility of consideration of oneself as an 
“individual” are themselves “interpersonal constitutive relations enacted in and sustaining communities” 
(Di Paolo et al. 2018, p. 254).  
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embodiment, our linguistic agency constrains and enables our other dimensions of 
embodiment. Following Di Paolo et al. (2018), we propose that our self-directed 
utterances are an integral part of our acts of perception, affecting both the ways we 
are invited or solicited by affordances and how we coordinate with distal aspects of 
the environment. And as Cuffari et al. say of our use of linguistic skills, “we develop 
sensitivities to certain acts and strategies of coping, and we incorporate the coping 
practices until they become constitutive of our way of being in the world” (Cuffari et. 
al 2015, p. 1092). Again, when we get in the car, places that might otherwise not be 
reachable for time or distance constraints are now available to us. For example, we can 
now get that burrito we’ve been craving from the other side of town. The car changes 
the way in which we perceive what we can do in the environment, and what distal 
aspects the present affordances offer. However, self-directed speech can also serve a 
regulatory role when we remind ourselves that we need to run some important errands 
before we indulge in any distal burritos. This self-regulation—reminding myself of my 
D-intention to run those errands—makes some affordances more salient and 
influences what information I am looking for in the environment. In this way, language 
is inextricably bound up with our habits of engagement and interaction, action 
coordination, and perceptual processes.  
 What we propose is that an ecological-enactive account of distal engagement 
will benefit from a more developed understanding of the role of this self-directed 
aspect of linguistic agency as an integral part of our skilled intentionality. That is, it is 
a vital inclusion in the repertoire of skills involved in skilled intentionality. Given this, 
two items will need further explanation: the process of deliberation (the formation of 
D-intentions), and the coordination of actions toward the fulfillment of such D-
intentions.   
 First, the self-directed speech involved in the formation of D-intentions can be 
part of the regulatory process of evaluation and selection between different courses of 
action. It is very much a situated, nested process.19 Considering the regulatory roles 
that other-directed and self-directed utterances play in navigating tensions, we can also 
think of self-directed deliberation and evaluation as playing a regulatory role in regards 
to our sensorimotor habits. Through ongoing development of this recursive skill, we 
become able to regulate more complex, temporally distributed, or abstracted 
                                                   
19 Sensorimotor schemes and evaluation are given a dynamical systems explanation in Di Paolo et al. 
(2017), but we will not have room to provide the details of that account here.  
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intentional acts over time.20  
In terms of the ecological-enactive account, we could say that self-directed 
speech can be an aspect of the processes of attunement to law-like or conventional 
constraints between present and distal aspects of the environment. Van der Herik 
(2018) has made a similar point about how we should conceptualize communicative 
language acts, arguing that language is “a system of social actions that function by 
constraining unfolding cognitive and interactive dynamics. ... In line with the action-
oriented nature of cognition, language is reconceptualised as a mode of action” (p. 98).  
 Evaluating these distal aspects of the environment, we suggest, will often 
involve the self-directed regulatory aspects of language that we have described. 
However, there is no reason that this would be limited to present and distal aspects of 
the environment in a strict physical sense. That is, it could include interactions with 
social affordances, institutions, and collective practices (see Gallagher 2013, van Dijk 
and Rietveld 2017, Gallagher 2017 Ch. 3), accounting for the formation of more 
abstract D-intentions like those that have been mentioned above (saving for retirement 
or making more ethical choices).  
 With this in place, we can look at the issue of coordinating one’s activities 
toward the fulfillment of a D-intention. For this, we turn back to Pacherie (2015): 
 
“[I]f action control is an essential function of intentions, then we should stop 
thinking of intentions as simply mental representations of goals somehow 
triggering motor processes that, if everything goes well, will yield the desired 
outcome. Rather, we should think of monitoring and control processes as 
intrinsic to intentions, that is, of intentions as encompassing not just 
representations of goals but also a specific set of monitoring and control 
processes organizing and structuring the motor processes that themselves 
generate movements.” (p. 10) 
 
Action control indeed seems to be an essential function of intentions. However, we 
see no reason why we ought to think of these intentions, even D-intentions, as mental 
representations. Rather, this confuses the phenomenological aspects, or what we 
experience when we linguistically self-regulate, with the underlying monitoring and 
                                                   
20 This is similar to the ecological-enactive account of imagination, in which the agent is said to be 
coupled to something local that allows for imagining “in virtue of constraints in the form of life 
bring[ing] the agent in touch with some distal aspect of the environment” (Bruineberg et al. 2018).  
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control processes (involving the link between languaging and action evaluation and 
coordination). In other words, D-intentions, though involving language when made 
explicit, should be seen as “evidence of something humans are capable of doing, 
evidence of a type of activity, not in itself evidence that the processes underlying this 
activity are themselves representational” (Di Paolo et al. 2018, p. 220). We see no need 
to posit a D-intention as a mental representation guiding the monitoring and control 
processes; the D-intention simply is part of those regulatory processes over a period 
of time. The long-term coordination process is what we have called distal engagement.  
 Distal engagement, we claim, is then achieved by sustained coordination of 
sensorimotor schemes towards a goal through ongoing engagement with the 
environment, social affordances, institutions, normative frameworks, and the like. 
Similar to the point made in the last section, we think the problem with treating 
language as intrinsically representational stems from treating language skills as 
involving the products we are familiar with generating through language (statements, 
questions) rather than looking at the skill of creation itself (see van Dijk 2016 for a 
related discussion). From the fact that we can create language artifacts that may have 
a representational function (that can be used to represent in some context) it does not 
necessarily follow that the process by which these artifacts are created involve 
representations (a point also made in Zahnoun 2019). While we can succeed or fail in 
aiming at a specific outcome, this success and failure is not due to the fact that our 
intentions themselves have any veridicality beyond what we attribute to them in the 
course of certain linguistic practices. That is, we remain coupled with distal aspects of 
the environment that are relevant to and through which we are able to coordinate 
future actions, for “I’m no less embodied and coupled to the world when I plan my 
holidays than when I ride a bike; I’m simply doing different things with my body and 
my coupling” (Di Paolo et al. 2018).  
 We have here provided a sketch of distal engagement, accounting for how it is 
that a human agent might be able to formulate long term goals, or D-intentions, and 
coordinate their actions toward their fulfilment, using both the ecological and enactive 
frameworks. Further, we have done so without the need to posit representations. The 
coordination of actions over time in order to achieve a distal goal does not require 
representing the world but, instead, involves the continuous coordination of multiple 
sensorimotor schemes in regards to the affordances of the environment and their distal 
aspects. The enactive account of linguistic agency provides a non-representational way 
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of understanding how it is that we can form D-intentions and their role in distal 
engagement by means of self-directed regulatory processes that involve the 
intertwining of immediate with virtual or distal affordances, sensorimotor scheme 
selection, and monitoring and control processes. Thus, to say that our intentions 
influence affordance perception requires no positing of representational mental 
entities, regardless of whether the intention is formed through a deliberative process 
which serves a regulatory role over a series of actions or whether it is attributed to an 
intentional arc or process in reflection.  
  
5.6 Concluding Remarks  
 
 What we have proposed in this paper is the beginning of an ecological-enactive 
account of planning and distal engagement. We’ve argued that the intentions of an 
agent, or what they want to do in an environment, can shape affordance perception 
and salience. We’ve also shown that long-term planning or coordinating actions 
toward achieving distant goals does not necessarily need to involve the positing of 
representations. In doing so, we maintained that both the agent and the environment 
play important roles in the explanation of this capacity. In bringing language into the 
discussion of skilled intentionality, we keep in mind that languaging is not just for 
social purposes, but involves “reflexive and reflective negotiating with one’s self” 
(Cuffari et. al 2015, p. 1110), which is crucial when explaining the activities of human 
forms of life.  
 We have argued that such an account needs to take into consideration the 
integration of self-directed speech and other skills alongside the education of attention 
toward affordances within a socio-cultural community. Of course, there is far more 
fine-grained work to do to in expanding and refining such an account. Doing so could 
involve the integration of several different areas of research--those previously 
discussed, and possibly work on affordance space perception and decision-making 
(Brincker 2015), or studies linking language area activation and sensorimotor areas in 
action perception circuits (Pulvermüller 2018). One example of future research could 
be the ways that gender influences institutionally scaffolded goals and affordance 
saliency in regards to gender or other socio-cultural identities. For example. Yang and 
Barth (2015) have argued that the goals that certain occupations afford, and whether 
they fit into traditionally masculine or feminine categories (e.g, achieving communal 
goals vs. individual goals), shapes whether students view these occupations as 
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appealing. Examining this research through the framework of distal engagement 
enriches the way that we can look at the socialization and shaping of socialized 
interests and what they call goal affordances. 
 The advantage of the ecological-enactive framework provided above is that it 
prioritizes agent-environment coupling, and in doing so, does not posit agent nor 
environment as explanatorily privileged while staying true to both ecological and 
enactive frameworks. It also offers more resources for exploring other aspects of 
intention formation processes and affordance perception, such as the ways that social 
expectation and accountability can influence skill development across affordance 
scales. Specifically, we think an approach like this is important as a groundwork for 
further research on the ways that social identities, gender, race, ability status, sexual 
orientation, and political oppression can shape our languaging habits and affordance 
relevance and solicitation.21 
 
  
                                                   
21 The connections between social identities and the habituation of languaging, the perception and 
relevance of linguistic affordances (see Ayala 2016), and the ways in which we set and maintain our 
orientation towards long term goals could be explored in future research. The framework introduced in 
this chapter can also be used in tandem with the research done in chapter 4, where I look at the ways that 
affordances are perceived as possibilities for interaction will differ given the socio-cultural situation and 
habituation of the subject. Another possible linkage with my other work would be to use the distal 
engagement framework to explore the ways that epistemic goals are influenced by situatedness, and how 
this links to work that has already been done in standpoint theory.  
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Chapter 6 
Interpersonal Affordance Perception: Agency and Selfhood* 
 
 
Abstract:  
 
Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that 
differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? Conceptually, we could say that 
interpersonal affordances are different from environmental and other social 
affordances because they offer inter-agential interactions. In this paper, I argue that 
the enactive framework of participatory sense-making demonstrates that there is a 
difference in coupling that warrants a hard distinction between interpersonal and other 
affordances, where interpersonal affordances ought to be considered those that are 
afforded by agents and are recognized as such. I will explain why this distinction 
matters for a relational view of affordance perception because of the differences in 
coupling between agents and agent-environment. However, there is further nuance to 
this distinction for humans, because our social conventions establish persons as more 
than mere agents. Distinguishing between types of affordances is thus also one that 
matters politically: there are harms done when an agent is not seen as an agent, and 
there are harms done when an agent is not seen as a social self.  
                                                   
* A version of this paper is under review.  
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Chapter 6 
Interpersonal Affordance Perception: Agency and Selfhood  
6.1 Introduction  
 
Is there a difference between our perception of the environment and our 
perception of other agents? Drawing from James Gibson’s work (1979) on perception, 
contemporary enactivism and ecological psychology both use the theory of 
affordances, or perceived possibilities for interaction. Affordances are neither 
properties of the environment nor the agent, but are co-constituted in the agent-
environment relationship, given the agent’s values, abilities (Chemero 2003), and skills 
(van Dijk and Rietveld 2017) as the agent actively explores her world (Gibson 1979). 
Ecological psychology is largely built around the notion of affordances as the main 
objects of perception, while in enactivism affordances have played a more subsidiary 
and contentious role.  
Increasingly, enactivists are using the language of affordances in their 
explanatory frameworks (see e.g. Gallagher 2017, Di Paolo et al 2017). Enactivism and 
ecological psychology share a number of theoretical commitments, and many see them 
as kindred approaches to cognition. Both reject the received view of cognition as 
internal, computational, and representational. Both propose that we see cognition as 
an active process constituted in the relationship between organism and environment. 
Both argue that perception is intersubjectively developed (Gallagher 2008, De Jaegher 
et al. 2016), learned (E. Gibson 1963), and/or socially mediated (Heft 2007). These 
should be thought of as broad agreements in spirit, though, rather than precise 
overlaps—the approaches are sisters, not twins.  
 Given that the ecological approach relies on Gibson’s theory of direct 
perception (1972/2002), we should understand affordances not as inferred through 
our perception of the environment, but as directly perceived. We see an apple as edible, 
rather than post-perceptually inferring that it is edible, for example (Nanay 2011). 
Further, while apples can offer the possibility of sustenance, or afford being eaten, this 
might only be perceived as a relevant affordance if an agent is actively searching for 
something to eat; if I were looking for something to hold down a paper that was in 
danger of blowing away, an apple might afford the possibility of serving that purpose 
for me.  
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 The social contributions to affordance perception have been widely discussed 
and debated in the ecological psychology literature (e.g. Reed 1991, Costall 1995, 2012, 
Heft 2007). Other people, though, are not apples, and how we perceive the affordances 
offered by other agents is a much smaller subset of this literature. The contemporary 
hybrid theory of ecological-enactivism has offered some headway on how we might 
approach uniquely social affordances (Rietveld et al. 2017, Rietveld 2008), holding that 
social affordances offer possibilities for social interaction. However, ecological-
enactivists have also maintained that there is an equivalence between our perception 
of environmental affordances and social affordances (Rietveld et al. 2017, Rietveld et 
al. 2013). This work on social affordances has been valuable for explaining how we 
might both pre-reflectively experience and conscientiously shape our interactive 
spaces. Here, though, I propose that we need to maintain a fine-grained distinction 
between (environmental) affordances that offer opportunities for socializing, such as 
public spaces, and those offered by agents themselves—opportunities afforded by 
other agents, whether purposefully (offering a hug) or not (tapping someone’s 
shoulder to let them know they’ve dropped something).  
Given the role that intersubjectivity plays in the enactive framework, and the 
importance of joint sense-making in interaction (De Jaegher 2013a,b), maintaining 
such a distinction between agent-environment and agent-agent affordances is 
explanatorily relevant due to the differences in cognitive activities and types of 
coupling. The theory of direct perception has been taken up to provide an enactivist 
account of social cognition (Gallagher 2008), where it is argued that we directly 
perceive rather than infer the mental states of others. Drawing from this, I will argue 
that the defining features of interpersonal affordances would be that they are (1) 
offered by an agent, and (2) involve perceiving one as an agent.  
Importantly, this distinction is also politically relevant. For human forms of life, 
the mutual attribution of agency that happens in social interactions involves many 
layers. One of these, I argue, is that we see other humans as social selves (Kyselo 2014). 
Social selves are scaffolded by social convention and practice, and are developed in 
relation with others. Incorporating social and minimal selfhood, Michelle Maiese’s 
‘life-shaping’ thesis of selfhood (2019) offers a unifying enactive theory of self. I will 
use Maise’s conception of selfhood to show the political importance of perceiving 
agency and selfhood, and conversely, demonstrate the harm that can be done by 
refusing to recognize another as an agent or as a self. Maiese’s account is helpful for 
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discussing the ethical dimensions of affordances in interaction, and helps illustrate the 
damage that is done when someone is perceived as affording possibilities for 
interaction that deny agency, selfhood, or are not in line with who they are.  
 
6.2 Social Affordances 
   
 The social aspects of affordances have been detailed in ecological psychology, 
by those such as Heft (2007), who argues that the perception of affordances is in all 
ways social. That is, Heft argues that both the ontogeny and phylogeny of how we 
come to perceive affordances, for humans, is socially developed through niche 
construction and the influence of culture through the constructed ecological niche (see 
also: McGann 2014 on intersubjectivity, E. Gibson 1963 on perceptual learning, and 
Ramstead et al. 2016 on cultural affordances)22. The intersubjective development of 
affordance perception applies to both environmental affordances and the more limited 
conception of interpersonal affordances I will offer here.  
As Rietveld et al. define them, social affordances are “possibilities for social 
interaction or sociability provided by the environment” (2017, p. 300). They have been 
defined elsewhere even more broadly: 
 
“Social and communicative affordances that reflect the meaning of human 
activity for other humans (cf. McArthur & Baron, 1983; Reed, 1988). These 
include not only the affordances of symbolic behavior such as human 
conversation and writing (Dent, [1990]) but also the affordances of nonsymbolic 
activity such as facial expressions (Alley, 1988; Buck, 1988), gesture (Tomasello, 
1988; VanAcker & Valenti, 1989), body postures and movements (Runeson & 
Frykholm, 1983), tone of voice (Walker, 1982; Walker-Andrews, 1986), and the 
direction of gaze (orienting; Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Scaife & Bruner, 
1975) that provide information about the actor as well as about other aspects of 
the environment. The symbolic behaviors (language) are entirely conventional 
and culture-specific, whereas the nonsymbolic are only partly so.” (Loveland 
1991, p. 101) 
 
                                                   
22 Eleanor Gibson is often overlooked and under-cited in the literature on ecological psychology. 
Following the suggestion of Miguel Segundo-Ortin, I cite her as E. Gibson to bring more attention to her 
unique contributions.  
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Loveland’s conception incorporates a list of affordances that might be related to acts 
of socializing or communication. Loveland’s list is meant to be more limited than, for 
example, saying that affordances can be canonical, a term used by Costall (2012) to 
refer to the way that affordances can be specific to socio-cultural practices. That is, 
Costall uses this term to point out that some affordances are available only because 
those perceiving them have learned certain ways of engaging with the environment or 
certain meanings of items through social means. An example of this is a recycling bin. 
This only affords the recycling of an item if one has been raised in a social environment 
where recycling is a norm, or somehow otherwise knows about the social convention 
of recycling.  
Gallagher and Ransom (2016) use the term “social affordances” in an even more 
limited sense in discussing the social affordances provided by social media. As many 
of our social interactions do not take place in person, that a certain website or app 
affords sociability could mean many things. For example, an app can be used for 
facilitating meet-ups in the sense of one creating or responding to a social media event 
for an upcoming gathering or collective action. It could also mean facilitating direct 
exchange between agents in a virtual space, such as with a messaging app. This usage 
of the term is also becoming widespread in areas that study human-technology 
interaction and mediation, such as networking technology (e.g. Brandner 2001) and 
social robotics (e.g. Paauwe et al. 2015).  
Social affordances have also been discussed in some detail by ecological-
enactivists. The hybrid theory of ecological-enactivism (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2014) 
has brought together both the ecological and enactive approaches in their proposal of 
the Skilled Intentionality Framework, or SIF (van Dijk and Rietveld 2017). The SIF 
incorporates the “lived perspective of a skilled individual” as integral for 
understanding how it is that we perceive relevant affordances (van Dijk and Rietveld 
2017, p. 3). The development of the skills for being attuned to relevant affordances 
for the agent can be thought of as “multiple bodily states of action readinesss…. 
reciprocally coupled to the landscape of affordances, in the sense that these states of 
action readiness self-organize and shape the selective openness to the landscape of 
affordances” (van Dijk and Rietveld 2017, p. 8). Though we might think of skill in the 
sense of expertise, this includes any embodied or pre-reflexive skills or capacities for 
navigating the world. Skilled intentionality can be as simple as selectively perceiving a 
mug handle as graspable when one is heading to the coffee pot for a refill. Through 
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our skills and habits of coupling, we are selectively open to the relevant affordances of 
the environment for the task(s) we are undertaking.  
In their discussion of social affordances, Rietveld et al. (2017) offer a number 
of concrete suggestions for improving sociability in the sense of providing spaces 
where people from disparate backgrounds or with very different interests might be 
inclined to come together. Their suggestions include park planning and other 
architectural interventions to offer options for activities conducive to social 
interactions in public spaces. In this sense, sociability could also be afforded anywhere 
that people tend to have social interactions, such as coffee shops, parks, the grocery 
store check-out lane or even the sidewalk, though all of this would be heavily 
dependent on sociocultural norms and practices. 
Because sociability and social interaction are quite different, I think it’s 
important to distinguish these further. A possibility for sociability seems much more 
general than a possibility for social interaction, so I think we should take sociability to 
mean having others available for interaction in an interaction conducive space. Affording 
sociability would then be something offered by the environment, rather than others. 
This would be as a (non-necessary) pre-condition for a social interaction. Of course, 
generalities about social affordances, or sociability affordances more broadly, should 
be made cautiously. What one feels is an “interaction conducive space” would of 
course be dependent on culture, social position, and identity. There may be gender, 
race, neurodiversity, disability-related, or historical issues or dynamics that would 
influence whether spaces are perceived as hostile or uncomfortable for some and 
welcoming or comfortable for others (De Jaegher 2013a, b, Heras-Escribano 2019, 
Ch. 7, Jurgens, in press). Given that the focus of this paper will be on interpersonal 
affordances, I turn now to the enactivist framework to explain why that narrowing is 
explanatorily important.  
 
6.3 Enactive Autonomy and Interaction 
 
The enactivist notion of autonomy is based on the most fundamental of 
organismic processes: self-maintenance and self-production. These self-organizing 
processes form the foundation for the autopoietic approach to cognition (Maturana & 
Varela 1980). An organism must maintain itself and its boundaries through a network 
of biological processes while at the same time being selectively open to the world in 
order to take in from the environment what it needs to sustain its existence.  
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Summarizing Varela (1979), Thompson describes the autopoietic view as holding that 
processes constituting the autonomous organization of a system: “(i) recursively 
depend on each other for their generation and their realization as a network, (ii) 
constitute the system as a unity in whatever domain they exist, and (iii) determine a 
domain of possible interactions with the environment” (2007, p. 44). The autonomous 
system thus creates the conditions of its own persistence, and the capacities of the 
system establish the ways in which it can interact with the world.  
 Maintaining these processes requires that the system be open to the world in 
ways that enable the system to continue these maintenance processes. Being open to 
the world in ways that are appropriate for the organism is possible because, in addition 
to having the capacities to act, organisms are able to make sense of the world in some 
way. Sense-making (Varela 1991) involves an organism actively exploring a world 
through the perception of what might be helpful for maintaining organismic integrity 
and what can hinder or harm, and acting accordingly. Or, more concisely, it is “the 
creation and appreciation of meaning in interaction with the world” (De Jaegher 
2013b, p. 6). 
 In the autopoietic tradition of enactivism, an agent can be defined as “an 
autonomous system capable of adaptively regulating its coupling with the environment 
according to the norms established by its own viability conditions” (Di Paolo et al 
2017, p. 127). This is not to say that agency itself is attributable to the organism, as 
enactivism holds that cognition is a relational process rather than involving the internal 
processing of environmental information. Thus while we might call an organism an 
agent, agency itself would be the relational process of selectively attuning one’s actions 
in accordance with the environment. On the enactive account, then, “perhaps agency 
is not a property that belongs exclusively to a system but is a property of a relation 
between that system and its surroundings. And this relation is variable” (Di Paolo et 
al 2017, p. 110). The relational account of agency is variable in that there is an 
interactional asymmetry between the organism and the environment, and the 
relationship fluctuates given the organism’s needs and perhaps environmental 
demands. There can be a difference in the balance of agency in the agent-environment 
relationship given the particulars of a current circumstance. For instance, the balance 
of agency in the agent-environment relationship will be different when I’m looking in 
the fridge for a midnight snack versus when I’m fleeing a park due to a sudden 
lightning storm.  
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 While these provide a picture of the most minimal processes of life and 
cognition, these notions scale up to more complex behaviors and systems of 
organization. These also capture interpersonal and social dynamics through the theory 
of participatory sense-making, as introduced by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007). In 
participatory sense-making, we have the coupling of autonomous systems that, 
through that coupling, create an autonomous interaction that involves a precarious 
balance between participants in order to be maintained. De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
define participatory sense-making as “the coordination of intentional activity in 
interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are affected and new domains 
of social sense-making can be generated that were not available to each individual on 
her own” (2007, p. 497). The interaction is mutually co-constituted, co-regulated, and 
co-sustained by autonomous agents, who are recursively shaped within the interaction 
they are co-regulating.  
 Being able to be involved in processes of mutual creation of social meaning is 
important to self-production and maintenance within the intersubjective sphere. It is 
through these kinds of interactions that the normativity of social practices in the social 
niche are created, shaped, and changed. For human forms of life, maintaining 
autonomy involves more than organismic processes of self-production and 
maintenance in a purely bodily sense. De Jaegher and Di Paolo give a brief description 
of the criteria for establishing that an interaction is social, based on this interactive 
notion of emergent autonomy:  
 
“Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous 
agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it 
constitutes an emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational 
dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents 
involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced).” (2007, p. 
493) 
 
In participatory sense-making, preservation of the autonomy of the involved agents 
involves a mutual recognition of the agency of the other. This recognition is meant in 
an immediate fashion—it is not that one decides the other is an agent, but that they 
are already seen as an agent, or as “a subject, not an object” (McGann & De Jaegher 
2009, p. 428). It is a direct perception of the agency and subjectivity of the other.  
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The interaction process can and does involve asymmetries of autonomy in order 
to maintain itself. Agency is recognized, while autonomy fluctuates. This is because 
the interaction process also involves ebbs and flows of mutual regulation (Di Paolo et 
al. 2018). In an interaction, the regulating role of the processes of mutual sense-making 
should, ideally, flow back and forth between agents in order to co-constitute the 
interactive process. This will involve coordination in multiple dimensions. For 
instance, two people may be engaged in a conversation at a coffee shop. There will be 
bodily coordination in the sense that they pre-reflectively align their postures 
(Richardson et al. 2005) and they will perhaps be pre-reflectively balancing their 
emotional states in response to the other (Hatfield et al. 1993, Kiverstein 2015). Both 
participants may pre-reflectively compromise in order to attune to the comportment 
of the other. One may follow the other in leaning forward when exchanging a 
particularly juicy bit of gossip, or lean back when talking about how busy their 
workweek has been. One may have a long story to share, and there may be an 
asymmetry in regulating the flow of utterances in the interaction—one person is 
regulating through their continued utterances, while the other is regulated as listener, 
offering a chuckle or gasp at the appropriate times. While the regulator and regulated 
roles flow back and forth, neither party’s autonomy is ever harmfully compromised in 
this idealized example. Both are perceived by the other as autonomous agents within 
the interaction, both are involved in establishing the norms of that interaction, and 
regulatory roles can be seen as a matter of request, not force.  
There are many fairly innocuous reasons that an agent’s autonomy might be 
compromised in an interaction: we can imagine a caregiver giving a child a stern 
talking-to for misbehavior, for example. There are also ways in which sociocultural 
position, norms, and power dynamics can limit the speech affordances available in 
some interactions (Ayala 2016), which might be considered a compromise of 
autonomy and/or contributor to regulation role imbalance, depending on the 
situation. There are also more extreme imbalances in autonomy, in the case that one 
is not treated as a subject and as an agent, constituting a grievous devaluation or 
dehumanization, such as occurs in torture or warfare, where one is treated as non-
human (animalistic dehumanization) or as not possessing agency at all (mechanistic 
dehumanization) (Gallagher and Varga 2013, Haslam 2006).  
 Failures to recognize a person as an agent are not only something that happens 
in these extreme cases though. This frequently happens more subtly in everyday 
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interactions. This can be through failing to recognize one’s agency by perceiving one 
as an object or tool. Or this can include failing to recognize another’s social selfhood 
in interaction. In the following section, I’ll expand on an enactive notion of selfhood 
to provide a way of approaching how we might directly perceive social selves.  
 
6.4 Enactive Selfhood 
 
How we think of ourselves, or the reflective aspect of our selfhood, plays an 
important role in structuring our lived experience, how we see ourselves inhabiting 
our social world, and how we interact with others. For human forms of life, agency 
alone is often not going to be a robust enough notion to capture what it is we might 
want recognized in social interactions. However, the approach to agency provided on 
the enactive account offers more than this—there are several domains of agency that 
enable and constrain each other through their overlap of processes and sensorimotor 
schemes, such as organismic agency (discussed in section 3), sensorimotor agency (Di 
Paolo et al. 2017), and linguistic agency (Cuffari et al. 2015, Di Paolo et al. 2018). The 
complexity of these latter kinds of agency, their intersubjective development, and their 
ubiquity in our social niche enables the formation of what Kyselo (2014) has called the 
social self.  
  In detailing her proposed method for individuating social selves, Kyselo states 
that “cognitive identity of the autonomous system cannot only be grasped from a 
third-person, operational definition of the processes involved in its individuation; 
instead, it requires a view from which the world is encountered and interactions are 
evaluated by the system itself.” (2015, p. 5). I take this to imply that a unifying theory of 
self, as might be used in the sciences, should be able to accommodate cultural and 
social differences in the understanding of the self for the agent. This is important, as 
the aspects of selfhood relevant to a diverse group of persons themselves ought to be 
providing guidance in establishing the phenomenon of interest, as well as providing 
crucial political and ethical considerations to how we approach the science of selfhood.  
Further, Kyselo argues that the social self is “never fully separable from the 
social environment, but instead determined precisely in terms of the types of social 
interactions and relations of which it is, at the same time, a part” (2014, p. 12). This is 
similar to the way the self is said to be involved in participatory sense-making.  To 
think of how the social self is determined in social interactions, we can consider the 
recursivity in participatory sense-making, where the autonomous agents both shape 
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and are shaped by their social interaction. McGann and De Jaegher say of this process 
that “[c]ulture transforms our body from a physical mode of cognition, action, and 
perception to a social one where action can be shared, values coordinated. It is a 
dramatic alchemy that occurs through participatory sense-making and the 
acknowledgement of the agency of another. The implications of this fact for the 
enactive approach cannot be overstressed.” (2009, p. 433).  
Indeed, having a theory of social selfhood that can accommodate how we want 
to be treated in interaction is one way of taking up these implications. This is not 
exactly the aim of Kyselo’s project, though further elaboration is helpful. Kyselo 
(2014) argues that we need a unifying theory of self that can be used to guide work in 
the cognitive sciences. As it stands, the conception or definition of self varies in 
different areas of research, affecting study and treatment. Given this, she claims that 
“we still need a notion of the self as a whole, something that can count as a 
distinguishable unit of explanation and eventually help to interrelate different aspects 
of the self” (2015, p. 2). 
Kyselo (2014) argues that we need a meta-theory of self to guide research 
(methodological), which she argues is not provided by earlier enactive theories of self, 
such as Gallagher’s pattern theory (2013). Gallagher’s pattern theory of self offers a 
list of characteristics of the self that we might use to guide research given the kind of 
phenomena we are looking to investigate. But, as Kyselo points out, the “pattern 
approach to the self acknowledges diversity but lacks integration, offering no account 
of the individual as explanatory whole. Once the diversity of self related phenomena 
is acknowledged, we also need to understand how the elements of a collection of 
relevant self features interrelate” (Kyselo 2014, p. 1). In other words, she wants the 
methodological notion to provide or correlate with the grounds for individuation.  
Gallagher’s pattern theory of self is not intended to be a unifying theory of 
selfhood, so it does not provide an explanation for individuation. I think it is more 
appropriate to treat the pattern theory of self as a descriptive rather than prescriptive 
consideration of how self is and can be used in the sciences, given Gallagher’s 
commitments to a non-reductive naturalism and his rejection of inter-theoretic 
reduction (Gallagher 2018). Gallagher’s position seems to map onto a methodological 
approach that is in line with enactivism, and a non-reductive naturalistic approach to 
cognition more generally, with “an insistence on a dynamical, multidimensional 
existence that requires a multidisciplinary approach that necessarily discounts every 
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single discipline for the sake of the many; where neither neuroscience, nor psychology, 
nor phenomenology, nor anthropology, nor economics, nor any one of the cognitive 
arts and sciences gets the final say because existence is never just one thing” (Gallagher 
2018, p. 135). And like existence, selfhood, especially in a more robust reflective or 
narrative sense (Schechtman 2011), is not any one thing. In specifying what might 
unify the self in order to provide a point of orientation for research, it is important to 
consider how any one conception would treat the myriad of socioculturally situated 
folk psychologies of self, as the sense of self of importance to a person in thinking 
about their individuation and coherence over time. 
Gallagher’s pattern theory of self is intended to accommodate the 
interdisciplinarity of the cognitive sciences and their varying research methods. 
However, without positing any coherence relations or specifying the individuation or 
persistence conditions of selfhood, we don’t have the kind of unifying theory of 
selfhood Kyselo is after. 
 
6.4.1 Embodied Selfhood and the Life-Shaping Thesis 
 
Kyselo’s answer to the problem of unification distinguishes between two 
possible answers cognitive scientists might give in trying to locate the self. The first is 
the idea that what individuates the self is the living body, which entails that the social 
is non-constitutive of the self. She calls this the social as contextual claim, which she 
rejects. The second is to individuate the self as a coherent unity according to the social 
dimension. She calls this the social as constitutive claim, which she backs.  
In response to this, Maiese draws on the enactive approach in providing a ‘life-
shaping thesis’ of selfhood. While Kyselo claims (2015) that the self is individuated via 
the social world, rather than via the body, Maiese bases selfhood in the autonomous 
organization of a system, which requires that an organism individuates itself as a closed 
network of systems of self-maintenance. She holds that the individuated self “is fully 
embodied, and that the various dimensions of mindedness—that is to say, our desires, 
feelings, emotions, sense perceptions, memories, thoughts, intentional actions, etc.—
are all partially determined, or shaped, by the social world” (2019, p. 364). For humans, 
the intersubjective scale of agency involves individuating oneself in the social realm, 
but this is scaffolded by the ongoing bodily processes by which we are able to maintain 
our individuation over time. So while the self is shaped by the social, this does not root 
the persistence conditions of the self in the social. Rather, the social would be one 
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domain of embodiment of the organismically individuated self, which would enable 
and constrain other dimensions of embodiment.  
 Maiese’s proposal of the life-shaping thesis (2019) shows that the enactivist 
account doesn’t make us choose between the self of cognitive science and the social 
self. The enactive account holds that cognition is constituted by a number of nested 
processes involving body, brain, and world—and for human other social forms of life, 
shaped intersubjectively. The project of deciding between social as contextual or 
constituting of the self is perhaps a bit misguided in terms of metaphysical 
presuppositions, as a non-reductive, process-oriented account such as enactivism, one 
which promotes dynamical over mechanistic explanations, would not look to make 
sense of the self in terms of a context/constitution dichotomy. To illustrate, let’s look 
at what Maiese says about the role of individuation: 
 
“This distinction between components that constitute the living system and 
elements that form its environment grounds not only biological identity, but 
also the identity of the self. Indeed, just as a living system should be individuated 
according to this form or organization, the self (or what might described as the 
human mode of life) should be individuated according to its characteristic form or 
organization, rather than the energetic or relational material that ensures its 
continued existence.” (2019, p. 364, emphasis added)  
 
Maiese seems to ground both individuation and persistence in the autonomous 
processes of living systems, in line with the autopoietic notions of individuation 
through self-maintenance and self-production. The life-shaping thesis holds that the 
social is not constitutive of the self, but that the self is embedded in the social. The self, 
she argues, is influenced and shaped by the social in the sense that the social has a 
causal influence, is reciprocally shaped by us through our responses or contributions 
to the social, and normative. It is normative in both the sense that the social shapes 
our internal norms through enabling or constraining our embodied processes, but also 
in the contributory sense of taking part in participatory sense-making and practices 
that can reinforce, shape, or transform social norms. Social normativity is thus 
recursive.  
 Grounding the self in this way is important for three reasons: (i) this notion of 
self is more accommodating in terms of understanding varying sociocultural 
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conceptions of selfhood and embeddedness, (ii) it does not allow for full 
determination of the self in the social, thus maintaining what I might call an agential 
core to the self, and (iii) it can be productively integrated with the enactive theories of 
participatory sense-making and direct perception in interaction. The self engages in 
social interactions in which it can be shaped or influenced, but it is not fully determined 
within the sphere of these acts, thus fundamentally preserving the autonomy of the 
embodied agent. As Maiese says: 
 
“…indeed, participatory sense-making presupposes and requires bodily-
organismic ‘selves’ who can partake in the interaction process. Moreover, for 
each of these ‘selves’ to remain an autonomous interactor, it must be possible 
(even if unlikely) for her to defy social expectations, or even disengage from the 
social interaction if she feels so inclined.” (2019, p. 363) 
 
It is also important to note that by being accommodating to varying socioculturally 
situated notions of self, this doesn’t necessarily mean that individuals have a self in the 
narrative or reflective sense. In other words, I believe we can take Maiese’s notion of 
selfhood as not implying that the social presentation of self is unified apart from the 
embodied sense. There is a lot of literature in feminist and critical race theory on 
multiplicitous selves and identities, given the numerous communities that one may 
navigate in their social terrain (e.g. Ortega 2001, Anzaldua 1987, Barvosa 2008). In 
fact, in this work, it is oftentimes embodied persistence through multiple social worlds, 
or the phenomenological mine-ness of experience given through embodied persistence 
and subjectivity, that offers individuation or persistence conditions through which the 
agent is able to enact numerous selves in the social sphere. Locating the individuation 
and persistence of selfhood in the “self-organizing” of autonomous systems opens up 
room for an enactive approach to how it is that selves can manifest in different ways, 
depending on particularities of context, social roles and cultural knowledge, power 
dynamics, marginalization and oppression, and other aspects the shape the social 
situatedness of an agent. 
 
6.5 Interpersonal Affordances between Agents and Selves 
 
The notion of selfhood proposed by Maiese (2019) captures the root of what is 
important in developing an account of how it is that we directly perceive and selectively 
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respond to interpersonal affordances. On her account, the social self is an aspect of 
the embedded embodied self, and the persistence conditions of selfhood, while socially 
embedded, are maintained by the embodied processes of organization rather than 
being fully socially determined. The subject directly perceived in participatory sense-
making is an embodied subject embedded in the social. Further, the account makes no 
general claims about what social selfhood is, and can be sensitive to the many ways 
that sociocultural norms, practices, and neurodiversity can influence self-perception 
and experience.  
I’ll turn back now to the perception of agency and selfhood in the social sphere 
by way of interpersonal affordances. As discussed in section 2, we should take 
interpersonal affordances to mean actual possibilities for interaction with an agent. An 
interpersonal affordance is not perceived in the agent-environment relationship, but is 
afforded by another agent (whether intentionally or not). Interpersonal affordances are 
not necessarily part of an interaction, but they can afford an interaction. For example, 
let’s say I’m walking down the street and I see a friend, who is engaged in a 
conversation with someone else. We could say that I perceive them as affording a 
social interaction, though they haven’t actually seen me yet. Conversely, in 
participatory sense-making, both agents are actively affording possibilities for 
interaction through their ongoing utterances, gestures, bodily and emotional 
coordination, and so on. In both cases, the perception of interpersonal affordances is 
not a product of the agent-environment relationship, but the agent-agent relationship, 
and involves seeing the other as a subject. This requires some further discussion.  
 
6.5.1 Direct Perception in Social Cognition  
 
First, though, in the terms of the social cognition literature, interpersonal 
affordances should not be taken to imply a Theory of Mind, which is an inference 
about or simulation of the mental state of the other. A Theory of Mind is built on the 
idea that we are at a remove from the mental state of the other in social interactions, 
and use simulation (implicit mental simulation, e.g. Goldman & Sripada 2005, or 
mirror neuron systems, e.g. Gallese 2005) or inference (e.g. some kind of implicit or 
explicit theory about others’ minds, e.g. Gopnick & Wellman 1992) to explain how we 
as spectators (Schilbach et al. 2013) come to know the other’s mental state (their 
intentions, emotions, etc). Rather, perceiving an interpersonal affordance should be 
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thought of as phenomenologically immediate, as with Gibson’s theory of the direct 
perception of affordances (1979).  
Direct perception is the basis of the theory of social cognition proposed by 
Gallagher (2008). It might be helpful to draw a similarity between Gallagher’s direct 
perception theory and how we ought to understand interpersonal affordances. This 
enactivist conception of direct perception is built on the idea that cognition is 
fundamentally embodied and action-oriented. As such, it is not the case that cognition 
is locked away inside the mind of the other. In direct perception, we see goal-oriented 
actions as such, with no need for inference. Explained by Gallagher and Varga (2013): 
 
“According to [interaction theory] and the direct perception hypothesis, social 
perception is enactive. That is, my perception of your action is already formed 
in terms of how I might respond to your action. I see your action, not as a fact 
that needs to be interpreted in terms of your mental states, but as a situated 
opportunity or affordance for my own action in response. The intentions that I 
can see in your movements appear to me as logically or semantically continuous 
with my own, or discontinuous, in support or in opposition to my task, as 
encouraging or discouraging, as having potential for (further) interaction or as 
something I want to turn and walk away from” (p. 189). 
 
Having moved away from the input-model of perception, there is no need for an 
inference or for simulation in order to see a motion of a hand towards a cup as reaching 
for the cup. Likewise, we see a friend as excited without need for inference or attribution 
(Varga 2020). Reflexively, we might make this attribution, but in most cases this is 
because that is how we perceived the action. And while we might sometimes use an 
inferential process to try to figure out what someone is doing or feeling, this is when 
something is complex or confusing. It is the exception, not the rule. 
 
6.5.2 Direct Perception of Interpersonal Affordances 
 
Interpersonal affordances are also directly perceived: “The sight of a sad friend 
affords consoling him or her, a colleague at the coffee machine solicits small talk, and 
an extended hand immediately prepares the body for shaking it” (Rietveld et al. 2013, 
p. 436). It is crucial to note that in this example, the perception-as and the action-readiness 
are intertwined. It is also important to note that perceiving-as is not static, especially 
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in the case of other agents, as has been pointed out by Fiebich (2014). Fiebich makes 
the point that interpersonal affordances are “perceived within interactive reciprocal 
processes” (2014, p.1) where the perceived agent is engaged in their own ongoing 
action processes. A similar point is also made by McGann: “There is also no particular 
moment in time at which perceiving is “complete” because such perception always 
occurs in the flow of on-going behavior – activity does not have to wait for it.” (2014, 
p. 26) Therefore, a continuous interaction would offer a continuous stream of 
changing interpersonal affordances (and engagement with these affordances changes 
the process of interaction).  
The participatory sense-making account provided in section 3 makes it clear that 
these reciprocal processes often happen within an autonomous interaction, where the 
interactors are involved in a shared, co-regulated (and co-regulating) domain of sense-
making. Taking this into account, perceiving what is afforded by the other agent can 
also be influenced by the perceiver’s desire to maintain the interactive coupling. The 
perception of relevant interpersonal affordances by each individual agent will involve 
more than the concerns of their own self-maintenance—they include concerns about 
the maintenance of the autonomous interaction as well. Or, perhaps, the relevance of 
affordances will be influenced by an agent’s desire to leave the interaction (so they may 
begin glancing around the room, looking at their phone, or become slow to respond 
to the interpersonal affordances the other agent is offering).  
 As argued above, participatory sense-making requires seeing another as a 
subject. In other words, maintenance of an autonomous interaction, or agent-agent 
coupling, already presumes agency.   
Previous discussions of interpersonal affordances don’t specify this 
requirement. That is, I’m not sure it has been made explicitly clear that perceiving an 
interpersonal affordance involves experiencing “the other as a subject,” as Schilbach 
et al. (2013, p. 395) say of direct perception in social cognition.    
Consider that affordances are possibilities for action (or interaction). Rietveld et 
al. (2013, 2017) want to avoid a hard distinction between the perception of social and 
environmental affordances by appealing to the similarities in how we perceive them as 
embodied agents. Pointing to the Skilled Intentionality Framework, they note that the 
skill of picking out relevant affordances generates ‘readiness of the affordance-related 
ability’ (Rietveld 2008). Whether a relevant affordance is environmental or social, 
“starting from bodily or skilled intentionality, our perspective avoids an artificial 
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separation between social cognition and nonsocial engagements with the 
environment” (Rietveld et al. 2013).   
 This is unproblematic if we are talking about the difference between 
environmental and social (in the sense of sociability) affordances. However, if we are 
talking about interpersonal affordances, those afforded by or in interaction with others, the 
lack of distinction becomes an issue. First, interpersonal affordances are not given in 
the relationship between an agent and an environment, but in the relationship between 
agents. De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007 argue that these are different types of coupling 
(see also De Jaegher et al. 2010). The divide between environmental affordances and 
interpersonal affordances is not artificial—in the first case, you have a mere coupling, 
and in the latter case, there is a mutually regulated coupling: 
 
“Thus, social interaction has two characteristics: (1) there is a coupling, which 
is regulated so as to generate and maintain an identity in the relational domain. 
Thus, the resulting relational dynamics are autonomous in the strict sense of 
precarious operational closure … and define events and processes as either 
internal or external to the interaction. And (2) the individuals involved are and 
remain autonomous as interactors.” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007, p. 493) 
  
I would argue that the skill of being attuned to relevant affordances should also include 
a sensitivity to the possibility that one can engage in a social interaction. This would 
often involve directly perceiving one as an agent able to enter into an autonomous 
interaction, due to the intertwining of perceiving-as and action-readiness. It might be 
relevant that one is a specific agent (when one has an appointment to meet with a 
friend), or it might be relevant that one is an adult agent more generally (if I’m on the 
street looking for someone to speak with so I can ask for directions), but nonetheless, 
I am searching for an agent, and the perception of agency is intertwined with my 
readiness to respond to a perceived interpersonal affordance.  
This leads to the second issue, which is more political in nature and in line with 
the ethical dimension of the Gibsonian perspective of affordance perception: “The 
meaning or value of a thing consists of what it affords. What a thing is and what it 
means are not separate, the former being physical and the latter mental as we are 
accustomed to believe” (Gibson 1982, p. 407). If we apply this to interpersonal 
affordances, we can consider how being seen as an autonomous agent capable of 
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entering into a participatory sense-making process would be a valuation of our 
contributions to that shared domain of sense-making. Thus, while it does not matter 
to a chair whether or not it affords sit-ability to a person23, it can matter immensely 
whether a person is viewed as candidate for shared meaning-creation. While there are 
plenty of reasons one might not want to engage in an interaction with another agent, 
some of these reasons have to do with a devaluation of one’s agency or autonomy due 
to power dynamics, biases, stereotypes, or a number of other reasons having to do 
with social status.  
On the farther end of compromises of agency in interaction, we can think of 
objectification. To be objectified is to have one’s agency and autonomy denied 
(Nussbaum 1995, Langston 2009).24 A common example of this phenomenon would 
be catcalling or other forms of street harassment. In these cases, women (mostly) are 
treated as though they afford comments about their appearance, being groped or 
grabbed, ogled, and so on without consent. It is often appropriate to objectify the local 
environment as affording something for you, within reason and given prevailing 
norms. It is not appropriate to perceive an agent as offering something for you in the 
same way, if it constitutes a devaluation of the person.25 And, as I’ve shown above, to 
objectify someone this way also forecloses opportunities for entering into meaningful 
interactions.   
However, we also need to take into account that, as previously discussed, 
interactions do not just take place between ahistorical agents. I have argued that 
participatory sense-making involves the coupling of selves in the interaction process. 
This means that there is a recognition not just of an embodied agent in the course of 
interaction, but also a socially embedded agent—an agent that has a way (or ways) of 
being in the world with others that pre-exists and continues on after the interaction. I 
hold that social selfhood, in this sense, and grounded in the embodied self as discussed 
by Maiese (2019), is directly perceived rather than reflectively attributed or inferred. 
While this is not always the case for every interaction, I think this is an important 
aspect of participatory sense-making. Seeing the participant as an embodied, socially 
                                                   
23 Naomi Beecroft (in discussion) has used this example to discuss the ways that class influences 
affordance perception. 
24 There are certainly exceptions to this, as not all acts of objectification are against an agent’s will. To 
consent to objectification and be objectified would involve being seen as an agent in order to provide that 
consent (e.g. BDSM).  
25 This would not apply in cases such as stopping someone on the street to ask the time, as this is a request 
for assistance, not a denial of agency. 
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embedded self allows for the coordination of expectations about shared meanings that 
structure the interactive space. And in creating a shared domain of sense-making, there 
are opportunities for creating and shaping meaning for the social self that extend 
beyond the interaction itself.  
In contrast, one who is denied aspects of their selfhood is subject to a 
compromise in that individual’s autonomy in participatory sense-making. An example 
of this would be engaging in an interaction with a person but consistently not using 
their pronouns. To do so is to perceive one as a social self, with an autonomous 
identity, and then purposefully undermine that very sense of self. Insisting on denying 
someone’s selfhood in interaction in this way denies full entry into participatory sense-
making, as it is a forced regulation of autonomy. This kind of harm, as a denial of 
selfhood and agential identity (Dembroff 2019, Barnes 2019), limits an agent’s ability 
to participate in the co-creation of meaning (De Jaegher et al. 2016) in a social 
interaction, amongst causing or perpetuating many other harms.  
While there’s clearly more to discuss in regards to the perception and denial of 
agency and selfhood, my intention in this paper was to demonstrate that the direct 
perception of interpersonal affordances involves the perception of agency. I have also 
argued that in many forms of interaction, including participatory sense-making, it will 
also involve seeing the other as a self. While I have not integrated nor provided 
arguments for the integration of ecological psychology or enactivism, I hope that I 
have given some indication that further integration in exploring the issues of agency 
and selfhood in interaction would be fruitful. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
As enactivism and ecological-enactivism progress in explaining complex human 
realms of being, they grow increasingly concerned with social normativity and social 
institutions. For example, De Jaegher (2013) has looked at how patriarchal and 
democratic institutions can be understood through the enactive approach to 
intersubjectivity. Michelle Maiese and Robert Hanna (2019) have offered concrete 
suggestions for transforming our political and social institutions using insights from 
enactivism and ecological psychology. And Rietveld et al. (2017) have brought 
attention to the important challenge of adapting insights from enactive and embodied 
cognition into resources for increasing social cohesion and inclusivity. 
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In this paper, I’ve argued that recognition of selfhood and maintaining a 
distinction between environmental affordances and interpersonal affordances are 
important for these projects. On one hand, this is explanatorily important due to the 
different kinds of coupling involved. On the other hand, this distinction is important 
for theorizing about the ethical and political aspects of affordances. To say that 
perception of affordances is the same, whether environmental or social, generalizes 
away from the concrete realities of experience and selfhood in interaction.  
Both the positive and negative aspects of affordance solicitation imply that we 
view an agent as an agent. However, there are also cases where one is directly perceived 
as affording a possibility for interaction which denies their agency or selfhood. Using 
the enactive theory of participatory sense-making, I have shown that this is a denial of 
autonomy and can limit one’s ability to enter into acts of meaning co-creation.  
 If we are looking for ways to increase social cohesion “understood as the co-
existence of disparities, not the elimination of particular backgrounds” (Rietveld et al. 
2017, p. 303), as Rietveld et al. have argued we can do through environmental 
interventions, we also need to understand the concrete particularities of bringing 
people together in social spaces. The goal of social cohesion “is only possible when 
individuals from different groups make a shared effort in achieving a common goal 
and, moreover, for which these groups have to be dependent on each other for 
reaching this goal” (Rietveld et al. 2017, p. 307). Evaluating the ways in which our 
social institutions and practices can be transformed also must involve actively building 
resources for examining and understanding how our habits and actions contribute to 
devaluation and other harms to other agents.  
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Chapter 7 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
 
This thesis has offered a number of contributions in the field of feminist 
philosophy of e-cognition, all organized around the goal of articulating the influence 
of gender in cognition without basing that influence purely in the social sphere or by 
reducing it to on object of neurological investigation. By using the enactivist 
framework, these works have examined how a shift in our approach to naturalism can 
integrate first-person and third-person perspectives in the cognitive sciences. In doing 
this work, I have centralized the importance of agency and experience in discussing 
social norms and the habits of interaction by which those norms permeate our 
embodied ways of being, while also shaping, reinforcing, or transforming those norms 
through our interactions. And I have shown that we can have non-essentialist ways of 
talking about gender, cognition, and embodiment that forefront the roles of gender 
identity and agency.  
In the second chapter, “Naturalizing Situatedness”, I offered an argument 
against using the computational framework for understanding situatedness. I discussed 
how naturalism has guided or provided theoretical underpinnings for previous 
research on situatedness and pointed to the enactivist framework as an alternative that 
doesn’t encounter the same metaphysical and political conundrums as a reductive 
approach. Picking up on these themes in the third chapter, “Epistemic Agency in 
Practice: Languaging, Knowing, and Epistemic Diversity”, I looked at how the 
enactivist conception of languaging can connect with work in critical social 
epistemology. I argued that an enactivist epistemology ought to start from our 
epistemic practices rather than trying to map onto analytic epistemology, which is itself 
a socioculturally situated epistemic practice. My intention in these chapters was to clear 
the ground for some new ways of thinking about epistemic diversity, which could be 
explored in further work.  
 The fourth chapter, “Gender and the Senses of Agency”, connects the narrative 
and minimal senses of agency in order to illustrate the dynamics between these 
domains of cognition. I argue that the influence of gender permeates the narrative and 
the minimal senses of agency, and demonstrate how these scaffold and constrain each 
other. In shaping our immediate, or pre-reflective, experience of the world, I argue 
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that we ought to look more at how gender and social norms more broadly might shape 
affordance salience.  
 Drawing on this same research, I argue in the fifth chapter, “Distal Engagement: 
Intentions in Perception” that coordinating our actions towards achieving a goal, or 
having an intention, ought to be thought of as a particular kind of skill. However, 
rather than positing representations to account for how we manage to do so, I use the 
enactive account of languaging to show that the involvement of language, even self-
directed language, does not require a representational explanation. As affordance 
perception is an active process, I also argue that exercising this skill influences 
affordance salience. Given what I’ve argued in the previous chapter, I think there is 
potential for future research on how intentions and affordance salience are influenced 
by social norms, linguistic practices, and linguistic resources (or epistemic resources, 
as discussed in chapter three).  
 The sixth chapter, “Interpersonal Affordance Perception: Agency and 
Selfhood” offers an argument for maintaining a distinction between environmental, 
social, and interpersonal affordances. I use the theory of participatory sense-making 
and the theory of direct perception to argue that maintaining a distinction between the 
perception of environmental affordances and interpersonal affordances is 
explanatorily valuable, as these involve different types of coupling, and politically 
valuable, as not seeing someone as an agent or as a self is a serious harm. This work is 
intended to set up future research specifying the types of specific harms that can be 
done in interactions (to agents and to the community more broadly) by denying aspects 
of selfhood or agency altogether, by connecting with work in critical race theory and 
trans theory.   
The significance of this work can be viewed in a number of ways: as epistemic, 
political, integrative, and resource building. By integrating work in the fields of e-
cognition, feminist philosophy of science, feminist epistemology, and feminist 
phenomenology, we increase the number of perspectives and epistemic resources 
available for investigating the influence of social differences and disparities in our lived 
experience.  
Through using the feminist lens in doing enactivist research, we also discover 
or expose issues that come from trying to generalize from dominant perspectives. 
Treatment of cognitive processes or bodies as neutral is inappropriate for human 
forms of life, especially on a framework that stresses the interdependence of our 
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dimensions of embodiment. Gender, race, and our other lived identities should not be 
treated as additive to a neutral body, and discussions of social situatedness should not 
be reserved for discussions of our most sophisticated cognitive processes. Our 
intersubjective starting point needs to adequately reflect the social world most of us 
are born into: hierarchical, oppressive, patriarchal, and intolerant.  
In many ways, I intended for this thesis to clear ground, and I feel that it has 
done that. My hope is that this work has made connections that will be valuable for 
future research in understanding how it is that gender influences cognition, in a way 
that can be gender affirming while also conscious of ongoing oppressions.  
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